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Preface 
 
  
The many Things that Things Afford (or Freedoms and Constraints) 
Free to dive between barriers 
(Musée des Civilisations d’Europe et de Méditerranée (Marseille, Julia Molinari, 2016) 
iv 
This thesis is my freedom and invitation to dive between barriers. 
 
 
 
Rooted in a critical learning incident which took place in the academic year 
1989/1990, my first year as an undergraduate at the University of St 
Andrews, my PhD is a promissory note to nurture understanding, respect 
and space for diverse literacies.  
I entered university as a promising multilingual and multidisciplinary high 
achiever, whose European Baccalaureate grades had been exemplary. That 
first undergraduate year ruined everything. My grades nose-dived, dragging 
my confidence in tow. The new demands of monolingual and 
monodisciplinary writing, and the threshold concepts they required, were 
so disorientating that I very nearly dropped out. I didn’t, but I was painfully 
alerted to the porous, permeable, fragile reality of being: just as human 
identities are multiple, often crashing against entrenched gate-keeping 
binaries that demand they be ‘one or the other’, so too are academic 
writings.  
Yes, there are barriers to who we can be and how we can write, but so too 
are there freedoms. 
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Abstract 
  
…exploring the 
boundaries of 
‘academicness’ 
Is Twitter academic? 
In April 1995, my article was 
accepted for publication in 
‘Social Text’; precisely a year 
later it appeared in print. I 
revealed the hoax a few weeks 
later (Sokal, 2008, p. xiii)  
 
…providing an 
account of what 
makes a text 
‘academic’ 
Was the early Wittgenstein 
academic? 
The publishers Springer and IEEE 
are removing more than 120 
papers from their subscription 
services after a French researcher 
discovered that the works were 
computer-generated (Noorden, 
2014) 
 
Is the IELTS exam academic? 
 
vi 
This thesis contextualises academic writing in EAP (English for Academic 
Purposes) and subjects it to an interdisciplinary (educational and 
philosophical) analysis in order to argue that what makes writing academic 
are its socio-academic practices and values, not its conventional forms. In 
rejecting dominant discourses that frame academic writing as a transferable 
skill which can be reduced to conventional forms, I show that academic 
writings are varied and evolve alongside changing writer agencies and 
textual environments. This accounts for the emergence of a diverse 
academic writing landscape that enacts diverse socio-academic practices 
and that does not reduce writing to predictable static surface features. My 
methodology resists traditional disciplinary classifications and is in line 
with the reflective and interpretative approaches associated with the 
humanities. Rather than ‘filling a gap’ in academic writing research, I 
challenge writing conventions in EAP by questioning assumptions. This is 
because EAP is influential in shaping discourses about academic writing 
and, as such, it must not mislead students and practitioners about the 
evolving purposes, forms and possibilities for academic expression. The 
thesis is divided into three parts, each containing two chapters. Part 1 is 
concerned with explaining what academic writing is in EAP and how EAP 
can misrepresent it. Part 2 delves into the history of writing and literacy to 
tease out the ideologies shaping writing practices. Part 3 proposes a model 
based on philosophical theories of mind and sociology that lays the 
foundation for a macro theory of academic writing and a future writing 
pedagogy. The model re-imagines academic writing as an affordance within 
a non-linear, emergent and complex social open system. This system can be 
referred to as an organic unity and requires a shift from conceiving writing 
as a ‘transferable skill’. When re-imagined as an affordance, change and 
diversity in academic writing practices become possible. 
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Framing the research 
Preliminaries 
 
what is seen as ‘academic’ writing is contestable and always emergent (A. Archer 
& Breuer, 2016a, p. 2). 
 
This thesis contextualises academic writing in my area of professional 
expertise, EAP (English for Academic Purposes, which I outline below), and 
provides a rationale for subjecting it to an educational and philosophical 
analysis. Essentially, it argues that what makes writing academic are its 
socio-academic practices, not its conventional forms. Since EAP tends to 
foreground forms, my critique begins here, but extends to all prescriptive 
and mechanistic approaches to academic writing. 
Teaching context 
My questioning of what makes writing ‘academic’ began when, in 2011, our 
presessional1  EGAP unit (English for General Academic Purposes) decided 
to abandon its IELTS-inspired curriculum in favour of an academic 
literacies approach (Lea & Street, 1998; Scott & Lillis, 2007). IELTS is a 
commercial language proficiency test recognised by many universities; an 
academic literacies approach is a transformative, critical and educational 
 
1 Presessional courses in the UK enable access to undergraduate and postgraduate courses 
for which students typically (but not necessarily) have an offer that is conditional on 
passing an EAP course. These are different to insessional courses which offer EAP support 
alongside study on degree programmes. Both presessional and insessional courses provide 
academic communication support to international and home students. 
2 
approach to literacy. This change led to foregrounding a more exploratory 
pedagogy (Allwright & Hanks, 2009) centred around the learner’s critical 
engagement with knowledge rather than around the transmission of 
disembodied language skills and written products. One key feature of our 
EAP programmes is that we have, to some extent, created genres to fit the 
research our EAP students want to engage with, rather than impose pre-
existing templates. We consider these genres to be ‘academic’ in virtue of 
the academic ideas of the writer who generated them and not simply in 
virtue of their texts displaying conventional ‘academic’ skills and forms. 
Such ‘displays’ typically include, for example, the skill of summarising for its 
own sake rather than for a relevant purpose, or including generic 
vocabulary from ‘academic lists’ (Coxhead, 2011) rather than from the 
student’s own disciplinary discourses.  
It was this shift – from form to content – that sparked my reflections on 
what makes a text academic. My thesis is a manifestation of this reflection, 
rather than its conclusion, and essentially proposes a puzzle, rather than an 
answer, to what happens to the ‘academicness’ of writing when we start to 
play with its conventional forms. 
When P. Bourdieu and Passeron (1994) claimed that ‘academic language is a 
dead language for the majority of people and is nobody’s mother tongue’ 
(referring, specifically, to the French language), they were indexing 
concerns that underpin this thesis, namely that what makes language - and 
the texts that contain it - academic, requires ongoing reflection and 
revision.  
Further teaching and learning exchanges confirmed in my mind 
that this was a real puzzle, not one that could be easily solved by 
following textbook advice or diligently doing classroom tasks. The 
 3 
 
following account fictionalises the essence of real conversations I 
have had with students over the years as they try to adapt to the 
writing expectations of their departments:  
I got 48% in my essay and I don’t understand why. I got 
distinctions in my Access course and when I was writing this 
essay, I thought it was good. I put in references, I looked at 
different aspects of the research question, my friend, who is 
really good academically, advised me to start with some context 
and give some definitions, but my tutor said I had too many 
ideas and they weren’t really connected to the main question. I 
also don’t really know what a paragraph is or how long it should 
be and what should go in the introduction and conclusion? Is 
the conclusion just a summary? I need to start writing my 
second essay and I just don’t know where to start now. I want to 
do it right, but I don’t know how. How do you write an academic 
essay? How is it different to what they taught me on my Access 
course? I know people who have done A-Levels and they also say 
it is completely different to an A-Level essay. 
What these student accounts suggest is that they perceive advice about 
what makes writing academic as conflicting and confusing, rather than as 
context-dependent and ‘contestable and emergent’. Their evidence for this 
is that Access and A-level students are finding a mis-match between their 
understandings of paragraphs, conclusions and coherence (‘too many ideas 
not connected’) and their university tutors’ understandings. Similarly, EAP 
students who have been instructed in IELTS, for example, come to 
university with beliefs about what makes a text academic that find limited 
resonance with disciplinary writing.  
If academic writing were framed as ‘contestable and emergent’ from the 
outset, this might help writers tolerate its ambiguities, reflect on the 
choices they have (rather than the rules), and manage the uncertainty of a 
context-dependent writing process. 
4 
Without reflecting on what academic language is, why it is as it is and what 
purposes it serves, educational institutions risk perpetuating ‘distancing 
mechanisms’ whereby academic language alienates those who are not 
familiar with it. This unfamiliarity may stem from diverse social and 
cultural backgrounds, but not only: there are many academics who choose 
to represent knowledge in alternative ways, including non-linguistic ways 
(as I show in Chapter 4) and who may also feel excluded by conventional 
academic writing practices. Since academic language shapes how we 
represent the world (Bazerman, 1988, 2015), retaining a critical stance 
towards its affordances seems sensible. It is in this ‘critical’ sense that I will 
argue that what makes writing academic is not a static property of texts but 
one that is emergent and open to change.  
Although knowledge and skills about what makes a text ‘academic’ remain 
necessary to operate within existing institutional conventions, a higher 
education also needs ‘habits of mind’ and ‘attitudes’ that ensure we remain 
“open to surprise and revision” (Warner, 2018, pp. 18-27). This is because 
‘existing’ conventions may not always be relevant to the socio-academic 
practices that academic writers wish to enact. 
Why start with EAP? 
In this thesis, I question EAP’s tendency to present academic writing as a 
transferable skill which can be reduced to universal rules. Instead, I re-
orient the discourse to showcase that academic writings are varied and 
evolve alongside changing academic practices and writer agencies. This re-
orientation can foster the emergence of a diverse academic writing 
landscape, one that may avoid reducing writing to predictable static surface 
features that are then easily standardised and replicated. When 
standardisation takes root, essay mills are more likely to thrive because they 
reproduce templates (Molinari, 2014); hoaxes (Cuthbert, 2018) find fertile 
soil to implant themselves because when writing is made to ‘look like 
 5 
 
writing’ (Warner, 2018, p. 7), it merely mimics academic practices; and 
creativity risks being thwarted because uniformity is hostile to diversity 
(Tardy, 2016). 
A brief introduction to what EAP is can explain why it lends itself to a 
discussion about the tensions involved in what makes writing academic. 
EAP is concerned with “assisting learners’ study or research in that 
language [English]. In this sense, it is a broad term covering all areas of 
academic communicative practice such as […] [s]tudent writing (from 
essays to exam papers and graduate theses)” (Hyland, 2006a, p. 1). EAP 
emerged from within the field of Applied Linguistics (Flowerdew, 2013) and 
has distilled its own selective understandings of the writing needs of Higher 
Education, often by conducting quantitative surveys on university writing 
genres to identify templates that can be taught by EAP teachers (Nesi & 
Gardner, 2012). However, such understandings do not systematically do 
justice to wider research in Writing Studies and Literacies which reveal 
writing to be far more varied in its forms than EAP suggests (Adler-Kassner 
& Wardle, 2015).  
EAP is further informed by theories of Second Language Acquisition (e.g. 
Ellis, 1997), including Sociolinguistics and Semiotics (Halliday, 1994a), and 
shares the principles of ESP pedagogies (English for Special or Specific 
Purposes, such as English for Business, Pilots, Nurses or Engineers), which 
in turn share features of the broader family of Teaching English as a Foreign 
Language (TEFL) (Ding & Bruce, 2017, p. 83) (See Fig. 1). Although its 
specific aim is to engage learners in the broader discourses and literacies of 
academia (Coffin et al., 2002), it is not predominantly informed by writing 
research as is, for example, the US tradition of Composition Studies 
(Russell, 2002). Rather, its remit is to teach English for the specific purpose 
6 
of enabling non-native and, increasingly, native speakers, to join English-
speaking higher education communities.  
 
Moreover, far from engaging with the notion that academic writing is a 
‘contestable and emergent’ practice, EAP seems to be moving towards 
greater disciplinary specialisation by confining writing practices to 
disciplinary norms. For example, EAP courses increasingly offer discipline-
specific writing instruction (such as law, engineering or nursing), possibly 
because of the perceived stability and homogeneity that disciplinary 
discourses provide (Hyland, 2002d) but also because of a textbook industry 
that fossilises conventions (Bennett, 2009) rather than engages critically 
with them. 
Notwithstanding specialisation, general approaches to academic writing 
endure. Ken Hyland, for example, who has played an influential role in 
EAP’s 50-year history, has drawn the field’s attention to the ‘Academic 
Purposes’ of EAP (including disciplinary values and cultures) which have 
had a tendency to be overlooked in favour of a focus on teaching the 
‘English’. Specifically, Hyland’s concerns with ensuring that the ‘Academic 
TEFL  
Teaching English 
as a Foreign 
Language 
 
Higher 
Education 
(disciplinary 
genres, research 
writing) 
 
Applied 
Linguistics 
 (Second Language 
Acquisition, 
Sociolinguistics, 
Semiotics, ESP)  
 
EAP 
Figure 1: EAP evolved from TEFL and Applied Linguistics 
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Purpose’ of EAP be acknowledged draws on the principle that higher 
education is where knowledge is both learnt and transformed (Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1987), in other words where established knowledge is both 
consolidated and critiqued to enable new knowledge and perspectives to 
emerge. This requires engaging academically with knowledge, argument 
and critical thinking, not only language.  
 
Moreover, language scholars such as Widdowson (1983) have differentiated 
the purpose of general EAP from that of specific EAP in terms of the former 
providing an ‘education’ and the latter providing ‘training’ (pp. 16-20). What 
he means by this is that general approaches to EAP can provide educational 
opportunities for questioning, interpreting and analysing underlying 
rationales whereas specialist approaches tend to encourage technical skills 
aimed at mastery.  
 
The dualisms indexed by Widdowson and Hyland – educating versus 
training and academic purpose versus teaching English – raise questions 
relating to the extent to which EAP provision has been more concerned 
with the learning of established knowledge, norms and conventions (which 
might be better achieved through training) and less with transforming 
knowledge into new ways of understanding (which is a characteristic of 
education)2. As I suggest throughout Part 1, EAP seems more concerned 
with training students rather than educating them. This has led to 
descriptive and prescriptive programmes of study where students are told 
what the academic norms are, as if these were static, homogenous and non-
negotiable. Moreover, since the norms being taught tend to be those 
associated with what has been called the ‘scientific paradigm’ (Bennett, 
2015; Turner, 2010, 2018), EAP is presenting a particular form of academic 
writing that is not representative of all disciplines. Asking students to 
replicate norms and conventions leads to uncritical syllabi and assessment 
 
2 I discuss the distinction between training and education in Chapter 2. 
8 
practices that do not require knowledge of the broader educational process 
of understanding why these norms prevail, what they can and cannot afford 
and what the implications of adopting these norms might be for them and 
for the academic knowledge communities they will be contributing to.  
 
Given that writing is the preferred mode of academic assessment, as 
evidenced by the ‘essay’ remaining the default genre in the humanities and 
in many of the arts and social sciences (Womack, 1993), it is not surprising 
that it is student writing that receives a great deal of attention in higher 
education and EAP. This has been shown in Nesi and Gardner (2012) and 
Andrews (2003). As a consequence of the centrality of writing, the focus on 
norms and training mentioned above can be extended to how academic 
writing is also approached. This is despite a shift, in the last 20 years or so, 
from a narrow focus on text and its linguistic norms towards more 
multimodal forms of communication (Andrews, 2010, p. 93; Andrews, Borg, 
Davis Boyd, Domingo, & England, 2012; Paré, 2018; Roozen & Erickson, 
2017). This shift has seen literacy practices (such as informed rhetorical 
choices about style and multimodality), as opposed to skills (such as the 
decontextualized and transferable mechanics of writing, like referencing or 
paragraphing), come to the fore in several areas of research writing, 
including Kamler and Thomson (2006) and A. Archer and Breuer (2015). 
EAP, however, has been slow to catch up with or embrace this trend, a 
trend that indexes the richness and possibilities academic writing practices 
afford.  
This richness is being documented by writing and higher education 
scholars who recognise that university writing practices need to continue 
reflecting the range of purposes that these practices are intended to fulfil. 
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Such purposes include preparing students for the multimodal 
communication needed in the twenty-first century (Andrews et al., 2012; A. 
Archer & Breuer, 2016b; Mcculloch, 2017; Paré, 2017) and respecting the 
diverse literacies and identities that students bring with them to academia 
(Roozen & Erickson, 2017; Sperlinger, McLellan, & Pettigrew, 2018; 
Williams, 2017) .  
Approach and aims 
 
To answer my research question - what makes writing academic – I have 
chosen an interdisciplinary approach which draws on educational and 
philosophical theories. This means that my methodology resists traditional 
disciplinary classifications and is more in line with the reflective and 
interpretative approaches associated with the humanities, rather than the 
social sciences. This is partly to harness familiarity and continuity with my 
previous educational background in Philosophy and Education, but also 
because I would like this thesis to remain part of an ongoing reflective 
process, rather than its conclusion. Rather than ‘filling a gap’ or ‘creating a 
research space’ (Swales, 1990) - conventions which dominate traditional 
research writing paradigms and conjure up a comforting, bold and 
confident sense of closure (gaps get filled, spaces are finite, and researchers 
‘occupy territories and niches’ staking their claim to own rather than share 
ideas) – I have chosen to challenge conventions in the field of EAP writing 
by simply questioning some of the assumptions it is founded on. 
This allows my research to be explorative rather than exploitative 
(D’Agostino, 2012), meaning that it aims to ‘discover and innovate’ within 
the realm of what is possible, rather than ‘add details and fill in gaps’ 
(Krishnan, 2013, p. 19) within the boundaries of what already exists. In this 
10 
sense, it fulfils the socio-academic practice of being imaginative about 
‘future possibilities’ (Barnett, 2012, 2013)’. 
My approach further aligns with the kind of ‘problematisation’ discussed in 
Alvesson and Sandberg (2013), who also object to the uncritical adoption of 
the default ‘gap-spotting’ approach to research on the grounds that it posits 
an incremental approach to academic enquiry that often leaves the 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions unchallenged. 
Rather, my aim is to ‘unsettle’ assumptions about academic writing in the 
sense outlined here by Barnett (1990, p. 155) with reference to ‘higher 
learning’: 
A genuine higher learning is subversive in the sense of 
subverting the student’s taken-for-granted world, including the 
world of endeavour, scholarship, calculation or creativity, into 
which he or she has been initiated. A genuine higher education 
is unsettling; it is not meant to be a cosy experience. It is 
disturbing because, ultimately, the student comes to see that 
things could always be other than they are. 
Similarly, monodisciplinary approaches to knowledge can lead to 
assumptions remaining unchallenged, allowing them to seem ‘objective’ 
and to then ‘settle’ into established, arguably complacent, ways of knowing. 
Such disciplinary objectivity and complacency, however, has its challengers. 
Because of such challenges (briefly outlined below), it is wise to question 
and reflect upon the extent to which the notion of ‘objectivity’ is indeed 
universal, historically and socially agreed upon, and whether it can be 
exclusively conflated with the purpose of epistemic enquiry, including 
mono and interdisciplinary pursuits.  
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For example, there is, arguably, a plurality of different conceptions of 
objectivity. This has been documented historically by Daston and Galison 
(2007) who trace the etymological trajectory of epistemic virtues. They 
locate the naming of the epistemic virtue of ‘objectivity’ (understood as a 
mechanical conception of reality that does not require the subjective 
interpretation of a knower) within the mid-19th century (2007, pp. 17 and 
31). Although they concede that etymology does not, in and of itself, bring 
reality into existence (i.e. naming something does not negate its previous 
existence), they argue that ‘objectivity and epistemology do not coincide’ 
(ibid) because the history of epistemology, namely of the ways in which we 
have come to know and interpret reality, has drawn on other epistemic 
virtues. These include the virtue of ‘truth-to-nature’ (an essentialist and 
universal representation of reality where scientist and artist work together 
to represent what they see (cf. early 18th century botanical drawings) and 
‘trained judgment’ (whereby scientists make judgments about and interpret 
data) (Daston and Galison, 2007, pp. 20-21). 
The socio-feminist theories of the 20th century have further broadened the 
range of what counts as an epistemic virtue. Feminist philosopher of 
science Harding (1995), for example, has argued that disciplinary 
assumptions that seem to be ‘objective’ are only so from the particular 
‘standpoint’ of the researcher. Standpoint theory has been described as a 
‘political and social epistemology’ and explicitly positions the knower as a 
legitimate source of epistemic justification (Wylie, 2003). This indexes a 
further epistemic virtue, namely one in which ‘insider knowledge’ (such as 
being a black maid in a white household) affords explanatory power not 
necessarily available to an outsider (such as a researcher investigating 
racism). 
12 
To illustrate standpoint theory, Harding refers to Aristotelian and 
Ptolomeic geocentricism (1995, p. 339), which claimed ‘objectivity’ from a 
particular empirical standpoint. Once that standpoint shifted, a new 
epistemology emerged. Similarly, in social science, “[m]arital rape was a 
legal and, for most people, conceptual impossibility until collective political 
struggle and theorising resulted in its articulation in the law” (1995, p. 343). 
Her point is that many disciplinary notions of ‘strong objectivity’ and claims 
to what is ‘true’ are built on ‘standpoint’ assumptions that obscure 
complexity. 
Moreover, from a specifically interdisciplinary perspective, epistemologist 
D’Agostino (2012) recognises that disciplinary classifications can and do 
advance knowledge. Because of this epistemic pursuit, ‘disciplinarity’ could 
be said to count as an ‘epistemic virtue’, yet, for D’Agostino, what actually 
binds traditional disciplines is their ‘shallow consensus’ rather than the 
epistemic virtue of ‘objectivity’, for example. This ‘shallow consensus’ can 
be understood as a broad and abstract disciplinary assumption (or 
agreement), such as ‘democracy is worthwhile’. However, a ‘shallow 
consensus’ can also go unchallenged when more fine-grained, technical 
analyses within disciplines - such as which countries can be classified as 
democratic or which electoral systems are more conducive to democracy – 
prevent researchers from questioning their initial assumptions, such as 
whether democracy is indeed a universally worthwhile pursuit. When 
academic communities syphon into specialised and technical sub-fields 
about how to implement democracy, for example, they are less likely to 
question their initial assumptions, namely the value of democracy itself. 
Such syphoning then avoids abstractions, inhibits non-specialist 
communication and encourages incremental approaches to knowledge that 
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can mask deep-rooted, and potentially erroneous assumptions. All of this 
points to what Wiley recognises as ‘epistemic trade-offs’ (2003, p. 34), 
namely that the objectivity-making properties of epistemic virtues cannot 
be ‘simultaneously maximised’. What this means, to paraphrase Wiley, is 
that ‘the commitment to maximise specialist understandings requires a 
trade-off of empirical depth against value judgments about democracy (for 
example)’ (ibid). 
An equivalent shallow consensus in EAP might be that ‘academic writing is 
formal’. Fine-grained approaches to how to teach such formality then 
syphon EAP into its own sub-fields of discipline-specific writing, academic 
grammar and academic corpora, leaving the original assumption 
unchallenged and, in doing so, denying students the opportunity ‘to see 
that things could always be other than they are’.  
Although important, such incremental approaches can also hamper the 
advancement of knowledge because, as Krishnan (2013, p. 1) argues in his 
response to D’Agostino: 
The problem with disciplinarity […] is that it results in the division of 
knowledge into compartments that resist easy access because the 
disciplines protect their body of knowledge through the invention and 
use of discipline-specific knowledge practices. This makes real 
interdisciplinarity more difficult and causes, as described by Donald T. 
Campbell, the “redundant piling up of highly similar specialties” 
separated in different disciplines and departments (1969, 361). 
What this looks like in EAP is a ‘piling up of highly similar textbooks and 
resources’ on how to write an academic essay, for example, that ‘resist’ 
challenge from other disciplines, such as Composition Studies (Tardy & Jwa, 
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2016), Academic Literacies (Scott & Lillis, 2007), Multimodality (A. Archer & 
Breuer, 2015), post-Colonial Literacies (Thesen & Cooper, 2013) or 
Philosophy and Sociology (Judd, 2003) .  
 
EAP is a fairly well-established field (it has its own journals, professional 
networks, conferences, publications, and all the trappings of what 
constitutes a field of study) and, as such, it, too, boasts its own shallow 
consensus and fine-grained specialisms, from building lexical corpora to 
analysing discipline-specific genres. Rather than add further to the process 
of disciplinary specialisation and incremental technicalisation admonished 
by Krishan, I have chosen to take a step back and challenge some of the 
shallow consensus that binds EAP with regards to academic writing.  
 
I do this by asking a deceptively simple question: what makes writing 
academic, given its diversity and contingent history and given that what can 
seem to be academic may not be academic at all (as in the case of academic 
hoaxes)?  
 
I have chosen Philosophy, broadly understood as a form of enquiry into the 
nature of things, as the main approach for this thesis because it allows me 
to step back from the traditional disciplinary specialisms and standpoints of 
EAP and engage more freely in considering alternative conceptualisations of 
academic writing (Chester, 2016, p. 21): 
 
In this situation, philosophy provides a radical freedom of thought – a 
real philosopher doesn’t use a particular set of variables or defend a 
particular set of methodologies, a real philosopher enjoys a radical 
freedom to ask and answer in unprecedent ways.  
 
Whilst I am not at all identifying with ‘real philosophers’ (or educationalists 
for that matter), nor do I share the view that the discipline of Philosophy 
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doesn’t ‘defend a particular set of methodologies’, I adopt the spirit of the 
above quotation in order to claim that research into academic writing 
might benefit from resisting, or momentarily suspending, disciplinary and 
methodological classification. This is because researching writing in the 
field of EAP, where my thesis begins, has led me to raise broader questions 
that require educational and philosophical responses. Instead of deciding 
where I stand on any particular (specialist) theory of writing, by identifying 
putative gaps and limitations, I take a step back to look at writing as a 
broad and abstract social phenomenon, and then try to clarify questions 
regarding its nature, such as ‘what is writing’ and ‘what makes it academic’. 
This steers me more towards a theory of academic writing, not to applied 
advice on ‘how to write’. 
I will theorise about how writing in general accounts for historical, cultural 
and individual differences and about what activities are so central and 
characteristic of writing that they become constitutive of writing. In other 
words what are the functions without the availability of which we would 
regard something as not academic writing? I draw on an open-ended and 
non-exhaustive list. 
I have chosen a historical and analytic approach that allows me to ‘dissect 
research problems into their parts’ (Hobbs, 2014, p. 29) in order to address 
the central dualism of my research, namely that approaches to academic 
writing in EAP tend to be either skills-based or social practice-based (Part 
1). Dualisms and binaries have had a tendency to characterise Western 
approaches to knowledge (for example, by privileging reason over emotion 
or theory over practice). I will address the dualism I have identified in EAP 
writing by framing it ‘analytically’ (M. Archer, 1995, pp. 15-16). This allows 
me to treat ‘each pole separately and on its own terms’ (Little, 2012) whilst 
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also recognising that their relation is real and can be understood 
independently of each part (Chapter 6).  
An analytic approach allows me to address the epistemological and 
ontological dualism that underlies EAP’s approach to academic writing. As 
introduced in Part 1, and discussed throughout the thesis, this dualism 
manifests itself as a binary between skills, which tell me how to achieve 
something, namely procedural knowledge; and practices, which are claims 
about what is the case, namely propositional knowledge (Fantl, 2017; Knorr 
Cetina, Schatzki, & von Savigny, 2001). EAP makes knowledge claims such 
as ‘writing is formal, objective and linear’ that collapse claims about how to 
write (procedural) with what writing is (propositional). 
In doing so, EAP collapses epistemology into ontology by suggesting that an 
understanding of some basic constitutive elements of a composite (its 
putative formality, objectivity, and linearity) is sufficient for knowledge of 
the composite. In other words, by describing what academic writing is in 
terms of particular standpoints that enable us to know what it is composed 
of (i.e. skills and conventions that make it formal, objective and linear), we 
can know what academic writing is. But this is not the case. The fact that I 
have come to know academic writing as ‘formal, objective and linear’ does 
not tell me what academic writing is because there could be other kinds of 
academic writing that do not share these characteristics. Moreover, I may 
be using methods to determine what academic writing is that do not make 
visible alternative accounts of it.  
In this sense, EAP conflates how it has come to know academic writing with 
what academic writing is. This amounts to an epistemic fallacy, discussed in 
Chapter 5, whereby ‘how we come to know the world’ gets equated with the 
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way the world is. That this is problematic can be evidenced by how, for 
example, definitions of IQ or literacy or numeracy or sex and gender differ 
according to the methods of enquiry used to establish their ontologies.   
EAP makes further ontological claims, such as ‘composites are nothing 
more than the sum of their basic constitutive elements’ (Beckett & Hager, 
2018, pp. 138-140). This is a reductionist claim that underscores mainstream 
approaches to EAP writing, and one which I will reject in this thesis.  
My analytic approach attempts to expose these epistemological and 
ontological conflations by proposing a generative model of academic 
writing that allows for change in how instances of academic writing come 
to be classified in the first place and what academic writing is: the former 
requires empirical and inductive observation and includes a range of 
methodologies such as ethnography and corpus analysis to show how 
varied academic writings are. The latter demands a conceptual shift that 
does not conflate what something is composed of with what it is as a whole. 
This means that whatever our inductive observations tell us about what 
academic writing looks like may not be sufficient to determine what makes 
writing academic. 
Organisation 
I am ultimately interested in accounting for the academic nature of writing 
in the more general sense of ‘academic’3, but my starting point is to reflect 
on how academic writing has been conceptualised in the specific area of 
 
3 I am aware of the research on the discipline-specificity of academic writing, research 
writing and writing for publication, but I am starting from the premise that there is a 
general sense in which we understand ‘academic’, not least because courses in general EAP 
exist (Turner, 2018, p. 50; 59; 118). 
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EAP with a view to broadening its meaning. To do this, I have divided the 
thesis into three main parts, each of which contains 2 chapters.  
• Part 1 – What it is 
This is where I establish that EAP frames writing dualistically as either a 
skill or as a social practice and show why this dualism is problematic. 
Chapter 1 – The trouble with EAP 
The opening chapter identifies three main problems with EAP writing and 
exemplifies these in terms of straightjacket approaches; inadequate 
qualifications; and servitude. I argue that a skills-based approach reduces 
writing in ways that erase writing’s social practices and that textbooks 
contribute to this erasure. I also claim that, typically, EAP teachers, whilst 
qualified to teach English as a foreign language, may not be equally 
qualified to teach academic writing. This paves the way for discussing the 
implications.  
Chapter 2 – The implications of all this trouble 
Because of the way academic writing conventions have fossilised in EAP by 
being reduced to marketized rules and conventions nurtured by a lack of 
scholarly engagement, a particular kind of academic discourse has 
established itself and become universalised. This has led to the 
marginalisation of cognate fields and has standardised academic writing to 
a mono-culture that ignores the diversity of writers and textual 
environments. 
• Part 2 – Why it is 
The second part is concerned with historical contingencies and current 
practices. It showcases writing as a diverse and varied practice that is at 
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odds with the mono-culture portrayed by EAP. It contains the two largest 
chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 – Writing’s origins and ideologies 
This is where I show that the very notion of writing is contested by tracing 
its etymological origins and its conflation with the alphabet. I also condense 
the history of universities and their engagement with writing to show how 
writing and literacy are inextricably linked in Western societies and that 
this has ideological repercussions on epistemic representation, justice and 
inclusion. 
Chapter 4 – What makes writing academic 
The central claim of my thesis hinges on this chapter. It is where I propose 
that practices, not skills, make a text academic. I refer to studies in 
threshold concepts and showcase examples of alternative ways to represent 
academic knowledge. This allows me to scind the traditional umbilical 
bond between language and argument and suggest that multimodal forms 
of argumentation are more fitting for twenty first century academia. 
• Part 3 – How it could be 
The final part introduces my theoretical contribution to studies on 
academic writing. It locates academic writing within Complexity Theory 
(e.g. Byrne & Callaghan, 2014) and proposes four conceptual spaces in 
which to re-think writing as a socio-academic practice. What these four 
spaces have in common is their emphasis on the nature and interaction of 
parts and wholes. They show that there is no necessary connection between 
each. 
Chapter 5 – Complexity 
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Complexity Theory allows me to propose a macro-theory of writing that 
positions academic writing within an open system that is generative of 
novelty and mindful of diverse approaches. This is because academic 
writing is non-linear, meaning that small changes in its micro-constituents 
(such as choice of words) can lead to big changes at the macro-level (such 
as epistemological and ontological representations). This indicates that the 
effects of a small change can be disproportionate to their causes and that 
the former cannot be reduced to the latter. 
Chapter 6 – Academic emergence 
The four conceptual spaces are drawn from philosophy of mind, sociology 
and aesthetics: they are affordance theory; organic unities, emergence; and 
program explanation. Each interacts as exemplified by the model proposed 
in Appendix A and reproduced below (Fig. 2). It forms an open system that 
accounts for novelty and change, allowing academic writing to be re-
defined.  
 
Figure 2: Appendix A - Affordance Model of Academic Writing 
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In summary, by showing that what makes writing academic are its socio-
academic practices, not its rules and surface features, I will reconceptualise 
academic writing as an open and non-linear system. This allows for diverse 
academic practices to emerge and for novel forms of writing to count as 
‘academic’. This has implications for academic writing pedagogy and for 
developing the literacies of a diverse, international and multicultural 
academic community. 
Notes on style 
Because of the interdisciplinary (e.g. philosophy, education, history, 
sociology) readings that I have drawn on to write this thesis, the reader may 
notice some stylistic heterogeneity in my own academic prose as well some 
inconsistency, since I advocate multimodal approaches whilst adopting a 
traditional monomodal format. Since this is a thesis about what makes 
writing academic, I thought I’d better explain what makes my writing 
academic.  
As an academic writer and regarding stylistic variations, although I have 
been mindful of what voice to project in my writing, the thesis reflects the 
heteroglossic (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981), multimodal (A. Archer & Breuer, 
2015) and theoretical (Besley & Peters, 2013; Peters, 2009) discourses that 
have informed my thinking. By ‘discourses’ I mean the different ways that 
language is used in the different disciplines and in the social practices that 
they enact (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 62-72). This means that I swing between 
encyclopaedic tones, especially when trying to relay key historical events 
that have shaped writing, to ones that are didactic (when providing 
examples), analytic (when trying to convey key notions in the philosophy of 
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mind) and simplistic (when trying to retain a macro stance that glosses over 
micro analyses).  
Regarding multimodality, my thesis is a manifestation of the skills and 
practices I am familiar with, of negotiations with my supervisors and 
informed choices about expectations. It reflects my agency in relation to the 
textual environments that have shaped me. What I advocate here is that 
academic writers should be writing, drawing or dancing their PhDs or other 
texts according to their (cap)abilities and in relation to what is structurally 
possible and institutionally negotiated with(in) the textual environment 
(see Appendix A). I am not advocating that writers engage in acts of 
‘arbitrary or radical defiance’ (Sousanis, 2016), but that they be respected as 
agents who have a degree of freedom and knowledge to enact unique ways 
of expressing themselves academically. What follows represents my 
(cap)abilities in re-shaping (Bazerman, 1988) and transducting (i.e. 
translating from one mode to another) (Bezemer & Kress, 2008) the 
knowledge that I have developed over the past six years of part-time 
research and which came to me in the form of words, images, quotations, 
personal anecdotes, conversations with students, colleagues and critical 
friends, social media interactions, blog writing and conference 
presentations. My own bilingualism and background literacies (Italian and 
French) also explain idiosyncrasies in signposting and sentence structures. 
All of this has contributed to my style.  
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Part 1 
What It Is 
 
 
 
It is ironic that some educational institutions [...] militate against the 
very higher-order thinking that they are supposed to encourage 
(Andrews, 2010, p. 53) 
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Chapter 1 - The trouble with EAP writing 
On the one hand, it would be in their learners’ interests if they [teachers] could 
help them to conform to the expectations of the institution. On the other hand, 
by doing so, they are reproducing the ideologies and inequities of the institution 
and society at large (A. Archer and Breuer, 2016, p. 4) 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 highlights three distinct but inter-related problems with how EAP 
conceptualises academic writing. The linearity of the medium I am writing 
in obliges me to list these problems sequentially, but they are not 
sequential: they are co-occuring, co-causal and inter-connected. The first 
problem signals the conflation of academic writing with a set of transferable 
skills rather than with the enactment of social practices: this turns writing 
into a ‘straightjacket’. I suggest that an over-reliance on and mis-use of 
textbooks foments this conflation.  
Secondly, I trace the conflation to the disciplinary origins of EAP. These are 
in Applied Linguistics and EFLT (English Foreign Language Teaching) 
rather than in the literary, humanist, scientific and sociological fields of 
Sociolinguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis, Writing Studies, Research 
Writing, Science Writing, Sociology or Anthropology, which means EAP 
teachers are qualified to teach language skills and acquisition, not writing 
practices and discourses. 
And thirdly, I foreground EAP’s status as a ‘handmaiden to the proper 
disciplines’. What this means is that it is both institutionally (dis)located 
(i.e. some EAP Units are part of Universities; some are not) and separated 
from the disciplines themselves (i.e. writing is taught as a separate skill). 
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This has led to EAP behaving more like a service industry than a field of 
study, creating the conditions for academic writing to become a 
standardised product instead of a process for learning and thinking about 
how it represents knowledge.  
The straightjacket 
Dominant models of EAP writing practices are frequently framed as 
dualistic. They are broadly referred to as either skills-based (Hyland, 2006, 
p. 17) and straightforwardly transferable to other academic contexts; or as 
social practices (Lea & Street, 1998, p. 159; Lillis & Curry, 2010a, p. 19)4, 
which are less straightforwardly transferable because they are concerned 
with protean human activity that changes according to socio-academic 
contexts, purposes and intentions. References to this dualism resonate 
throughout the literatures in which writing is discussed from a UK 
EAP/Academic Literacies perspective (e.g. Hocking & Toh, 2010; Lea & 
Street, 1998; Scott & Lillis, 2007; Wingate & Tribble, 2012) and a US 
Composition Studies perspective (e.g. Anson & Moore, 2016; Downs & 
Wardle, 2007; Russell & Cortes, 2012). 
Drawing on Hamilton and Pitt (2009), I will liken skills-based approaches 
to a straightjacket. First, however, I provide some background to the skills-
practice divide. 
Knowing how and knowing that 
 
4 In EAP, a ‘skill’ can be understood as a mechanical ability to turn, for example, an active 
sentence into a passive one. This ability simply requires following rules. By contrast, a 
‘social practice’ is knowing when and why a passive or an active voice is appropriate, which 
cannot be universalised.  
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Distinctions between skills and practices differentiate between ‘knowing 
how’ to do something (for example, how to spell a word) and ‘knowing that’ 
(for example, that words can have different meanings in different contexts). 
Skills thus become equated with ‘technical knowledge’ and social practices 
with ‘practical knowledge’: the former concerns knowledge of rules and 
techniques; the latter “consists of organised abilities to discern, judge and 
perform that are […] rooted in understanding, beliefs, values and attitudes 
[…]. Practical knowledge is acquired by living within the organised social 
world”(Hirst, 1998, p. 152).  
Broadly, this dualism maps onto the distinction between procedural 
knowledge (knowing how to do something) and propositional knowledge 
(knowing that something is the case), whereby skills are examples of the 
former and practices of the latter (Fantl, 2017). The roots of this dualism run 
deep and have evolved from translations of the ancient Greeks’ distinction 
between epistêmê (science/theory) and technê (craft/practice). As such, the 
dichotomy of skills and practices is deeply embedded in Western 
understandings of human activity. It can be discerned in ancient 
philosophy, specifically in Aristotle’s ethical theory. Aristotle describes as 
poieis those human actions that require a form of knowledge he called 
technê, which has been translated as a rule-governed ‘ability to make’ an 
artefact, product or craft, such as a ship, tool or pot. Because poiesis 
requires the maker to know in advance what the result of their activity will 
be, it is not the same as praxis, which is an action aimed at ‘doing’ some 
morally worthwhile ‘good’ and not at the production of an artefact. Within 
the Aristotelian tradition, political, social and educational activities, whose 
nature is open-ended, reflective (phronesis or wisdom, deliberation) and 
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explorative, falls under praxis, not poiesis (Carr, 1998, pp. 168-169; Hogan, 
2015, p. 372).  
The dualism remains current in philosophical, sociological and educational 
discussions about how theory relates to practice. For example, Mike Rose 
(2005) blurs these distinctions in his sociological accounts of the tacit 
propositional knowledge needed to perform the highly skilled labour of 
‘American workers’; Graff and Birkenstein (2006) do the same when they 
encourage the use of ‘know how’ templates as a way to ‘demystify’ the 
practice of academic writing; and Warner (2018, p. 20) goes further in 
subsuming ‘skills’ under ‘practices’ alongside ‘knowledge’, ‘habits of mind’ 
and ‘attitudes’.  
In EAP, the skills-practices dichotomy reveals similar binaries. On the one 
hand, it foregrounds an atomistic and technical understanding of what 
makes writing ‘academic’ in which skills-based approaches are conflated 
with discrete textual items – such as ‘academic words’ (Coxhead, 2011; 
Paquot, 2010) or the rules for achieving specific ‘paragraph structures’ 
(Bailey, 2006)- that then become markers of ‘academicness’. This approach 
is problematic because, for example, it remains silent on the broader 
practice of finding an ‘academic voice’ (Elbow, 1994b; Matsuda & Tardy, 
2008) or on the practice of cultivating an awareness of readership 
(audience) (Richardson, 1990b). On the other hand, the ‘holistic’ and 
complex understanding of literacy, associated with a practice approach, 
potentially loses sight of the particulars typically involved in or associated 
with making a text ‘academic’. For example, a social practice approach 
downplays linguistic ‘accuracy’ or appropriate ‘academic style’ on the 
grounds that these vary or that they embody exclusionary ideologies and 
28 
powers that ignore the purpose of the writer and the experiences they bring 
with them (Lillis, 2001; Scott, 2013; Thesen & Cooper, 2013; Turner, 2018). 
In this sense, both approaches – skills-based and social practice - are 
problematic as neither is satisfactory in pinning down what makes writing 
academic. In isolating textual and linguistic features from the wider social 
practices of having purposes and audiences, skills-based writing pedagogies 
can weaken the academic credibility of the resulting written text. This is 
what T. Moore and Morton (2005) have shown by arguing against the 
academic credibility of IELTS written tasks (such as the 250-word 
unreferenced essay) because these encourage de-contextualised language 
skills at the expense of evidence-based claims and referenced-research. This 
leads to ‘hollow’ and ‘stilted’ expressions aimed at displaying language 
instead of thought: this, combined with weak and unsupported arguments, 
can result in ‘bad writing’ (Helms-Park & Stapleton, 2003). Aware of the 
perils of the skills-based approach, Paltridge (1992) called for EAP to 
integrate its reading and writing tasks so that they become academically 
authentic, allowing student writers to read-to-write and draw on evidence 
from literature to back their claims. Despite this call, popular commercial 
EAP syllabi still tend to differentiate between the four discrete skills of 
reading, writing, speaking and listening (for example, Sowton, 2016) as do 
many EAP Units who still advertise their courses using the language of 
discrete skills.  
On the other hand, when standard forms of English and of academic 
expression are being questioned (Jenkins, 2014), for example by being re-
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genred5 (English, 2011) or translanguaged6 (Wei, 2016), then this can raise 
issues about where, how and whether we draw the boundaries between 
what counts and does not count as ‘academic’ (cf. Canagarajah and Lee 
(2013); Le Ha (2009); Scott (2013). 
Despite there being no evidence that correlates grammatical and lexical 
accuracy per se with good academic writing (Hyland, 2016c, pp. 146-147; 151; 
Mike Rose, 1989, p. 141; Warner, 2018, pp. 106-110), prescriptive, skills-based, 
straight-jacket literacies - often referred to as ‘essayist’ literacies (see, for 
example, Andrews, 2003; Gimenez, 2008; Womack, 1993) that focus on 
language and accuracy have dominated the EAP approach to writing. 
Reasons for this vary and range from the ubiquity of commercial 
assessments (Leung, Lewkowicz, & Jenkins, 2016; Turner, 2004; 2018, p. 132) 
to pedagogy and its use of textbooks.  
Whilst I recognise the contentions surrounding the skills-practice divide, 
such as the fact that propositional and procedural knowledge cannot always 
be seamlessly prised apart, for the purpose of my argument, I take the more 
negative stance that EAP has, historically, erred on the side of skills. This is 
because it has tended to propose templates as “formulaic devices […] that 
 
5 ‘Re-genring’ is a term used by English (2011) to describe the process of re-working an essay 
by using a different genre, for example, from prose to a dialogue. This allows “students to 
introduce new perspectives, debate new issues and show a greater sense of ownership over 
the topic than was apparent in their original essays” (2011, p. 1) and develops critical 
thinking in ways that are not text-centred. 
6 ‘Translanguaging’ is a term used by several socio-linguists, including Canagarajah (2011), 
Wei (2016) and Leung, Lewkowicz, & Jenkins (2016) to describe the multilingual practice of 
communicating by drawing on one’s full linguistic repertoire to re-appropriate or re-define 
meanings. Translanguaging is viewed as a positive practice and signals a departure from 
framing ‘interference’ from other languages as negative. 
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encourage passive learning or lead students to put their writing on 
automatic pilot” (Graff & Birkenstein, 2006, p. xxii). 
Skills 
Within the field of Writing Studies (associated with the American tradition 
of Rhetoric and Composition; see, for example, Tardy and Jwa (2016), skills 
have been described as the art of “knowing what you are doing and making 
intelligent choices” (Bazerman, 1988, p. 321). However, such a broad and 
positive description is rare as well as applicable to countless other 
attainments (e.g. reason, wisdom and good sense). In the established 
disciplinary traditions of Education and Philosophy, skills are more readily 
seen as ‘limitations’ that encourage ‘mere habits’ (Dewey, 1916, pp. 78; 83; 
310; 339-340). It is this negative labelling of skills as habit-forming rather 
than as conducive to or a manifestation of (as M. Rose (2005) would argue) 
thinking and reflection that underscores several literatures that critique 
EAP, including writings by Lillis, Harrington, Lea, and Mitchell (2015); Lillis 
and Tuck (2016); Paltridge (1992); Paltridge and Starfield (2016); Paltridge, 
Starfield, and Tardy (2016); Yun and Standish (2018).  
Furthermore, skills-based approaches are associated with the ‘myth of 
transience’ (Russell, 2002, p. 50). The ‘myth’ consists in the mistaken belief 
that writing can be taught in transitory, temporary and isolated ways 
without an authentic purpose and that whatever skills are learnt in a 
writing class can be seamlessly transferred to all other contexts. Such 
approaches reflect the widespread perception that writing instruction can 
be out-sourced and learnt separately from the disciplines, a perception that 
has been challenged by Rose (1985, p. 355): 
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… the belief persists in the American university that if we can 
just do x, or y, the problem of poor student writing will be solved 
… and higher education will be able to return to its real work. 
The negative framing of skills-based approaches to literacy and learning can 
be further traced to what anthropologist and New Literacy scholar Brian 
Street (1984) called the ‘ideological and autonomous approach’. This model 
“encourages a transparency approach to language and transmission 
understanding of language pedagogy” (A. Fischer, 2015, p. 83). What Fischer 
means by ‘transparency’ and ‘transmission’, respectively, is that the 
meaning of words is treated as unequivocal (i.e. clear) and that this 
meaning can be taught and learnt (i.e. passed on) without the need to 
interpret or negotiate how or why the words are used, by whom and in 
which contexts. As such, the autonomous model frames academic writing 
as a cognitive skill that exists independently of its contexts and which “does 
not recognise that learning rests on the integrated development of both 
writing and reading within the disciplinary discourse” (Turner, 2018, p. 134). 
Zamel (1998a, 1998b) has similarly argued that the autonomous model 
presents the learning of language in essentialist terms, namely as a skill that 
is decontextualized from the ‘intellectual work’ that it has to do. For 
example, learning how to compose a paragraph (a skill) is not the same as 
understanding the ‘intellectual work’ that paragraphs do (a practice), i.e. 
that they cumulatively build arguments and for this reason can vary in 
length and structure (Thomson, 2018a). 
American educationalist and writing scholar Mike Rose (1985, 1989) has 
lamented the conflation of learning to write with the acquisition of 
cognitive skills (such as memorising rules). He claims that when we 
collapse the process of writing into the acquisition of skills, this risks side-
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lining the need to nurture every-day exploratory and personal literacies, the 
imagination (1989, p. 212) and a sense of ‘wonder’ (p. 223), all of which are 
more conducive to developing writing abilities. He traces this conflation 
back to the early twentieth-century writing curriculum which was 
influenced by studies in psychology. These were used to inform pedagogies 
based on ‘memory and drill’ and the mechanics of grammatical ‘dos and 
don’ts’ (Rose, 1989, p. 207). He labelled this socio-historical culturally 
decontextualized, mechanical and cognitive approach to literacy as 
‘essentialist’ and ‘exclusionary’, further claiming that it assumes the 
meaning of words is straightforwardly accessible to all. Instead, he argues, it 
excludes learners who do not share its underlying conceptual frameworks. 
What better explains students’ misunderstandings of academic discourse is 
often not their lack of specialist vocabulary but their ignorance of the 
‘semiotic’ reach of academic words and of the conceptual frameworks and 
disciplinary traditions they belong to (1989, pp. 182-184).  
One poignant example offered by Rose is of a student, Lucia, whose 
brother’s mental illness drew her to a psychology degree. The specific 
jargon, such as ‘alchemy’, and abstract conceptual frameworks that are 
embedded in the disciplinary literatures of psychology, such as ‘there is no 
such thing as mental illness’, were not ones that she recognised from her 
personal experience of psychology. Despite her first-hand knowledge of 
mental illness, she began to feel excluded from the academic knowledge she 
wanted access to. This was because of her unfamiliarity with the language 
and what it referred to, not because of her inability to understand 
psychology. The university’s response to Lucia’s difficulties was to remove 
her from the psychology class and send her to language lessons that would 
‘fix’ and ‘remedy’ her lack of understanding. Rose’s point is that ‘remedial’ 
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approaches to developing academic literacy, which are frequently 
associated with skills-based approaches (Anson & Moore, 2016; Myers 
Zawacki & Cox, 2014; Russell, 2002) and which are couched in the language 
of medicalisation (diagnose problems, drop-in clinic) and failure (fix, 
correct), are unlikely to help students become writers. The reason for this is 
that academic terms refer to histories of concepts that form ‘disciplinary 
conversations’ and have a semiotic reach that extends beyond the word 
itself. This indicates that they cannot be understood outside the discipline 
by decontextualized rote learning and grammatical drills or gap-fills.  
The following passage captures what is generally meant by 
‘decontextualised and autonomous’ literacy skills (Rose, 1989, p. 192, 
emphasis added): 
The discourse of academics is marked by terms and expressions 
that represent an elaborate set of shared concepts and 
orientations: alienation, authoritarian personality, the social 
construction of the self, determinism, hegemony, equilibrium, 
intentionality, recursion, reinforcement, and so on. This language 
weaves through so many lectures and textbooks, is internal to so 
many learned discussions, that it’s easy to forget what a foreign 
language it can be. Freshmen are often puzzled by the talk they 
hear in the classrooms, but what is important to note here is 
that their problem is not simply one of limited vocabulary. If we 
see that problem as knowing or not knowing a list of words, as 
some quick-fix remedies suggest, then we’ll force glossaries on 
students and miss the complexity of the issue. 
Throughout this thesis, I too take the more negative view that a skills-based 
approach to academic writing, as it is enacted in EAP, excludes diverse ways 
of approaching writing, inhibits thinking and reflection on conventions, 
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and encourages a one-size-fits-all approach which ‘excludes’ other 
potentially fruitful ways of representing knowledge. However, I go further. I 
argue that it also restricts possibilities for what makes writing academic 
because it reduces writing to a finite set of skills that become the ends of the 
writing process, not the means to a practice that is changing. In this 
respect, I agree with Hamilton and Pitt (2009, p. 63; 70; 76), who have 
claimed that in an evolving globalised and digitalised higher education 
landscape, academic genres – understood as ‘conventionalised ways of 
acting and interacting’ (2009, p. 63) - can function like a ‘straightjacket’ 
because they impose forms of writing that may not suit the content and 
purpose of the author or context.  
Furthermore, the reduction of academic writing to a set of skills is at odds 
with how the broader field of writing research approaches academic 
writing, which is more questioning and critical, and more open to 
possibilities for representation. For example, A. Archer and Breuer (2016b) 
and Huang and Archer (2017) emphasise the multimodal nature of and 
possibilities for writing in higher education, often drawing on the socio-
semiotic theories of Kress (2010); within the established tradition of 
sociological and anthropological concerns with representation (Becker, 
2007; Geertz, 1973; Goody, 1977), Atkinson (2013) discusses the extent to 
which writing is able to adequately capture the deep ethnographies of social 
reality; Carter, Lillis, and Parkin (2009) bring together research on how 
identities shape and are shaped by academic writing practices, drawing 
specifically on the work of critical literacy theorist and feminist Roz Ivanič 
(1998); Thesen and Cooper (2013) have detailed ways in which writing in the 
South African context centres around negotiating diverse identities which 
come together in the ‘contact zone’: an academic melting pot where 
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multilingualism, diverse socio-economic, cultural and academic 
backgrounds as well as unequal material conditions frustrate access to and 
participation in higher education; and in the social sciences more generally, 
Law (2003, 2004) has described the ‘messiness’ of research methods and 
methodologies, which affects how these methods are reported in writing. 
Generally, EAP’s approach to writing does not seem to acknowledge or to 
have been informed by the above writing traditions, and although attempts 
to broaden its academic writing lens have been made, these have had little 
uptake (see, for example, the Journal of English for Academic Purposes on 
Critical EAP (S. Benesch, 2009) and Gender (Lillis, McMullan, & Tuck, 
2018), referred to again in the last part of this chapter).    
Having sketched what is meant by a skills-based approach to literacy and 
likened it to a straightjacket, I now show how it stands in contrast to the 
‘transformative’ approach associated with the field of Academic Literacies, a 
field concerned with writing practices, not skills.  
Practices 
As discussed in Knorr Cetina et al. (2001), practices can be broadly 
understood as “arrays of human activity” (2001, p. 11) organised around 
‘patterns’, ‘relations’ and ‘interdependencies’ that cannot be reduced to the 
micro activities of the individual. Rather, since they are part of our 
propositional knowledge, they can guide and monitor our actions, 
including our procedural knowledge (i.e. skills), without which practices 
could not be enacted. 
Practices are generally viewed more favourably than skills by literacy 
theorists (Scott & Lillis, 2007) and by philosophers (MacIntyre, 1985). They 
see them as activities that require reflection and thought, social interaction 
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and a sense of purpose that change to suit the aims, beliefs, values, 
experiences and choices of, in this case, writers (Scott, 2000; Williams, 
2017).  
For Lillis (2013, pp. 78, emphasis added): 
practice signals two key principles: an empirical commitment to 
observe and explore what, where and how people read and write, 
including their perspectives on what they do, as well as their 
values and interests; a theoretical interest in seeking 
explanations for the nature and consequences of what people do, 
including a focus on issues of power and agency drawing on 
notions from sociological and critical discourse theories. 
The spirit of Lillis’ sociological and ethnographic understanding of practice 
is also evident in the following quotation by moral philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre (cited in Hogan, 2015, pp. 372, emphasis added), who echoes 
similar views on the role played by ‘human powers’, ‘agency’, ‘activity’ and 
‘purpose’ in ‘social activity’. As such, his work has influenced both Ethics 
and the Philosophy of Education (see, for example, Noddings (2003): 
By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex 
form of socially established co-operative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, 
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. 
What MacIntyre’s understanding of practice indexes is its processual and 
complex nature whereby the standards of excellence in any given practice, 
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such as the practice of writing academically, are relative to the practice 
itself, not to any specific token of writing, such as an essay. So, for example, 
as Fitzmaurice (2010, p. 47) illustrates, it is the practices that are the ends, 
not the skills deployed to achieve those ends. Her argument relates to 
teaching as a practice and shows how teaching requires human 
dispositions, values, virtues and qualities (standards of excellence) that 
transcend the application of techniques, skills and competencies. If 
practices are the end of human activity, then when these change, so must 
the skills required to achieve them. Fitzmaurice (ibid) illustrates what a 
practice is as follows: 
[t]he planting of crops is not a practice, but farming is, as are the 
enquiries of physics, chemistry, biology and the work of the 
historian, the musician and the painter. A practice involves 
standards of excellence and to enter into a practice is to accept 
these standards and to judge one’s own performance against 
them. The goods internal to a practice can only be had by 
involvement in that practice unlike external goods such as 
money, status, prestige, which can be achieved in many ways.  
When academic writing is understood as a practice, it too requires an 
understanding of a range of standards of excellence. These might include 
elusive qualities such as ‘writtenness’, discussed in Turner (2018), which 
refers to qualities of ‘good writing’ that are difficult to teach and 
understand, and that can be achieved in different ways. Qualities that 
experienced writers simply ‘recognise’ (Becker, 1986, pp. 71-72).  
The practice of writing is also the practice of writing in and for institutional 
framings, constraints and policy, where standards of excellence vary 
(recalling Harding’s discussion of ‘strong objectivity’) (1995) and where 
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communities of scholars are required to reach agreements about what 
counts as disciplinary writing, and about where and when to publish. 
Recent research on academic writing (Alvesson, Gabriel, & Paulsen, 2017; 
Mcculloch, 2017; Tusting, McCulloch, Bhatt, Hamilton, & Barton, 2019), for 
example, has showcased that disciplinary writing is wide-ranging and 
includes email correspondence, grant applications, book reviews and 
interdisciplinary variations. Equally, it laments the proliferation of 
formulaic writing at the expense of having ‘something meaningful to say’. 
As indicated by Fitzmaurice, above, when the practices change, then so 
must the skills needed to enact the practice. 
When writing for audit purposes (such as the REF, the 4-yearly UK 
Research Excellence Framework), academics face dilemmas that can require 
them to choose between publishing to a deadline or doing justice to a 
longitudinal research project. Taking the time necessary to undertake 
research and write it is more likely to achieve the ‘standards of excellence’ 
inherent in the practice of doing history, for example, than if the historian 
were to rush to write an article to meet the audit requirements of the 
university: rushing to meet such requirements would require more skills in 
time-management and journal genre-writing than excellence in historical 
research. And, finally, the practice of writing within such institutional 
confines also raises questions about “the degree of agency individuals have 
in making their own writing decisions” (Tusting et al., 2019, Preface), which 
indexes concerns that are central to this thesis. 
Different genres also serve different purposes, with some, like the PhD 
thesis, possibly no longer being fit-for-purpose (Paré, 2017, 2018). 
Specifically, Paré argues that the traditional ‘big book format’ of the PhD 
requires skills that are obsolete, such as the ability to work alone when 
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much of academia, and other professions, require collaboration, co-
authorship and versatility (Thomson, 2018b). The thesis as practice, rather 
than as skill, requires standards of excellence that adhere to the activity of 
research, namely enquiry, curiosity, evidence and relevance, and so on, not 
to the skills required to achieve these standards, such as knowledge of 
genres and of formatting (clearly, these skills are necessary, but they are the 
means to achieving the practice, not the ends of doing a PhD). 
Whilst acknowledging that skills are needed to conduct any given practice, 
MacIntyre emphasises that the skills must not become the ends of the 
practice but the means to achieving the standards of the practice itself. This 
further entails that humans (‘powers’) are the agents of change 
(‘transformations’) in any given practice (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 193, emphasis 
added):  
what is distinctive in a practice is the way in which conceptions 
of the relevant goods and ends which the technical skills serve - 
and every practice does require the exercise of practical skills - 
are transformed and enriched by those extensions of human 
powers and by that regard for its internal goods which are 
partially definitive of each particular practice or type of practice. 
What this means for academic writing is that when writing is conceived as a 
practice, it is the writers (human powers), not the skills, who through 
reflection, deliberation and understanding (by that regard for) drive 
transformations and determine what writing could be. Clearly, institutional 
constraints and expectations influence the degree of agency that writers 
have (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 72-73; 80), but Fairclough also reminds us that 
subjects have the capacity “to act individually or collectively as agents” in 
opposing [ideological] practices (ibid, p. 91). 
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Textbooks 
It is beyond my scope to analyse the complex relationship between 
pedagogy, textbooks and assessment, but some remarks on textbooks may 
further illustrate why academic writing in EAP is problematic and how it 
constrains practice. 
The need to simplify the complexities of written communication and to 
provide model texts for those not proficient in the discourses of the 
academy (models which Bazerman, 1988, p. 8 calls a set of 'cookie cutters'; 
and which Nesi & Gardner, 2012, p. 2 call 'templates'), has bolstered a 
burgeoning industry of textbook publications (Bennett, 2009; Harwood, 
2005; Tribble, 2009, 2015). These generally foreground skills rather than 
practices, and compound the conflation of achieving complex academic 
discourse with the ability to perform discrete skills.  
John Swales (1980), in the first issue of The English for Special Purposes 
Journal, addressed the ‘textbook problem’ by claiming that it has been an 
educational failure in the field of EAP. This is because of several inter-
related reasons, including the unclear role that textbooks have in EAP 
pedagogies, the way that they are mis-used by practitioners (as well as 
language learners), the commercial rather than educational motivations 
that determine their popularity (as I explain below), and their inability to 
keep up to date with research and development (Swales, 1980, p. 13, 
emphasis added): 
The ESP7 textbook therefore stands or falls in terms of whether it 
is up-to-date in approach and methodology, at the present time 
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how far it can attract such labels as communicative, functional, 
discoursal, and dealing with study skills. 
A poignant example of how textbooks can ‘fall’ in this regard is given by 
Swales with reference to an ESP (English for Special Purposes) course book 
series on the language of General Science published by Oxford University 
Press and Longman. The books focused almost exclusively on the uses of 
the present tense in science because the aim of the series being published 
was to focus on ‘the language of science’, which is often correlated to the 
present tense because of its concerns with describing processes and 
experiments. However, what the series ignored were the equally ubiquitous 
uses of the past and perfect tenses in the specific sciences, such as Geology, 
where the present perfect is needed to explain ‘present evidence’ in relation 
to ‘past geological events’. When Swales claims that “it is the series design, 
the imposition of a pure science paradigm, that has produced an 
unjustifiable syllabus position” (ibid), he is indexing the problem of 
foregrounding skills (in this case, the ability to use the present tense) at the 
expense of the practices, namely the scientific purposes (such as explaining 
the effect of the past on the present, which requires a perfect tense) for 
which tenses are intended. 
Further examples of how textbooks encourage skills-based approaches are 
detailed in Harwood (2005), who catalogues several anti-textbooks views 
followed by several pro-textbook arguments. In arguing against textbooks, 
he highlights the unqualified status of many textbook writers who “rely far 
too much on intuition or folk beliefs when attempting to describe academic 
discourse norms” (2005, p. 150); the risk of practitioners equating textbook 
content with ‘officially sanctioned knowledge’ (2005, p.151), rather than 
engaging in deliberative and reflective praxis; and the fact that what 
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motivates textbook production is commercial interest, not pedagogical 
concern (2005, p. 152). In arguing for the use of textbooks, he cites their 
function as ‘proposals for action’, as opposed to prescriptions, and as 
effective ways of not having to ‘re-invent the wheel’ (ibid). He concludes 
that as long as EAP textbooks remain up-to-date, research-informed and 
evidenced-based, they have a positive role to play. He cites Swales (1995) 
and Swales and Feak (2000) as good examples of textbooks which draw on 
available research to encourage teachers to reflect on what they are asking 
students to do, thus avoiding “the sweeping generalisations about academic 
writing which other textbooks resort to” (Harwood, 2005, p. 158).  
As with all publications, questions remain, however, as to which research 
one chooses to include in textbooks and whether to include it at all. For 
example, being ‘up-to-date’, ‘informed’ and ‘evidence-based’ does not rule 
out research that foregrounds the ‘autonomous’ view of language 
competency, as Bennett (2009, 2015, 2014) and Tribble (2009, 2015) have 
shown. Moreover, textbook publishers may opt to not include up-to-date 
research because this would require revising popular textbooks which may 
lead to alienating “instructors […] comfortable with the previous edition, 
which, in turn, would negatively impact sales” (Feak & Swales, 2013, p. 309). 
The fact it is generally agreed that EAP textbooks generate high income 
(Harwood, 2013) and that “none of these materials can be seen as 
contributing to Academic Literacies programmes”8 (Tribble, 2009, p. 411) 
suggests that skills-based approaches remain more economically viable, and 
 
8 One notable exception – which, surprisingly, Tribble does not mention - is Coffin et al. 
(2002), whose Academic Literacies approach to ‘Teaching Academic Writing’ has had little 
uptake, as far as I can tell, in EAP. 
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therefore more easily marketable. This then is likely to disincentivise 
attempts to include writing research that unsettles the status quo 
(Harwood, 2005, p. 152): 
Rather than viewing the textbook solely as a pedagogical tract, 
we need to realize it is also an economic commodity to be traded 
in a competitive marketplace […] Marketability rather than 
pedagogical effectiveness is therefore said to be the publishers’ 
main concern. Compared to publishers of fiction, textbook 
publishers produce relatively few titles, increasing the pressure 
on those that are published to be successful. 
With the intention of obtaining actual sales figures to support the extent to 
which textbook production is as profitable as these, and other, quotations 
suggest, I have made some preliminary enquiries, which have so far proven 
to be unsuccessful. Bennett’s research concluded that there is far too much 
on the market to be able to quantify what profits textbook sales generate for 
publishers and writers (Bennett, 2009, p. 44): 
The sheer number of books on the market designed to teach 
academic writing in English is staggering. An on-line search 
under ‘academic writing’ (performed on 3rd October 2007) 
yielded 216 hits for Waterstones.com, 2655 hits for 
Amazon.co.uk and an astounding 11,849 hits for Amazon.com. 
And even after these lists had been screened to eliminate 
irrelevant titles and multiple editions of the same work, a 
Bibliography of Academic Style Manuals compiled from the 
bestsellers on these on-line lists ran to over 250 titles.  
My own tentative investigations into this area, through correspondence 
with Swales, have further revealed how sensitive obtaining sales figures 
actually is (Swales, 2018): 
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The relationship between EAP textbooks and in-house materials 
has always been tense. Back in 1980 in the first issue of "The ESP 
Journal" I raised some of the tensions and contradictions. 
Nothing much has changed. 
The following Twitter exchange (Fig. 3), prompted by my enquiries on the 
BALEAP email forum, also indicates how hard it is to come by evidence, but 
it also confirms that the EAP community has concerns about the effect that 
textbook production has on the pedagogies and literacies of academic 
discourse, which is encouraging:  
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Figure 3: EAP Twitter exchange on textbook sales available at 
https://twitter.com/Ricky_Jeffrey/status/1059063536117149697 [accessed 07/11/2018] 
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The qualifications 
Defining EAP and what qualifications are needed to teach it is messy. Gillet 
(2011) is confident in his definition, which is that EAP teaches students the 
language they need to be in Anglophone higher education: 
EAP - English for Academic Purposes - refers to the language 
and associated practices that people need in order to undertake 
study or work in English medium higher education. The 
objective of an EAP course, then, is to help these people learn 
some of the linguistic and cultural – mainly institutional and 
disciplinary - practices involved in studying or working through 
the medium of English. 
The question, however, is what is ‘the language and culture of higher 
education’, that Gillet refers to, given what has been said about the modern 
university’s range of aims (Barnett, 2012; Besley & Peters, 2013; Collini, 2012), 
social practices, networked nature and actors, including its diversified 
student body (Sperlinger et al., 2018)? 
Campion (2016, p. 60) draws attention to more divergent opinions about 
what constitutes EAP, but nevertheless narrows it down to language 
courses that are: 
• Designed to meet the specific needs of learners 
• Related in content to particular disciplines, occupations 
and activities 
• Centred on the language appropriate to those activities 
• In contrast with ‘General English’ 
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Her contention, however, is that, whatever EAP is, teachers of it may be 
unprepared to deal with the linguistic, cultural, institutional and disciplinary 
needs of learners because most EAP Units require General English Teaching 
qualifications such as DELTAs (Diploma in English Language Teaching) 
and, increasingly, MAs in TESOL (Teaching English to Students of Other 
Languages). In other words, they are not qualified to teach EAP, which 
requires more than teaching language because it also teaches writing.  
Although there is evidence that EAP practitioners are able to draw on 
research from a range of writing communities, such as genre-analysis 
(including disciplinary differences), systemic functional linguistics, critical 
EAP and Academic Literacies (Benesch, 2001; Bruce, 2008; C. Coffin & J. P. 
Donohue, 2012; Devitt, 1996; Lynne Flowerdew, 2000; Hyland, 2002b; Johns, 
2003; Swales, 1990), establishing the proper remit of a general EAP course, 
and by implication its dominant writing paradigms, remains unclear and 
challenging. This is as a result of a paucity of specific postgraduate EAP 
teaching qualifications (Ding & Campion, 2016), which is likely to be 
compounding the problem of how academic writing is understood. If, for 
example, there were MA-level degrees in EAP with dedicated writing 
modules, or MAs in Academic Writing9, as there are MAs in Creative 
Writing, or PhDs researching Academic Writing, such as those in Rhetoric 
and Composition Studies in the US, then teachers would have the 
knowledge, confidence, theory and practice to explore the range of 
academic writing landscapes. 
 
9 Notable exceptions in the UK are an MSc in Chemistry and Scientific Writing [accessed 
27/12/2018] at the University of Warwick and an MA in Academic Writing Development 
and Research [accessed 27/12/2018] at Coventry University. 
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As Wardle (2007, p. 554) claims, "Having a major […] dramatically changes a 
field's standing in the academy". 
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that EAP courses are run by 
very different providers whose knowledge of writing is likely to be drawn 
from disparate and fragmented sources. Many of these providers are private 
and outsourced (such as Study Group and Kaplan (US), INTO and 
Cambridge Education Group (UK) and Navitas (Australia); some are taught 
by university departments (such as the School of Education at the 
University of Nottingham or Modern Languages and Linguistics at the 
University of Southampton); and others are offered as part of ‘library 
services’, where advice on and support with academic writing is also offered 
(such as at the University of Leeds, the University of Nottingham and 
Middlesex University). Unlike the US and Europe, albeit with a handful of 
exceptions (e.g. the University of Coventry’s Writing Centre), UK 
universities do not have a culture of ‘writing centres’ (Russell, 2002, p. 50), 
where qualified writing instructors guide student writers and which raise 
the profile of writing as a disciplinary practice. 
This range and fragmentation of writing provision is also symptomatic of 
the unregulated status of the EAP practitioner, a status which in other 
professions is generally conferred by being part of a professional body (such 
as accountancy or translation) or by having a subject-specific academic 
qualification (such as English or Maths)10. Within such a disparate 
 
10 BALEAP [accessed 08/01/2017] ‘supports the professional development of those involved 
in learning, teaching, scholarship and research in English for Academic Purposes (EAP)’. It 
was formerly known as SELMOUS. The first meeting took place in 1972 to meet the 
growing demand for the professional recognition of EAP (Jordan 2002). BALEAP is a 
response to this need for professional status and has developed its own Competency 
 49 
 
landscape, EAP providers can determine their ‘essential qualification’ 
requirements ad hoc, which may not include postgraduate degrees or any 
EAP study and where experience of EAP may only be a ‘desirable’. Add to 
this that what counts as ‘experience of EAP’ also varies in quality and 
content, because of inconsistencies in its provision and theoretical 
underpinnings (are these critical EAP? ELT? Genre-analysis? Systemic 
Functional Linguistics? Applied Linguistics? TESOL? Academic Literacies?), 
it becomes clear why the ‘status of EAP practitioners within the academy’ is 
ambivalent (Ding & Bruce, 2017, p. 2). 
As a consequence of this ambivalence, many EAP tutors may not have gone 
through any relevant academic writing process themselves because they 
may never have written a Master’s dissertation or a PhD thesis. It is likely, 
therefore, that they will glean much of their understandings of academic 
writing from EAP textbooks. However, as discussed above, since these 
generally tend to foreground procedural skills rather than propositional 
practices (a notable exception being Coffin et al. (2002), they are unlikely to 
differentiate between kinds of academic writing and will be unevenly 
informed by writing research. As such, many textbooks are inadequate, 
such as popular textbooks like Bailey’s (2006) Academic Writing for 
International Students, which fails to capture the diversity of student 
writers and the nuances of disciplinary discourses. 
Reservations about EAP teaching qualifications extend to and are further 
embedded in the assessment culture that surrounds EAP and university 
 
Framework for Teachers of English for Academic Purposes – CFTEAP. However, because of 
the fragmentation of providers, including their international presence, not all EAP centres 
abide by the same professional standards 
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entry requirements. Leung et al. (2016), for example, challenge the notion of 
an ‘appropriate academic language’ and indirectly criticise the field of EAP 
for ignoring recent research on multilingualism and English as a Lingua 
Franca in the global university. They do this by questioning the construct 
validity of commercial language proficiency tests, such as IELTS (developed 
by Cambridge English Language Assessment in collaboration with the 
British Council and the International Development Program in Australia) 
and TOEFL (developed by the US Educational Testing Service). These tests 
necessitate expensive preparatory courses (which further perpetuates a 
cycle of commercial, not necessarily pedagogic, interests) and are taught by 
General English teachers. They are then used by institutions of higher 
education who assume they are reliable predictors of academic success. 
IELTS and TOEFL dominate the English assessment market and being 
qualified to teach and test IELTS, in the UK, for example, is highly desirable 
for securing EAP jobs. This further blurs the boundaries between EAP and 
the teaching of language skills. In fact, Leung et al.’s critique centres around 
the fact that IELTS test constructs are designed to measure language skills, 
not socio-academic practices. Practices, they argue, would include ‘effective 
communication’, rather than ‘appropriacy’ or traditional notions of 
accuracy, whereby ‘effective’ means handling the complex nature of 
academic communication, including the confidence to share and critique 
ideas, to manage multimodal and social media communications (2016, p. 61) 
and to feel comfortable with the multilingualism that characterises the 
global university (2016, pp. 64-66).  
Whilst a threshold of language skills may be a pre-requisite for academic 
writing, determining what that threshold is yields inconclusive findings 
(Trenkic & Warmington, 2018). Moreover, whilst having language skills is a 
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necessary condition for academic proficiency, it is not a sufficient one. 
Turner (2018), for example, argues that proficiency in English is unlikely to 
be the root cause of writing problems (2018, pp. 132-3) and that the test 
construct of IELTS as an academic entry exam encourages the conflation of 
good writing with language proficiency. Since IELTS does not integrate the 
practices of reading to write, of knowledge of academic discourses 
(including disciplinary discourses), and of developing research dispositions 
and attitudes to referencing and critical engagement, it does little to ensure 
that “lecturers will have no difficulty in reading students’ work” (2018, p. 
133). 
EAP teachers are therefore left having to juggle decisions about what to 
teach: language or discourse and text analysis? Commercial testing or 
principled pedagogy? Authentic texts or textbook templates? This leaves 
them vulnerable to not developing a knowledgeable and scholarly identity 
of their own. 
The handmaiden 
Écrire est un acte d'amour. S'il ne l'est pas, il n'est qu'écriture (Cocteau, 
1957, p. 151) 
Cocteau’s claim about the nature of writing is thoroughly lost in translation: 
“Writing is an act of love. If it is not, it is just writing” (Google Translate), 
which makes little sense. What écrire evokes is care and passion; écriture is 
simply script. 
Yet, Cocteau’s distinction between écrire (to write - verb, process) and 
écriture (writing - noun, product ) is crucial to understanding how EAP has 
tended to represent academic writing: it conceptualises it as a product 
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stripped of love and feeling, cleansed of the impurities of Cocteau’s 
difficulté d’être (difficulty of being). It is an object of standardised 
convention, structure, formality, clarity and logic, nothing but ‘a dull read’ 
that leads to ‘literary boredom’ (Wolff, 2007). Wolff further laments the 
genre’s obsessive focus on ‘clarity’ and on ‘making every move explicit’, an 
act, he says, which kills suspense, removes surprise and saps joy. Certainly 
not an act of love. 
Such joylessness is evident in the following (standard) characteristics 
deemed to make writing academic: formal, logical, clear, concise, balanced, 
more algorithmic than human, as Warner might describe it (2018, pp. 97-
98) (Fig. 4): 
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I also sense the distinction between écrire and écriture in Mike Rose’s 
depiction of American literacy practices and in his discussion about who is 
responsible for teaching writing, understood as process and as product 
(Mike Rose, 1989, p. 207): 
Figure 4: Characteristics of academic writing available at 
https://library.leeds.ac.uk/info/14011/writing/106/academic_writing [accessed 07/12/2018] 
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Anything longer than the sentence (even two or three sentences 
strung together) is considered writing and the teaching of 
writing shall be the province of the English Department. 
Anything at the sentence level or smaller (like filling words and 
phrases into a workbook) is to be considered grammar review, 
and that falls within the domain of the remedial program. 
Mike Rose, like other educationalists concerned with literacy, social justice 
and access to higher education (Lillis, 2001; Russell, 2002; Sperlinger et al., 
2018), laments the disciplinary and institutional divides that create binaries 
between ‘writing’ as prose, taught by professors of English literature, and 
‘writing’ as mechanical skill, taught by writing tutors. The former, écriture, 
is the domain of the erudite; the latter, écrire, is banished to corrective 
centres serving the academic disciplines their students want to join. 
In an influential article published in 2001, Hyland intimated that the 
identity of the sector is in tension between being a ‘humble servant’ to the 
academy and being a ‘transgressor’. He has since also labelled it a ‘hand-
maiden to those proper disciplines’ (Hyland, 2006b, p. 34, emphasis added): 
Applied linguists, in fact, have generally been seen as inhabiting 
the less glamorous, low rent neighbourhoods of the academy, 
and this is particularly true of those concerned with English for 
Academic Purposes, which is generally regarded as a hand-
maiden to those ‘proper’ disciplines which are more directly 
engaged in the serious business of constructing knowledge or 
discovering truth. EAP, in fact, has come to be regarded as an 
almost mercantile activity and attracted to itself negatively 
evaluative concepts such as pragmatic, cost-effective and 
functional, untroubled by theoretical issues or questions of 
power as it merrily seeks to accommodate students to the 
faceless and impersonal prose of their disciplines. 
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By describing EAP in terms of two contrasting identities, a ‘servant’/‘hand-
maiden’ and ‘transgressor’, he drew attention to the fact that EAP pedagogy 
has been conceived, on the one hand, as a means to an end in the sense that 
it has been designed to prepare students for academic study by following 
templates and prescribing formal language (the ‘humble servant’); and, on 
the other, as being an academic study in its own right (Melles, Millar, 
Morton, & Fegan, 2005), where conventions can be discussed and choices 
encouraged. Hyland’s distinction thus mirrors broader divisions within EAP 
that conceive of it as either a transferable skill or as a critically engaged 
social practice.  
Another way of grasping the tense ‘skills-servant’ versus ‘social practice-
transgressor’ binary that, to some extent, still underscores debates in EAP11 
(albeit with emerging exceptions12) is to consider the following. If we agree 
that the academy is a site of both learning and transforming knowledge 
(Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987) and that the purpose of EAP is to facilitate 
access to the academy, then EAP should also be a site for both learning and 
transforming knowledge. Therefore, in addition to ensuring learners 
become knowledgeable about the norms of language and about who sets 
these norms and why, EAP also has a responsibility to ensure students 
 
11 As recently as November 2018, Baleap held an event entitled ‘Academic Literacies and 
EAP: Same or Different?’ [accessed 24/03/2019] signalling that the binary endures. This is 
six years on from Wingate and Tribble (2012)’s influential, and controversial, article on the 
same issues. Controversial because it was rebutted by Academic Literacies scholars Lillis 
and Tuck (2016), who distance themselves from EAP and align themselves to Critical EAP 
(Benesch, 1988, 2001; S. Benesch, 2009; Benesch, 2012) and the US-based field of Writing in 
the Disciplines (Bazerman, 1988) and Writing Across the Curriculum (Russell, 1991) 
12 The sociological theories of Basil Bernstein, via Maton (2013) are beginning to be heard in 
EAP via scholars such as Mark Brooke (2019), who argue for ‘knowledge’, rather than 
language, to be the purpose of EAP. 
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become knowledgeable about the norms of the academy, which require 
being autonomous and critical, including critical of norms. In order for EAP 
to facilitate this, it would need to critique its own practices, linguistic and 
academic, by transgressing against as well as serving the academic 
disciplines.  
The binary is also manifest in academic writing. By presenting writing as a 
relatively non-negotiable set of transferable skills, EAP replicates and 
perpetuates, i.e. ‘serves’ rather than challenges, institutional writing norms 
without involving students in exploring the affordances of meaningful and 
creative alternatives. Without, that is, involving students in ‘transgression’. 
Framing EAP through the Hyland lens of institutional servitude versus 
transgression highlights the ill-defined purpose of EAP writing culture: is it 
to ‘serve’ an Other, where ‘other’ stands for the disciplines, whose writing 
practices are as varied as the length of string?; or is it to be ‘academic’, in 
the sense of ‘educational’ and a beacon of “truth and critical thinking” 
where practices are questioned (Connell, 2013, p. 106)?  
In the UK, at least, most EAP provision exists to serve the Academy in the 
sense that it is classified as an academic ‘service’ or ‘business’ (Ding & 
Bruce, 2017; Turner, 2004, p. 96) or ‘major industry’ (Hyland, 2012, p. 30) 
that can be bought from providers who are not academically accredited (by 
the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), for example) and whose staff are not 
academics. These providers, as already mentioned, are generally private 
sector units whose EAP exiting exams have been recognised by universities 
or they can be non-credit-bearing units within the university itself that act 
as feeder-schools for accredited university degrees. Because of its profit-
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making nature, EAP is a commodified13 sector and is part of the 
marketisation of higher education, generally (Molesworth, Scullion, & 
Nixon, 2011). In some ways, skills-based approaches are both masters of and 
slaves to this marketisation because skills and products are easily measured, 
tested, transferred and monetised: they are masters because their easy 
transmission ends up determining what counts as academic writing, but 
also slaves because they then have to abide by the rules they themselves 
have created.  
While many in higher education more broadly lament this trend where 
skills are valued more than practices (Collini, 2012, pp. 141-146), blaming an 
‘ascendancy of technicism, competencies and the proliferation of 
performance indicators that accompany audit cultures’ (Smith, 1999, p. 
327), many also seem to welcome it, as evidenced by the proliferation of 
‘study skills’ publications.  
In an apparent volte-face and notwithstanding his earlier recognition of 
EAP’s servile status, Hyland’s more recent defence of EAP (2018) largely 
supports the field’s right to remain a ‘hand-maiden’. His main reasons for 
this can be summarised as follows: firstly, alternative approaches to 
teaching academic writing have not worked (2018, p. 388, although he 
doesn’t refer to which approaches), which means EAP is all we have to help 
students access higher education; secondly, EAP teachers take on the 
responsibility of preparing students who would otherwise be ‘vulnerable’ to 
 
13 I use the term ‘commodification’ in the sense used by Connell (2013) to refer to the 
process of transforming principles into commodities, that is to say into ‘things’ that can be 
bought and sold within a free market and whose value is measured in monetary terms 
rather than in social or educational terms. 
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the challenging demands of academia (ibid), which implies we ought to be 
grateful to them rather than accuse them of being subservient ‘butlers’ 
(with reference to Raimes (1991); thirdly, precarious teaching contracts and 
the low service-technician status of EAP in the ‘marketised higher 
education system’ mean that EAP teachers cannot take on the risks of 
challenging writing conventions by engaging critically with their epistemic 
affordances (ibid): to do so would be like “blaming coal miners for air 
pollution” (Hyland, 2018, p. 389); and fourthly, critical approaches to EAP 
are ideological in the sense that they assume the teacher has a correct 
reading of any given socio-political situation as well as a right to share that 
reading in class. Rather, according to Hyland, students are likely to be more 
comfortable with the received wisdom of convention in order to pass their 
exams than with understanding the finer socio-semiotic opportunities of 
textual representation that a more critical writing pedagogy might afford 
(Hyland, 2018, p. 393): 
[t]he ‘student consumer’ of the twenty-first century, relatively 
austere, career-focused and laden with debt, is keen to get what 
he or she has paid for. 
There are several difficulties with Hyland’s line of defence, which I now 
address with the intention of showing that they perpetuate the problem of 
academic writing in EAP by accommodating deficit, skills-based models.  
Firstly, claiming that EAP is the best approach we have to writing because 
‘alternative approaches’ haven’t worked does not exonerate EAP from 
criticism. It merely begs his claim. To adapt his own example, that would be 
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like stating fossil fuels are the best source of energy because alternative 
sources haven’t worked: if an alternative source or approach ‘doesn’t work’, 
the reasons may be structural, institutional or political rather than 
inherent. Moreover, that alternative approaches haven’t worked or, indeed, 
that EAP itself ‘works’, is contentious since standards for measuring success 
and failure are dependent on assessment constructs (which, as evidenced in 
Leung et al. (2016), are not always valid), on writing tasks and genres, on 
learning aims and outcomes, on entry levels and wide-ranging disciplinary 
demands.  
If one measures EAP’s successes in relation to the IELTS writing task, for 
example, such as the 250-word 5-paragraph ‘argumentative’ essay that 
focuses on accuracy, not academic argument, then EAP is indeed likely to 
‘work’ better than an Academic Literacies or Composition Studies approach, 
both of which teach and test extended pieces of research writing. If, on the 
other hand, one were to measure EAP’s ability “to prepare students for the 
unpredictable new forms of communication that await them” (Huckin, 
2003, p. 3) or for managing risk (Thesen & Cooper, 2013), developing voice 
(Matsuda & Tardy, 2008), writing multimodally (Andrews et al., 2012; Jewitt, 
2013) and for research writing in the social sciences (Thomson & Kamler, 
2011b), then an EAP approach that is uncritically anchored to its own 
academic writing skills and conventions may not ‘work’.  
It has also been recognised that alternative approaches to EAP, such as 
Academic Literacies and Critical EAP (Lillis & Tuck, 2016), have played an 
important role in “raising questions about and possibly extending the roles 
and responsibilities of practitioners” (Ding & Bruce, 2017, p. 120) to include 
“a responsibility to engage in promoting social justice and political change” 
(p. 121). Taking on such responsibilities might, in turn, affect the forms of 
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writing that teachers model and that students can choose from. For 
example, a recent special issue of the Journal of English for Academic 
Purposes was dedicated to gender and academic writing, where the 
relationship between discourse, language choice, labour, access and gender 
is explored and the possibility of presenting students with alternatives to 
standard academic writing is raised (Lillis et al., 2018). The fact that this 
more questioning, critical role is being acknowledged as important by the 
field of EAP testifies to its success, not its failure. 
Secondly, even if preparing students for academic study were the sole 
responsibility of EAP teachers, this does not exonerate them from adopting 
a critical and reflective stance towards what, who and how they teach. This 
point has been raised by Turner (2018, p. 242) who suggests that if teachers 
of writing were also researchers in their field, they would in fact be best-
placed for educating the academy at large about writing because they could 
raise awareness of how varied, ideological and mobile writing landscapes 
are (2018, pp. 242; 252-3; 256-7). According to Turner, writing researchers 
are more disposed to interrogate the assumptions of Western cultural 
rhetoric than might be the case for academics reading texts for arguments 
within a specific disciplinary context. The reasons teachers may be adopting 
a ‘butler’ or ‘handmaiden’ stance, argues Turner, is in part because they are 
not qualified to do otherwise, but it may also amount to a choice dictated 
by convenience or ideology, or both. 
Thirdly, however, there is an important sense in which this may not be a 
choice. Rather, it may be the result of institutional practices that prevent 
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EAP teachers from doing and keeping up to date with writing scholarship14. 
In support of his claim that the low status of EAP practitioners15 prevents 
them from challenging writing practices, Hyland draws on Ding and Bruce 
(2017), who reflect on how the precarious status of EAP practitioners within 
the academy poses a ‘fundamental conundrum’ for how they are to “induct 
students into the literate practices and processes of the academic world 
despite their own ambivalent status within the academy” (2017, p. 2). Whilst 
recognising that “EAP has accumulated an extensive interdisciplinary 
knowledge base that draws upon different research streams” (2017, p. 5), 
Ding and Bruce also acknowledge the material and institutional difficulties 
that EAP practitioners face in endeavouring to do justice to such 
knowledge. These difficulties surface in what they call a ‘conundrum’: on 
the one hand, EAP is seen as a commodified ‘support service’ that relies on 
commercially available materials that lend themselves to being taught 
uncritically and within limited time frames; on the other hand, EAP sees 
itself as a ‘field of study’ that (2017, p. 8): 
involves developing students’ ability as discourse analysts so that 
they can unravel and participate in the discourses of the 
particular academic community that they aspire to join. 
Furthermore, it involves developing awareness of critical 
 
14 By ‘scholarship’ I mean “activities relating to developing and refining one’s overall 
knowledge of practice in EAP”. This is different to ‘research’ which “[is] a planned, 
systematic investigation that aims to inform one specialised aspect of the knowledge base on 
which the field of EAP draws” (Ding and Bruce, 2017, p. 111, emphasis in original) 
15 See Ding and Bruce (2017) for a detailed discussion on the use of the term ‘practitioner’ to 
designate the EAP ‘teacher’ 
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thinking as an evaluative judgment shaped by epistemology, 
research methods and communicative values and genres. 
If the status of EAP practitioners, argue Ding and Bruce, were aligned with 
the status of being an academic, whereby time and resources for 
scholarship were built into permanent contractual terms and career 
progression, then greater critical and reflective autonomy might 
characterise the way they teach EAP, including writing. It is in this sense 
that blaming teachers for their inability to engage critically with writing 
research, and therefore potentially misguiding students about what writing 
is, does and can do, amounts to ‘blaming coal miners for pollution’. 
A recent article by Davis (2019), whose report of EAP practitioner responses 
to why they generally don’t engage in research and publish their work, 
largely echoes the findings of Ding and Bruce (2017). Specifically, Davis’ 
interviewees claim that they are actively discouraged from engaging in 
scholarship (2019, p. 78): 
All EAP professionals would like to say we are a profession, but 
you are not encouraged, once you get to a certain point, to take 
it any further. I find that contradictory really. The message from 
the department is ‘it isn’t your job to do research, this isn’t what 
you’re employed to do … this does not benefit the ELC so you’re 
not getting any time for that (Practitioner F). 
In an institution of quality, you would expect it to be legitimate 
to publish […] I have encountered jealousy from certain 
managers, and have the feeling that management is sometimes 
unhappy about efforts to publish because it might undermine 
their authority (Practitioner H). 
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Davis’ portrait of EAP further compounds its status of servitude and 
marginalisation whereby practitioners continue to operate ‘on the edge of 
academia’. 
To be fair, EAP has evolved since its more prescriptive beginnings (Jordan, 
1996, 1997) to include a range of theories and teaching approaches (Hyland 
& Shaw, 2016) that recognise a range of written academic genres (Nesi & 
Gardner, 2012), including controversies surrounding the inclusion and 
exclusion of ‘non-native’ varieties (Hyland, 2016a, 2016b; Politzer-Ahles, 
Holliday, Girolamo, Spychalskae, & Harper Berksonf, 2016). This critical 
attention in EAP literatures might suggest that it is no longer the ‘hand-
maiden’ it once was. Yet, doubts linger. These include concerns about what 
theories and pedagogies of writing are actually being enacted in EAP 
classrooms across the world (Jenkins, 2016, emphasis added): 
[ELFA16, Critical EAP or Academic Literacies] are […] challenging 
the practices in the real teaching approaches such as EAP, that 
were indeed quite prescriptive earlier on, but have now moved 
away from prescribing narrow templates of academic writing 
towards engaging learners in genre analysis. In the publications 
around these approaches there’s no evidence that ‘they conform 
by default to native academic English’, though I suspect this is 
what’s going on in practice in the many EAP pre-sessional and in-
sessional classes around the world. 
Similar concerns about what actually goes on in EAP classrooms and about 
the disjunction between theory and practice have also been voiced by 
Hyland (2016c, pp. 146-147; 151, my emphasis): 
 
16 English as a Lingua Franca Academic (Tribble, 2016) 
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‘what’s the basis for believing that you can teach writing as a set 
of generic skills that prescribe accuracy and the avoidance of 
error? [A view that] is still very much alive in many classrooms 
around the world, especially where English is taught as a second 
or foreign language. In many schools, writing classes are 
grammar classes in disguise and students are asked to write 
simply to demonstrate their knowledge of syntactic rules. In 
these situations, grammatical accuracy and clear exposition are 
often the main criteria of good writing […] This autonomous, 
decontextualised view of writing also carries over into the design 
of many large international exams […] focusing on accuracy is 
exactly the wrong place to look for writing competence, as there is 
little evidence to show that either syntactic complexity or 
grammatical accuracy are the best measures of good writing […] 
no particular feature can be said to be a marker of good writing. 
What is being signalled by Jenkins and Hyland, above, is that there may be 
a mismatch between what EAP advocates in its guise of “a researched-
informed academic field of study” (Ding & Bruce, 2017, p. 4, emphasis in 
original) and what it practises in its guise as a support service. 
Conclusion 
Despite EAP’s positive aspirations to be a critically engaged and reflective 
field of academic study, it nonetheless continues to operate predominantly 
as a service sector. Because of its marketized status, it lends itself to 
adopting narrow and reductionist approaches to academic writing, thus 
failing to engage fully with writing research. Reductive approaches to 
writing, in turn, both lead to and are generated by several problems. These 
include the straight-jacket approach to genre, encouraged by the textbook 
industry; EAP teachers whose ELT backgrounds confer upon them an 
ambivalent identity that does not systematically qualify them to teach 
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academic writing; and to consolidating the hand-maiden, or butler, stance 
of EAP more generally as it grapples with its own ambivalent status within 
the academy. 
Chapter 2 explores the broader implications of these problems. 
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Chapter 2 - The implications of all this 
trouble 
More than any other measure of the value of what writers do, even academic 
ones, is to provide companionship for further thought. Writing here is less an 
achievement that is measured extrinsically than an invitation to imagine beyond 
its own terms of reference. Books and essays here befriend and encourage 
thinking with interlocutors that remain anonymous. This value cannot be 
audited or cheapened through the mechanisms that aim to judge, measure and 
distribute repute and ultimately money (Back, 2016, p. 64). 
 
Introduction 
EAP’s servitude to the academy, discussed in Chapter 1, has several 
problematic implications for the development of writing practices. In this 
chapter, I limit my focus to three implications. These are the tendency for 
EAP to universalise and standardise its own version of academic writing 
instead of teaching about writing. It does this by foregrounding the 
mechanics at the expense of the content (Murray & Sharpling, 2018) and of 
the thinking (Yun & Standish, 2018). Textbooks get instrumentalised to do 
this because they prescribe rules rather than guide towards possibilities. 
When skills, rules and conventions are foregrounded, the opportunities for 
academic misconduct (including plagiarism and ghostwriting) increase 
because templates are easily replicated and assessed.  
The second implication of EAP’s servitude is that it marginalises studies in 
cognate fields such as Writing Studies and Academic Literacies, all of which 
are shaping and critiquing academic writing practices. And finally, but not 
least, the hand-maiden approach to academic writing risks standardising 
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written communication to a mono-culture instead of internationalising to 
include a multiple-culture. This has educational, academic, social, 
economic, ethical and epistemological consequences.  
Universalising academic discourse 
The way EAP universalises academic discourse can be inferred from the 
following quotation taken from a study on ‘what academics value in student 
writing’ in which applied linguists Murray and Sharpling (2018, p. 9) argue 
that: 
academic writing programmes such as pre-sessional and credit- 
and non-credit-bearing in-sessional courses should focus less on 
language per se and more on other aspects of writing such as 
students’ understanding of subject-specific content and their 
critical engagement. 
The authors challenge standard perceptions of what counts as ‘good’ 
academic writing and conclude that linguistic accuracy and form are less 
important than content and critical engagement. This conclusion is shared 
by others who challenge the conflation of good writing with accurate or 
appropriate forms (C. E. Ball & Loewe, 2017; Pullman, 2009) and who resist 
foregrounding the mechanics of writing at the expense of the content (Yun 
& Standish, 2018). Yet, despite widespread consensus in the literatures that 
good writing cannot be reduced to linguistic skills, many EAP textbooks 
still foreground textual form, often drawing on lexical corpora (Gardner & 
Davies, 2014; Nesi & Gardner, 2012), ascribing academic meaning-making 
powers to some language forms rather than others (Fig. 5).  
As argued in Chapter 1, this is now explained and exemplified. 
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Academic Words 
For example, EAP has enthusiastically embraced the teaching of Academic 
Word Lists (AWLs) (Coxhead, 2011; Gardner & Davies, 2014)17. These are 
lexical corpora compiled from samples of academic texts designed to 
establish the frequency with which certain words occur in disciplinary 
writings (such as journal articles). AWLs are often included or referred to in 
 
17 Available from https://www.victoria.ac.nz/lals/resources/academicwordlist/sublists 
[accessed 19/11/2018] 
Figure 5: Text Inspector available at 
https://twitter.com/i/moments/1010897901923467264 [accessed 27/12/2018] 
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EAP textbooks, teaching materials and writing advice literatures, too, such 
as online Text Inspector tools (Fig. 5) which show how corpora (academic 
word lists) and lexical frequencies are being used commercially to assess 
academic writing. This particular tool boasts that it is informed by extensive 
research in applied linguistics and academic word lists, despite the fact that 
their relevance to the development of academic writing competence has 
been questioned by Paquot (2010) and Hyland and Tse (2007), inter alia, on 
the grounds that these lists are incomplete, inconsistent, irrelevant or 
imprecise indicators of what constitutes and contributes to the 
characteristics of academic discourses.  
Turner has argued that the use of such corpora is “the continuation of the 
long-standing cultural concern to choose words in the interests of precision 
and economy” (2018, p. 46), a legacy inherited from seventeenth century 
Enlightenment philosopher John Locke. This notion has since evolved into 
the Orwellian trope that good prose is ‘like a window pane’ (2018, pp. 36 
and 48), that it should be so clear and transparent that its meaning is 
apparent. And precision and economy are indeed valued in EAP discourses, 
as evidenced by Bennett (2009, 2015), for example. However, since general 
words like ‘sex’ and ‘team’ are also on the academic word lists (Sublists 3 
and 9, respectively), it is unclear how these lists contribute to developing 
academic discourse. My own EAP classroom experience has revealed that 
AWLs become easily misused and reified to the status of official academic 
discourse, and are deferred to by teachers and students as indicators of 
whether a text is academic or not. In fact, a common refrain amongst 
students who are asked to learn the AWLs is ‘how many academic words 
should my essay include to make it ‘academic’?, which suggests they think 
that it is the words, not the ideas they stand for or the discourses to which 
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they belong, that matters. Furthermore, narrowing what counts as 
academic to a finite list inevitably excludes what is not on the list making 
the list incomplete from the outset. 
A different approach to the teaching of academic writing can be found in 
Graff and Birkenstein (2006). Here, the purpose of writing remains firmly in 
the foreground, namely that academic writers are, from the outset, entering 
into conversations with literatures past and looking for their own voices to 
respond to the ideas they engage with. Rather than providing lists of 
prescribed words, Graff and Birkenstein encourage student writers, in 
particular, to approach their texts as places where they are ‘doing things’ 
rather than simply saying them. For example, writers explain why things 
matter, introduce what sceptics might say and provide meta-commentaries 
to orient the reader’s understanding. Once writers have made decisions 
about what they want to do, they can then choose language that best 
achieves this aim. In turn, having sentence templates that can then enable 
such functional moves enables writers to bring into focus what they want to 
say.  
Paragraphs 
EAP also tends to prescribe, and universalise, understandings of paragraph 
structures and their functions rather than describe their range and explain 
the reasons for why they vary in length, structure and content. For example, 
the following is a common understanding of paragraph structures in EAP, 
but also in standard writing instruction, including IELTS: ‘a paragraph must 
deal with one subject or main idea at a time, it must have a topic sentence 
and be of a certain length’ (Bailey, 2006, p. 111; 169; Basbøll, 2014; Bennett, 
2009, p. 46; Turner, 2018). This is despite evidence that academic writing 
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displays significant variety when it comes to paragraphs (Bodle, 2015; 
Pinker, 2014, p. 26) and that some even claim that ‘there is no such thing as 
a paragraph’ (Pinker, 2014, p. 145): 
Many writing guides provide detailed instructions on how to 
write a paragraph. But the instructions are misguided, because 
there is no such thing as a paragraph. That is, there is no item in 
an outline, no branch in a tree, no unit of discourse that 
consistently corresponds to a block of text delimitated by a 
blank line or an indentation. What does exist is the paragraph 
break: a visual bookmark that allows the reader to pause, to take 
a breather, assimilate what he has heard, and then find his place 
again on the page. 
Moreover, whilst many academic paragraphs seem to meet the topic 
sentence/main idea/one topic requirement found in EAP textbooks, as well 
as in classic style guides such as Strunk and White (2000) – now discredited 
because of its outdated advice (Hayot, 2014; Pinker, 2014) - many do not, 
and can be used instead to develop an author’s critique of and reflection on 
evidence rather than as an opportunity to display evidence (Fig. 6): 
Figure 6: Paragraph with no obvious topic sentence (Gillies et al., 2016)  
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Alternatives to the topic sentence/main idea approach, can be found in 
Hayot (2014, pp. 59-73), for example. Hayot frames the paragraph in more 
reader-enticing terms as: “an opening promise, a move towards detail and 
then a building up from the detail outward to a conclusion that supersedes 
the first sentence” (ibid 2014, p. 67).  
Stance 
EAP also tends to over-conflate personal pronouns with writer stance, 
identity or self-mention (Hyland, 2002c, p. 208). This has led to 
downplaying the role of other linguistic, rhetorical and disciplinary features 
(Bennett, 2009, pp. 48-50) such as content-related nouns (Stock & Lea Eik-
Nes, 2016) or adverbials (Swales, 2011) to indicate the writer’s position and 
orientation (Hyland, 2002a). It also ignores the intentionality and agency of 
the writer who may have chosen to use an active or passive for an overall 
rhetorical effect rather than for reasons of subjectivity/objectivity: 
sometimes, the use of a passive can have more force as a marker of agency, 
attitude and subjectivity than the use of the active. 
This can be illustrated with reference to a sociology paper that won a prize 
for outstanding scholarship and which tackled the highly controversial 
issue of how biology and neuroscience have informed the UK government’s 
policy on early years intervention. This social policy involved ‘teaching’ 
socially marginalised, poor and disaffected mothers how to parent their 
children (Gillies et al., 2016). 
At first glance, the paper displays the conventional features of a scientific 
academic text, features that EAP is likely to highlight and encourage 
students to emulate: nominalisations, post-modifications, noun phrases, 
paragraphing, referencing, and several words from the academic word lists.  
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A closer textual analysis, however, reveals features that a traditional skills-
based EAP approach to academic writing is likely to miss. The article 
displays the highly charged and personal language of scientific 
controversies (Bazerman, 1988) and the intention of the authors, who are 
sociologists, to foreground these through the use of frequent quotations 
(where EAP would normally encourage paraphrasing), flippancy and 
dismissiveness (marked by the use of the colloquial ain’t) at the suggestion 
that government policy is embarking on eugenics (“biology ain’t what it 
used to be”; “the thing that made eugenics so scary” and “we really don’t live 
in that kind of world anymore”), but also recognition that eugenics may be 
a reality (“horrifying legacy of eugenics”, 2016, p. 220) and that modern-day 
sociology has become a “mangy-looking beast” (2016, p. 221). 
The paper’s abstract relies heavily on the passive, which on an EAP reading 
might simply suggest an ‘objective distancing to focus on the result’ (Fig. 7): 
 
 
However, on a rhetorical or socially-oriented reading, it might indicate the 
authors’ strategic decision to abide by the conventions of scientific 
academic prose (the paper does draw on and question biological and 
neuroscientific evidence, but it is not a scientific paper) thereby appeasing 
the initial reading expectations of the scientific community and ‘luring’ 
them into the text. The initial use of the conventional academic passive 
might, however, be interpreted as a ‘hook’ to introduce what soon becomes 
a hard-hitting and impassioned sociological critique of how science is 
instrumentalised to engineer socio-political agendas.  
Figure 7: Passive voice (Gillies, Edwards, & Horsley, 2016)  
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Sociological Review Editor Marie-Andrée Jacob (2018) has described the 
paper in terms of a performative, in terms, that is, of what it does and the 
impact it has on the reader . She has called the paper: 
a beautifully written and stern warning […]. a hell of a ride. It 
has fast rhythms […]. The paper is an invitation to look at the 
backstage of […] powerful coalitions […] The language of the 
paper … it is effective how you use the language, you don’t spare 
us, you make it hard, it’s not gentle, it is an orgy of Newspeak … 
the paper is full of Newspeak, it is the hope that nurture can 
change nature. 
This is because, as the paper develops, personal pronouns (Fig. 8) and 
newspeak – such as ‘biologized policy trope’ or ‘ the grip of neoliberal 
moralization of hope’ (Gillies et al., 2016, p. 221) give energy and 
momentum to the argument as the writers sharpen their critiques: 
 
As Helen Sword (2009, p. 334) reminds us, “energetic engaged prose fosters 
energetic engaged reading, for better or for worse”: it is risky as it may lead 
Figure 8: Personal pronouns (Gillies et al., 2016) 
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to failure and rejection, but it does exist and as such is part of the academic 
writing landscape. 
A general EAP reading of such a text, by contrast, is likely to focus on 
surface grammar and lexis, such as the passive/active voice and frequency 
of ‘academic words’. In other words, the skills. Such a reductive reading, 
however, would miss the range of semiotic resources that the authors 
mobilise to further their argument and communicate their stance. It is 
highly unlikely that an EAP writing approach would highlight the 
performative qualities of the text, and in ignoring these, it would miss the 
overall academic practice that is enacted through this text, namely its 
critical engagement with a controversy. 
Monomodality and monolingualism 
EAP universalises monomodality at the expense of multimodality. This is 
despite the fact that Canagarajah, along with many others, has shown that 
(2013a, p. 1, my emphasis): 
Writing is multimodal, with multiple semiotic features (space, 
visuals), ecological resources (objects, people, texts), and 
modalities (oral, visual, and aural) contributing to its production 
and interpretation. Language is therefore only one of the 
resources that goes into writing. If text construction, circulation, 
and reception involve diverse social, semiotic, and ecological 
resources, we have to ask if we should continue to deﬁne writing 
according to language considerations alone. 
The terms ‘multimodal’ and ‘monomodal’ refer to the range of socio-
semiotic, or symbolic, properties of text rather than to vocabulary, text 
structure or grammar, understood as features typically associated with 
language. These properties include different media such as images, video, 
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sound (including speech), symbols, colours, fonts, layout and space, all of 
which create meaning.  
Work focused on modality and its socially-embedded, meaning-making 
nature includes the ‘grammar’ of images, exemplified in Kress and Van 
Leeuwen (2006) to show how meanings are created by sequences and 
juxtapositions of images. Building on this work, Bezemer and Kress (2008) 
explore the affordances of different modes of communication, or ‘what is 
lost and what is gained through transduction’, i.e. when meaning moves 
between visual and written modes. English (2011) has explored the concept 
of ‘re-genring’ as a way of helping students make meaning academically in 
ways that do not include traditional essays: for example, students can write 
in the genre of dialogues or produce radio programmes to explore academic 
issues and develop critical stances. Halliday (1994b) has explored the 
semiotics of spoken and written modes, specifically, and shown how the 
grammar of each produces different meanings. The work of Harris (2000) 
re-thinks writing as a semiotic system of spaces, marks and drawings, 
retracing the etymology of writing to drawing itself (I discuss this further in 
Chapter 3). The handbooks of Jewitt (2009) and Andrews et al. (2012), 
respectively, examine the use of multimodality in a range of contexts, 
including the PhD thesis. And multimodality is further documented by A. 
Archer and Breuer (2016b) and A. Archer and Breuer (2015), who examine 
its affordances in higher education and writing, respectively. 
For my present purposes, which are to show that EAP universalises 
monomodality at the expense of multimodality, it is sufficient to refer to 
the clarifications of C. E. Ball and Charlton (2015, pp. 42-43): 
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[T]here are still two major misconceptions associated with 
multimodality. First, some assume all multimodal texts are 
digital […]. Second, some assume that the opposite of 
multimodal is monomodal. In fact, there is no such thing as a 
monomodal text [e.g. the five-paragraph essay uses visual and 
spatial modes such as fonts, margins, spacing, etc., in addition to 
the linguistic mode]. […] Monomodality, then, is used 
(incorrectly) to signify a lack of multiple media or modes when 
really what a user might mean is that a structure like a five-
paragraph essay privileges the linguistic mode over the spatial or 
visual modes. 
Framing all writing as multimodal involves recognising the meaning-
making potential of a diverse range of interacting modes on the page 
because “[i]t is the page that illustrates, argues and elaborates by combining 
text, graphics, diagrams and tables” (Hippala, 2016, p. 55). This is not the 
same as reducing the meaning of a text to a finite set of modes, as EAP 
textbooks tend to.  
Despite general agreement by writing researchers that writing is 
multimodal, an online search (27/12/2016) of the Journal of English for 
Academic Purposes using ‘multimodal’ as the key word, generated just 34 
articles and book reviews published between 2001 and 2017. However, the 
only search item with ‘multimodal’ in its title was a book review: the focus 
of the remaining 33 items was not multimodality.  
Similarly, when searching for articles on multilingualism in EAP, most 
articles tended to focus on the differences between first and second 
language or on the hegemony of English as a lingua franca. This is different 
to multilingualism understood as the extent to which a learner’s first 
language can be accommodated or meshed with English to mobilise all the 
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communication resources available to a writer (Canagarajah, 2013b; Zenger, 
Mullin, & Peterson Haviland, 2014) or as the ways a writer’s many languages 
could be meshed to enhance meaning-making potential.  
This, too, is despite what Leung et al. (2016, pp. 64, emphasis added) have 
referred to as the ‘multilingual turn’ in applied linguistics. This “involves a 
move away from notions such as ‘native speaker competence’, ‘L1 
interference’, and monolingual approaches to languages more generally, to 
a focus on language as social practice and multilingualism as a valuable 
resource rather than a problem”. The authors go on to argue that by 
breaking down the dichotomy between first and second language to allow 
both to find their space in academic communication, ‘new creative 
possibilities’ for making meaning emerge. Examples of this can be found in 
Mao (2005), who documents the use of American Chinese rhetorical 
features in meaning-making or in Canagarajah (2011), who explores 
strategies for enabling student writers to bring their own languages into the 
text. 
This paucity of multilingual and multimodal content in EAP literature is at 
odds with the protean, mobile nature of written communication 
(Blommaert & Horner, 2017; Turner, 2018). Instead, EAP frames the writing 
of academic texts as linear, monomodal (in the sense of privileging the 
linguistic mode) and English language-oriented as opposed to opening its 
lens to a wider range of academic discourses and possibilities which could 
provide opportunities for framing knowledge differently. Work by, for 
example, Fiona English on re-genring (2011) and Karen Bennett on 
Portuguese academic discourse (2010) raises critical awareness of creative 
and knowledge-shaping textual possibilities. Specifically, English calls for 
academic communication to explore a far greater range of genres, including 
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dialogues and story-telling, whilst Bennett contends that since the aim of 
EAP is to reduce and eliminate interference from a writer’s first language, 
English Academic Discourse suffers because it ignores the fact that there 
are “alternative ways of construing knowledge”. As a consequence of this 
narrowing, epistemic representation becomes limited (Bennett, 2010, p. 22).  
Conventions 
The academic writing textbook industry plays its part in universalising and 
standardising EAP writing practices by allowing conventions, such as the 
avoidance of the first person pronoun ‘I’, to become entrenched (Agaoglu, 
Friday 19 April 2013 ): 
Some practices are so longstanding […] they have solidified in 
our subconscious – impossible to change, or even question. This 
irony is not lost on me. Academia is supposed to be a place to 
question everything, yet every day I’m surrounded by silent rules 
that are not up for questioning. 
One such ‘silent rule’ can be found in Bailey (2006, p. 105), a popular and 
widely referred to resource in EAP: 
Academic writing attempts to be precise, semi-formal, 
impersonal and objective. This does not mean that pronouns like 
I and we are never used, but in general, the focus is on 
presenting information as clearly and accurately as possible. 
There exist at least two misguided assumptions in this quotation: firstly, 
that ‘precision’, ‘formality’, ‘impersonality’ and ‘objectivity’ are defining 
properties of academic writing. They are not, as shown in Hayot (2014); 
Peters (2009); Pinker (2014); Sword (2012), at least. And secondly, that these 
properties are prevented from emerging when personal forms are used, 
80 
which, again, they are not:: "Often the pronouns I, me, and you are not just 
harmless but downright helpful" (Pinker, 2014, p. 53). Scientific writing also 
challenges the convention to be ‘objective and impersonal’, such as the 
seminal article announcing the discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick 
(1953), which relied on academically ‘inappropriate’ personal pronouns to 
achieve academic persuasion (Moore, 2000, p. 23; Bazerman, 1998, pp. 27-
34). 
The product description of another commercially available EAP textbook 
re-enforces atomistic and reductionist approaches to writing by 
foregrounding the surface features of lexis and grammar and by collapsing 
the notion of ‘academic’ with the essay genre. It also arrogates to itself a 
universal notion of ‘contemporary academic writing’ that has no equivalent 
outside of EAP (Sowton, 2016, pp., emphasis added): 
‘Contemporary Academic Writing’ represents a new and 
interesting approach to writing academic essays, providing 
staged support and guidance from the sentence level right 
through to whole text. There is a strong focus on the high-
frequency language and grammatical structures which are found 
in academic writing. 
What the book does not address is the role played in academic writing by 
referencing, argumentation, genre, multimodality, or anything resembling 
the threshold concepts discussed in Adler-Kassner and Wardle (2015), such 
as the fact that writing is an activity that enables things to happen. The 
book also remains silent on the fact that actual ‘contemporary academic 
writing’ includes research that requires knowledge of literatures in a 
disciplinary field and that academic writing is pivotal in what Thomson and 
Kamler (2011a) call ‘identity work’, namely establishing oneself within 
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disciplinary conversations. Rather, the sample ‘academic’ texts offered as 
examples of academic writing are five-paragraph essays with no referencing. 
For example, p. 82 proposes a textbook genre (‘Is too much social media 
dangerous’), whereby knowledge is presented as fact with no source 
(Friesen, 2017, p. 144). 
The complex and troubled notion of ‘voice’ in academic writing, especially 
with regards to second-language writing (Elbow, 1994a, 1994b, 1998, 2012; 
Helms-Park & Stapleton, 2003; Matsuda & Tardy, 2007, 2008) is mentioned 
on pages 65 and 66 of Sowton’s ‘interesting approach to writing’. However, 
this key and complex feature of academic writing is reduced to a 
grammatical feature, not a rhetorical, discursive, critical or identity-
building process. 
When it ossifies models that airbrush novelty, diversity and variety, 
pedagogy also contributes to the universalistion of EAP writing, as do 
standardisation in both teaching and assessment practices. 
‘Standardisation’ was the focus of a plenary talk given by John Swales18 in 
2015 during which he argued, on his final slide, that: 
as academic and research English becomes a lingua franca, both 
in its forms and in its varieties, as well as in terms of its 
participants, experimentation in both style and substance should 
be open to all the bolder-hearted, to all the discontents of 
 
18 Emphasis in original closing plenary ‘Standardization and its Discontents (with apologies 
to Sigmund Freud)’, 1 November, 2015, at the PRISEAL 3 conference on academic writing 
and publishing entitled Researching, teaching and supporting research communication: 
Perspectives and prospects at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Coimbra, 
Portugal.  
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excessive and stultifying standardisation, whoever they are and 
wherever they be. 
He further claimed that teachers are prone to dismissing examples of 
innovative or non-conventional academic writing as being one-off events 
that deviate from the norm. Yet, as also pointed out by Swales, both 
Bakhtin’s The Problem with Speech Genres (1953, 1987) and Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (1953), published in the same year, were highly 
influential academic texts (in philology and philosophy, respectively) and 
both testify to a ‘heterogeneity of speech genres (both oral and written)’ 
(Bakhtin, 1953, 1987, p. 60)  indicating that however stable the conventions 
may be at any given time, this stability is contingent on who the writer is 
and what their academic intent amounts to.  
Reflecting the contingency of conventions, however, remains a challenge 
for EAP. This is understandable given the generic, commercial nature of 
textbook resources, and the fact that time constraints coupled with the 
service status of EAP practitioners limits possibilities for critical 
engagement, as highlighted by Ding and Bruce (2017, pp. 8, emphasis 
added): 
These two competing conceptualisations of EAP [a service 
industry and a field of study] also influence the external inputs 
of time and materials that also shape the practitioner’s role. The 
support service approach sees EAP as taking place within limited 
(and often quite unrealistic) time frames whereas the academic 
field of study approach sees the development of students’ 
discourse competence as a longer-term enterprise. In relation to 
pedagogic materials, the ‘support service’ approach sees EAP as a 
commodified subject, teachable from finite commercial courses, 
while the ‘academic field of study’ approach requires the 
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practitioner to draw upon a wide range of resources. Certainly 
the commercially produced materials may constitute a vital, core 
element, but so too is the practitioner’s own ongoing and 
developing knowledge of EAP research. 
A recent exchange 
on social media 
debating the use of 
textbooks in 
teaching and 
learning (in the 
context of EAP 
and ELT) shows 
this debate 
continues to 
divide opinions 
with time being 
cited as a 
constraint to 
developing 
knowledge beyond 
the textbook (Fig. 
9). 
My concerns, however, rest with the reductionist approaches to academic 
writing which textbook and other textbook-like resources encourage 
(Pinker, 2014; Pullman, 2009; Volokh, 2015, pp. 1-2) and which risk 
universalising academic discourse by impacting on ‘what is going on in 
Figure 9: Debating the use of textbooks available at 
https://twitter.com/Jen_Mac_Donald/status/10131295257298739
20 [accessed 07/07/2018] 
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practice in the many pre-sessional and in-sessional classes around the 
world’, as Jenkins (2016) and Hyland (2016c) noted.  
American sociologist C. W. Mills (1959, pp. 156-158) has shown that the 
social sciences have siloed themselves into discrete bureaucratic disciplines 
that have lost sight of the range of approaches needed to understand social 
phenomena. Similarly, textbooks present ‘tinfoil Concepts’ which artificially 
silo disciplinary boundaries. In the case of writing in EAP, what has been 
artificially siloed is the practice of academic writing from its naturally 
occurring contexts. Instead, writing has been artificially reduced to norms 
and conventions that lose sight of the social practices that writing fulfils. 
This reduction is then reified to a misguided universal paradigm of what 
makes writing academic. 
Such misguided assumptions about what makes writing academic continue 
to underlie widely referred to web sources such as the one authored by 
Andy Gillet19, an independent EAP consultant. He has been referred to as 
the ‘Guardian of the EAP Temple’ (in a Panel discussion on the History of 
EAP and of BALEAP at the 2013 BALEAP Conference20), the implication 
being that Gillet upholds some of the most established conventions of EAP 
writing. These include, from the Introductory page21, the following claims, 
which I report or paraphrase below (my emphasis, followed by my 
commentary): 
 
19 http://www.uefap.com/writing/ [accessed 03/07/ 2013] 
20 This accolade is consistent with a comment made by Andy Gillet in which he apparently 
sees no difficulties with mainstream EAP assessment content and constructs 
(http://teachingeap.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/assessment-in-eap-a-continuously-
improved-means-to-carelessly-examined-ends/#comments) 
21 http://www.uefap.com/writing/writfram.htm [accessed 03/07/ 2013] 
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Academic writing is a social practice. By a social practice I mean 
that it is what people do together 
Gillet’s definition is more aligned to ‘collaborative writing’ and betrays a 
serious mis-understanding of the way writing as social practice is 
understood by, inter alia, Lea and Street (1998), Lillis (2013) or Paltridge et 
al. (2016), and discussed in Chapter 1.  
Gillet further claims that: 
Academic writing in English is clearly defined by having an 
obvious audience; a clear purpose, either an exam question to 
answer or a research project to report on. It is also clearly 
structured. Academic writing in English is linear: it starts at the 
beginning and finishes at the end, with every part contributing to 
the main line of argument, without digression or repetition. This 
line of argument must be made clear whatever kind of writing 
you are producing and you, the writer, are responsible for 
making this line of argument clear and presenting it in an 
orderly fashion so that the reader can follow. 
This is problematic on at least three fronts: firstly, ‘an audience’ is never 
‘obvious, nor is it a unitary, homogenous entity. It is made up of motley 
readers who, at different stages of the writing process, can be other 
students, tutors, examiners or editors all of whom have different 
expectations, topic knowledge and motives for reading; secondly, writers do 
not always know in advance who is going to read their work at different 
stages of its production (for example, a tutor–reader may be replaced by an 
examiner-reader who does not know the student); thirdly, because of the 
contested notion of ‘clarity’ discussed later in this chapter, there are some 
who call for a re-framing of the reader’s position vis à vis the text and who 
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argue that the reader should cooperate more with the writer in order to 
understand their intentions. This view shifts the onus of writer 
responsibility (to be ‘clear’) onto the reader, who must also make an effort 
to understand (Turner, 2018, pp. 258-259). 
There are several examples of academic writing that challenge Gillet’s claim 
that whatever kind of writing you are producing it has to be ‘clear’ to your 
reader, where being ‘clear’ presupposes a wide range of implicit and explicit 
cultural assumptions about literacy, disciplinary knowledge, even irony and 
sarcasm, as well as the reader’s cooperation. This can be illustrated with 
reference to the following economics paper (Maddock & Carter, 1982), 
which playfully defies standard academic writing conventions by 
expounding competing theories as a dramatic dialogue, in an act of what 
English (2011) calls ‘re-genring’ (Fig 10): 
 
Figure 10: Economics Paper written as a dialogue 
(Maddock and Carter, 1982) 
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I conclude this commentary on how EAP universalises its own version of 
academic writing by invoking the work of Karen Bennett, a strong advocate 
of approaching academic writing as a complex interplay of discourses as 
opposed to “a massive impersonal machine, where individual quirks are 
ironed out in the quest for uniformity and where there is no place for the 
‘personal voice’ of the kind that prevails in more humanistic cultures” 
(Bennett, 2009, p. 43). 
Bennett argues that academic discourse is not a homogenous entity and 
that a significant body of research has shown it to be so varied as to warrant 
descriptive rather than prescriptive pedagogic approaches (2009, p. 44). She 
presents the findings of an extensive study aimed at establishing the extent 
to which EAP textbooks, despite evidence of academic genre variety, 
reinforce the notion that academic discourse constitutes ‘a single uniform 
entity’ (ibid). She concludes that, bar very few exceptions, EAP has a 
prescriptive approach to writing (ibid, p. 52, emphasis in original): 
the single most important factor to have emerged from this 
survey of style manuals is the remarkable degree of consistency 
that exists as regards the general principles and main features of 
academic discourse in English. Despite the differences in target 
readership, genre and discipline, the works analysed all present 
a very similar picture of what academic discourse is understood 
to be, within the prescriptive (pedagogical) tradition.  
and that it universalises one kind of academic writing (emphasised in 
original): 
it is clear from the emphasis upon clarity, economy, rational 
argument supported by evidence, caution and restraint, and the 
incorporation of accepted theory through referencing and 
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citation, that the scientiﬁc paradigm still dominates, even in 
subjects like literature, history and law […] we inevitably 
conclude that academic writers in English have very little leeway 
as regards the way they present their ﬁndings (at least when 
compared with the great diversity of models found in some 
other countries). 
Bennett goes on to question the motives underlying the need for clarity, 
precision and economy of style that are associated with the ‘scientific 
paradigm’. The historical origins of English writing style, she argues, are 
puritanical, and culturally-bound, a view also held by Turner, who notes 
that descriptions of ‘pristine prose’ often draw on metaphoric collocations 
of ‘cleanliness’ and ‘purity’ (Turner, 2018, p. 97). However, since these 
origins are historical, Bennett claims, they also leave open the possibility for 
change (Bennett, 2009, p. 53) because they are contingent rather than 
necessary. And, as I intimated earlier, given the protean multilingual and 
multimodal landscapes that academic writings currently occupy, there may 
be new historical influences at play that could shift these dominant 
academic writing paradigms. 
Marginalising cognate fields 
As already mentioned, EAP as a field of research (Hyland & Shaw, 2016) 
draws on several cognate fields, especially Applied/Corpus Linguistics and 
Swalsian Genre Studies, even though textbooks may struggle to adequately 
keep up to date (Feak & Swales, 2013). Equally, however, it marginalises 
other fields, including Critical EAP, Academic Literacies and Systemic 
Functional Linguistics; Composition Studies; Sociology; and Education and 
Philosophy, which I focus on below. 
Critical EAP, Academic Literacies and Systemic Functional Linguistics 
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Two Special Issues of the Journal of English for Academic Purposes (S. E. 
Benesch, 2009; C. Coffin & J. Donohue, 2012), on Critical EAP (an advocate 
of rights-based and socially just pedagogies) and Academic Literacies 
(where writing is approached as a social practice) and Systemic Functional 
Linguistics (a socio-semiotic theory of language where meaning is 
understood to be highly content-bound) respectively, have had little 
uptake, especially in relation to Critical EAP (Hamp-Lyons, 2015, p. A2). 
Notwithstanding the relatively ‘little uptake’, controversies have ensued. 
Despite attempts to ‘bring both worlds together’ (Hathaway, 2015; Wingate 
& Tribble, 2012) or to subsume Academic Literacies, for instance, under 
other writing traditions such as Social Genres (Tribble, 2009), tensions 
between Academic Literacies and EAP endure (Lillis & Tuck, 2016, p. 37; 
Scott & Lillis, 2007; Tribble, 2009, p. 403; Wingate, 2012b; Wingate & 
Tribble, 2012). Attempts to diffuse the controversy, however, have been 
rebutted by Academic Literacies scholars such as Lillis and Tuck (2016, pp. 
37-39), who insist their remit is ideological (meaning it is committed to 
ideals of inclusion and social justice) and not skills-based and text-focused: 
Rather than assume the two fields [EAP and Academic 
Literacies] can straightforwardly be combined or their 
differences collapsed (as in Wingate and Tribble, 2012), it’s 
important to be aware of where convergences between EAP and 
Ac Lits [Academic Literacies] lie. The key convergence is in 
ideological orientation, signalled by the use of ‘critical’ EAP and 
‘literacies’ in Ac Lits. 
In other words, Academic Literacies explicitly aligns itself with Critical EAP 
pedagogies, those which “consider the overall political and social 
implications of their profession” (Macallister, 2016, p. 283). It does not align 
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itself with the literatures on Social Genres, which, according to Tribble 
(2009, p. 403), are also concerned with ‘social implications’ but which 
Academic Literacies theorists, claims Tribble, are “either unaware of, or fail 
to fully acknowledge”. Feuding aside, however, Hyland (2018) reminds us 
that alternative approaches to EAP are not mainstream, so in this sense, 
they have been marginalised. However, the price EAP pays for 
marginalising Academic Literacies is, as discussed in Chapter 1, that it loses 
its focus on the social practice of writing. 
Composition Studies and Genre Theory: learning about writing 
With regards to other, more established international traditions of writing 
instruction, research and theory (Castello, Donahue, & Rijlaarsdam, 2012), 
EAP distinguishes itself, from the American field of Composition Studies 
(also referred to as Writing Studies and Rhetoric and Composition, or First 
Year Writing) (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015; Bazerman, 1988; Downs & 
Wardle, 2007; Russell, 2002; Tardy & Jwa, 2016) and Genre Theory (Devitt, 
1996). This is mainly because EAP has evolved from the field of Applied 
Linguistics, unlike Composition Studies which grew around the need to 
help first year university students transition from school to academia 
(Tardy & Jwa, 2016, p. 57). Its theorisation of writing has drawn on more 
literary and humanities-inspired fields such as literary criticism, rhetoric 
and English studies, aligning it more closely to Academic Literacies than to 
EAP (Ding & Bruce, 2017, pp. 78-80). 
For historical reasons (Russell, 2002), US Composition Studies embraced a 
more process and activity-oriented approach to written communication 
revealing the “tangible ways in which learning to write within a discipline 
involves much more than learning particular forms or vocabularies but 
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rather relates to socially preferred ways of knowing and acting” (Tardy & 
Jwa, 2016, p. 61). So much so, that recent trends in Composition Studies are 
increasingly focusing on teaching students about writing, the assumption 
being that teaching students to write academically is potentially self-
defeating. This is because of the “the impossibility of teaching a universal 
academic discourse” (Downs & Wardle, 2007, p. 552) and of “teaching 
genres out of context” given that writing is a disciplinary activity that 
requires a purpose, or ‘exigence’ (Wardle, 2009, p. 767). EAP does not 
provide this exigence because it exists to serve the purposes of other 
disciplines, not to be a discipline in its own right with its own purposes. 
Similar arguments are advanced by Williams (2016, p. 132), for whom the 
“goal of teaching writing in university must be to develop students' abilities 
to negotiate unfamiliar writing situations”, echoing claims made by Huckin 
(2003).  
What many in the American field of Composition Studies argue is that since 
genres are ‘forms of social knowledge that make sense to those who create 
them and use them’ they cannot be taken out of context (Wardle, 2009, p. 
768). Moreover, since teachers of academic writing are unlikely to be 
knowledgeable of every academic genre, even if they are familiar with 
studies that have identified what students are required to write at 
university, it is hard to know what a general academic writing course 
should select and prioritise. One answer provided by Wardle (2017) is that 
students be taught general principles about writing and what it means to be 
an author so that they can critically transfer knowledge, rather than skills, 
to other contexts. This would avoid the ‘rigid’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
application of rules from one context to another and would educate 
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students in a reflective and mindful approach to writing whereby they 
notice what they read and infer patterns rather than rules.  
One of the writing scholars who has shaped the field of Composition 
Studies is blogger and author Andrea Lunsford, an advocate of multimodal 
approaches to writing, writing for social media, and collaborative writing. 
Her approach is practice-oriented in the sense that it looks at what and how 
students are already writing. Rather than imposing genres and modalities 
on students, Lunsford’s approach is to enable students to bring their genres 
to bear and to see themselves as authors. This is because the digital world is 
open to all and everybody is writing themselves into it, meaning that their 
literacies are being continually exercised. This in turn impacts on academic 
writing choices, which for Lunsford et al. (2013), require ways of analysing 
and organising arguments that are easily overlooked in EAP, for example, 
the ways in which authors weave images into their texts for rhetorical and 
argumentative effect (2013, pp. 305-324).  
Indeed, rhetoric plays a central role in the American approach to writing, 
but as far as I know, is not a feature of EAP textbooks or literatures. In 
Rhetoric and Composition Studies it is explored critically for its meaning-
making potential rather than suspiciously as the art of deceit (following the 
tradition of Plato’s Phaedrus). As Roberts-Miller (2017) reminds us, even 
seemingly ‘simple’ and ‘plain’ sentences like the ‘cat is on the mat’ are 
stylistic choices, even ‘moral’ ones, since the sentence may not even be true 
(in the sense that there may be ‘no cat on the mat’) (2017, p. 8): 
philosophers of language insisted that language works by 
sentences having propositional content—“the cat is on the 
mat”—which can be expressed in various ways. Rhetoric is what 
we layer onto the proposition. Or, as the old saying goes, 
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“Rhetoric is clothing on the idea.” In an Edenic world, we would 
all wander around naked, and we would all simply and clearly 
speak our thoughts; rhetoric is something we must have in this 
fallen world. 
Being plain and simple, naked and transparent does not guarantee the truth 
of a claim. Yet, when EAP aspires to a discourse of transparency and 
objectivity which, as Bennett has argued (2015), is a trope (since all 
linguistic propositions are rhetorical), it misleads students into thinking 
their writing can be ‘objective’. 
The relationship between Composition Studies and Genre Studies is a close 
and creative one. Although EAP has devoted much attention to genre 
through the work of John Swales (1990) and Ian Bruce (2008), in particular, 
it has had a tendency to portray genre as restrictive (L. Flowerdew, 2000; 
Hamilton & Pitt, 2009; Nesi & Gardner, 2012) rather than generative 
(Gröppel-Wegener & English, 2018; Tardy, 2016). Or, at least, the 
pedagogic/textbook uptake has foregrounded a restrictive 
conceptualisation of genre because of the way that it promotes ‘templates’ 
(Nesi and Gardner, 2012, p. 2) and ‘cookie cutters’ (Bazerman, 1998, p. 8).  
From a philosophical perspective, too, templates are problematic (Yun & 
Standish, 2018) because ‘thinking and understanding’, not only ‘accuracy 
and discipline’, need to be the focus of a writing programme. Yun and 
Standish (2018) argue that writing instruction needs to allow thinking to 
emerge. They make explicit reference to EAP (2018, p. 129) and the 
internationalisation of UK universities, arguing for the ‘exercise of 
imagination’ to be cultivated (2018, p.130): 
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If the university is to think, it should not rest comfortably with 
practices of this kind [template learning]. Writing templates or 
rubrics of standard research procedure can become constraints 
on disciplined thought itself. For disciplined exploration of the 
territory of enquiry often requires not railway tracks of 
procedure but trekking back and forth across an open, less well-
charted landscape, gradually revealing the lie of the land. 
Even in technical subjects there is a need not simply to rely on 
standard techniques and procedures but to be ready to approach 
the problem from a different point of view. A readiness for this 
and the exercise of imagination constitute a more rigorous 
disciplining of thought.  
An alternative approach to ‘railway track’ approaches to writing is one 
where choices are available to writers who are seen as “[s]ituated at the 
intersection between acting and being acted upon” in their textual 
environments (Bawarshi, 2003, p. x). This suggests that although writers 
operate in pre-existing genre environments, they are also agents and are 
able to ‘act upon’ existing textual structures. One way of understanding this 
freedom is to consider the work of Paré (2018), who questions whether the 
PhD thesis is fit for current research and professional purposes and urges 
both researchers and their supervisors to reconsider the traditional ‘big 
book’ format. Similarly, Paltridge and Starfield (2016) and Ravelli, Paltridge, 
Starfield, and Tuckwell (2013) paint rich ethnographies of academic writing 
genres and in doing so, capture the diversity of writer motivations and 
intentions, indicating that writers have choices.  
Sociology and Philosophy: writers as agents of change 
The vexed question of choice, change and creativity in academic writing is 
the focus of much sociological and philosophical attention, yet these fields 
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have been ignored in EAP. I return to this in my final chapters on 
Complexity (Chapter 5) and Emergence (Chapter 6), but for now it will 
suffice to note that since academic writing landscapes are varied and belong 
to complex social systems where genres enact different ways of shaping 
knowledge (Bazerman, 1988, 2015; Blommaert & Horner, 2017; Bruce, 2008; 
Christie, 1999; Devitt, 1996; English, 2011), an account is needed of the role 
that choice, agency and change play in establishing what makes writing 
academic. This is because, as I show in Chapter 3, the forms that writing 
takes are historically and socially contingent and, as such, open to change.  
What explains this change? Writing scholars Deirdre Pratt (2011), working 
in the multilingual context of South African academia, and Donald Judd 
(2003), working in the field of composition studies in the US, have drawn 
on the social philosophy of critical realism (M. Archer, 1998, 2000; Bhaskar, 
1979, 1989a, 1989b) to situate writing as a social practice and human 
science. Changes in practices are possible because of this. Very simply put, 
critical realism posits that social structures exist, they are real and 
historical, and humans are born into them. In this sense, we are determined 
by our environments.  
However, these structures can be changed through practical, self-reflective 
and critical engagement. Pratt and Judd have applied critical realist theories 
to explain the protean nature of academic writing by showing that writing 
belongs to social structures within which writers have some agency, 
namely, the power to influence and change these structures. These 
structures include several institutional constraints, including those 
documented in Hadley (2015), who argues that EAP is part of a neoliberal 
higher education agenda which, to some extent, limits scope for agency. 
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1 with reference to Ding and Bruce (2017), a 
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more hopeful note can be struck by arguing that EAP practitioners can 
become agents of change when they engage in scholarship (although Davis 
(2019) reminds us of the several institutional constraints that prevent EAP 
practitioners from doing research and publishing). 
Change cannot occur unless we understand the structures that operate the 
events that lead to how things are (Bhaskar, 1989a, p. 2). Since humans are 
reflexive beings whose self-consciousness develops through practical action, 
our humanity lies in our capacity to evaluate our concerns and these 
concerns include the forms our writings take. Change in existing structures 
becomes possible when we enact our humanity (M. Archer, 2000, p. 50), 
including our emotions, which for Archer are “commentaries on human 
concerns” (ibid, pp. 193-221).  
By ignoring social theories on structure and agency, EAP marginalises ways 
of thinking that could challenge accommodationist and gatekeeping 
approaches such as Hyland’s defence of EAP (Hyland, 2018). 
Education and Philosophy: educating about and training to write 
With its emphasis on mechanical skills at the expense of social practices, 
EAP betrays its marginalisation of Education and Philosophy. Widdowson 
(1983) has attempted to reclaim the learning purpose that language use 
achieves, but like Academic Literacies and Critical EAP, his ideas have had 
little uptake. He has argued for framing general EAP around educative 
purposes (as opposed to ESP, which ‘trains’ for disciplinary specialisms) 
claiming that EAP “has to be conceived of in educational terms, as a 
formulation of objectives which will achieve a potential” (1983, p. 6). That 
the aim of learning is to realise potential rather than acquire skills resonates 
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throughout Dewey’s philosophy of education (1916, 1938), but also 
underpins contemporary theorising in higher education, as outlined below.  
Sperlinger et al. (2018), in Who are Universities for?, argue that universities 
should be founded on social justice (2018, pp. 123-137) and prioritise access 
to those who have the potential to benefit more from a higher education 
(such as people who have missed out on secondary education or on a 
nurturing family background), rather than to those who are likely to be 
high achievers (based on predicted grades) (2018, p. 111). Collini (2012, p. 
104) seems to suggest this, too, in What are Universities for? when he 
questions the value of university admission procedures that rely on prior 
school achievements (such as UK A-levels) instead of student ‘potential’: he 
claims this as part of a broader argument in favour of diversity and of 
framing higher education as a public good that benefits society as a whole, 
not just the elites. More generally, in What is Education for?, Biesta (2015) 
argues for the ‘purpose’ of learning to be made more explicit by drawing 
attention to its multidimensional characteristics. These include 
‘qualification’ (namely, knowledge, skills and dispositions); ‘socialisation’ 
(namely, ways of being and doing with others); and ‘subjectification’ (where 
individuals learn to see themselves as subjects, rather than objects, who can 
take responsibility and initiatives that require active engagement). 
Knowledge of such debates should be informing the field of EAP because to 
deny practitioners and their students opportunities to understand what 
kind of higher education system they are part of, could be part of and who 
it is for, means denying them epistemic access (Morrow, 2009; Wheelahan, 
2010). Having access to such knowledge would enable them to make 
informed choices about the kind of higher education they want, allowing 
them to shape it by engaging in practices that reflect their concerns. These 
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practices include choices about the kinds of academic writing they wish to 
communicate through. 
Standardising to a mono-culture 
A further implication of EAP’s reductionist approach to writing is that it 
standardises to a mono-culture of writing that looks the same regardless of 
who has written it and why. This has broader consequences, including 
socio-cultural, educational, epistemic, linguistic, economic and ethical 
repercussions. I now explain these in turn. 
Socio-cultural consequences 
Advocates of multimodal approaches to literacy draw attention to how 
conventions both endure and are flouted chronotopically (i.e. in time and 
space) across fluid and changing social contexts. They remind us that 
norms and conventions change, and that universalising standards and rules 
is at odds with multiculturalism (Björkvall, 2016, p. 28): 
[…] in unstable social environments conventions disappear […] 
convention is actually an expression, which comes from a period 
of relative semiotic stability where the exercise of power, not 
normally even noticed because it is very subtle, leads to a kind of 
agreement to do things in a certain way. But in a deeply 
multicultural world – a hugely diverse world – there are no such 
agreements. And, as you know, in Anglophone PhDs in many 
places you can now use the first person, ‘I’, which you could not 
do 25 years ago. So, what is that about? It is another symptom, 
or rather an effect, of those kinds of social changes. 
Pedagogically, there is a commonly-held assumption that conventions are 
necessary and that second language learners need to ‘learn the rules before 
they can break them’. This forms the basis of what has been called the 
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‘deficit model’ of academic writing (by Bennett, 2009, p. 51; Hathaway, 2015, 
p. 507; Turner, 2004, p. 99; Wingate & Tribble, 2012, p. 491). This model 
often tells writers they must ‘take themselves out of their writing and never 
use ‘I’ (Parker, 2017; Rodríguez, 2017) or that the five-paragraph essay 
(Bernstein & Lowry, 2017) sets the standard for what counts as academic 
writing (see Sowton, 2016, whose model 'academic' texts are five-paragraph 
essays).  
The Aristotelian-Quintilian five-part argument essay has distinguished 
roots. These can be traced to classical (spoken and then written) rhetoric 
where what counted as argument in the public fora of ancient Rome was 
narrowed down to five parts: the exordium (the introduction), the narratio 
(the events in question), the confirmatio (the argument/claims), the 
refutatio (the counter-argument/claims), and the peroratio (summary) 
(Andrews 2010, p. 37). This model has clearly stood the test of time, but as I 
show in Chapter 4, arguments take many forms, especially when expressed 
multimodally.  
Interestingly, and in relation to the question of what makes writing 
academic, the familiar form of the five-paragraph essay is a sign of ‘bad 
student writing’ for US Composition Studies “whereas in the EAP program 
the same form is considered ‘an extremely serviceable template’” (Tardy & 
Jwa, 2016, p. 59). Similarly, Warner (2018) sets out to ‘kill’ the five-paragraph 
essay on the grounds that it encourages students to ‘perform as writers’ 
rather than to write authentically (2018, pp. 6-8). 
We now begin to see that since the rules themselves are contested, 
uncritical assumptions about ‘learning them before breaking them’ are 
unfounded. 
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Tardy and Jwa explain the predilection for having standard models as 
follows: “students and teachers […] desire a tool that can quickly and easily 
be applied to immediate writing needs” (2016, p. 59). While the desire for 
standardisation and applicability may be the prerogative of commodified 
service industries whose ‘products’ need to provide immediate gratification, 
this is not appropriate in a teaching and learning environment, such as 
higher education: the ‘learn the rules before you can break them’ is a 
comforting and seductive meme that panders to popular conservative 
understandings of education, but that also whitewashes critical engagement 
with what these rules are, who sets them and why, which should be applied, 
when and by whom.  
For example, Turner (2018, pp. 99-100) reminds us of inconsistencies in the 
advice given by academic style guide books themselves, which should 
immediately alert us to why rules need to be critically engaged with. On the 
one hand, guide books tell writers to avoid colourful words and the use of 
the personal pronoun ‘I’; on the other, they encourage the use of vivid 
language and avoidance of the passive (Sword, 2012). Similarly, as shown in 
C. E. Ball and Loewe (2017), the very existence of unqualified, or ‘bad’, 
writing advice should suffice to undermine uncritical acceptance of what 
the rules of good writing are. Because judgments of what counts as good 
writing vary, the intuitive appeal of ‘we need to know rules before we can 
break them’ seems to flounder, even though, as Hayot (2014, p. 80) 
cautions, it may work at a broader or more ‘abstract’ level of advice: 
The purpose of abstraction is to eliminate clutter […]. The 
somewhat violent clarifications [about definitions and norms] 
aim to make the process of academic writing easier to 
understand. You should feel free to follow these lessons and 
 101 
rules as they were, for now, norms of some kind. But the final 
rule is … break the rules! The best writing is the best because it 
upends standards in some way […]. 
As long as higher education remains dependent on (and reduced to) 
monolingual (English) and monomodal (language) proficiency and as long 
as we continue to measure academic success (almost) exclusively against 
language proficiency, then we will necessarily judge students who come to 
university with diverse repertoires and capabilities (multilingual, 
multimodal, dyslexic, autistic, artistic, social and cultural) as ‘deficient’. If 
language is an expression of socio-cultural identity (Evans, 2014; Holmes, 
1992), then by insisting on linguistic homogeneity, we are asking for 
‘cultural and social’ homogeneity. And by asking everybody to speak and 
write in the same way, just as was once the case with RP (Received 
Pronunciation), we are creating the conditions for a homogenised academy 
that communicates via a mono-literacy.  
When grammatical and linguistic accuracy become the focus of rule-
learning, controversies ignite around which standards and whose standards 
of ‘good’ English and writing are being set. Turner has likened discussions 
about what counts as ‘good writing’ (an elusive quality that she calls 
‘writtenness’) to debates about what counts as good pronunciation. But 
unlike the socio-politics and sociolinguistics of what counts as correct 
pronunciation and why, the socio-politics of writtenness have not received 
the same attention (2018, p. 7): 
writtenness is a cultural ideal, whose values are implicit rather 
than explicitly espoused. Indexed by evaluative tropes such as 
‘polished prose’ […] and assumptions of precision, accuracy and 
stylistic elegance, it is saturated with ideological and cultural 
102 
value. As such, it is similar to the position of RP (received 
pronunciation) in spoken language. However, unlike RP, whose 
ideological resonance has been extensively commented upon in 
sociolinguistics […], the ideologies, social identifications and 
linguistic assumptions of written language have generated much 
less concern. 
Allowing rules and conventions to establish themselves uncritically is 
problematic because academic practices are rarely homogenous because 
students, and the knowledge they bring, are diverse (Thesen & Cooper, 
2013, p. 4): 
‘How to Books’ on academic writing […] tend to over-generalise, 
over-simplify, de-skill students […] implicitly and explicitly 
perpetuating a restricted and deficit model of student 
competence and language use. The Guides […] tend to focus on 
how students can imitate existing conventions based on 
massively problematic assumptions about student homogeneity 
and the stability of the disciplines. 
Deficit models signal that the knowledge which students bring with them is 
inadequate and needs to be replaced with the ‘correct’ conventions and 
rules so that the learner can be ‘socialised’ into their academic community 
(Lea & Street, 1998). Since the “overall aim of an EAP course is to help 
students towards membership of their chosen academic community” 
(Alexander, Argent, & Spencer, 2008, p. 80), the assumption is that student 
‘deficits’ need eliminating. There are, however, several reasons to not adopt 
deficit approaches. 
For example, the deficit view has been challenged on the grounds that in a 
global (super)diverse higher educational context, diversity, and not 
homogeneity, is the norm (Blommaert & Horner, 2017). This diversity 
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extends to academic writings. Specifically, diversity is manifest in the 
varieties of English academic discourse, disciplinary diversity, 
multilingualism and multiculturalism that are an established part of the 
academic landscape. It is hard to imagine how such diversity can thrive if 
conforming to the conventions of a monolingual and monocultural 
university remains the focus of academic writing practices (Canagarajah, 
2002, 2013b, 2013c; Lillis & Curry, 2010a; Vertovec, 2007). Moreover, 
diversity, it has been argued, provides higher education with opportunities 
rather than constraints in so far as it allows the academy to shift from a 
‘difference-as-deficit’ model to a ‘difference-as-resource’ consciousness 
(Cox, 2014, pp. 303-304). This shift ensures students can bring their 
multiliteracies and identities to the classroom and create new ways of 
thinking, writing and representing knowledge (Thesen & Cooper, 2013). 
Despite the recognition that linguistic and cultural diversity is enriching, it 
remains “a dividing factor when textual norms and directions for student 
writing are in question” (Kruse, 2006, p. 38). This means that academic 
prose continues to be “a massive impersonal machine, where individual 
quirks are ironed out in the quest for uniformity and where there is no 
place for the ‘personal voice’” (Bennett, 2009, p. 43). For academic literacies, 
this points to a problematic disjunct in how universities portray themselves 
(Scott & Lillis, 2007, p. 8): 
whilst […] diversity is rhetorically celebrated in mission 
statements, diversity as a fundamental dimension to 
communicative practices is often viewed as problematic. 
This further echoes Andrews’ Part 1 opening quotation on the way 
universities ‘militate against’ their own thinking (2010, p. 53). 
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Epistemic-cognitive consequences 
Turner also challenges the conflation of ‘good writing’ with ‘good thinking’, 
a conflation she describes as ‘ontological complicity’ (2018, p. 181). She 
argues that this complicity indexes a “culture of expectation surrounding 
what written texts should look like” (2018, p. 147) and that it excludes 
writers, especially second language writers, whose style and prose differ 
from the English academic standard of ‘good’ writing.  
Turner’s views on what counts as ‘good’ writing echo those of Peters who 
claims that “within academia […] there are competing standards of what 
constitutes ‘good writing’ that refer to a set of values and assumptions on 
the relation of language, truth and logic that go largely unquestioned” 
(2008, p. 828) . Specifically, Peters has in mind the writings of French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida, who was deemed unworthy of an honorary 
degree in Philosophy - by philosophers trained in the analytic tradition of 
Cambridge University - for not meeting the ‘accepted standards of clarity 
and rigour’ of ‘normal and universal’ writing.  
While it could be argued that Derrida’s writing belonged to the French 
tradition of critical theory, sharing its style with his contemporaries and 
therefore not a candidate for comparison with his British contemporaries, 
when translated into English, it continues to elicit derision because of its 
‘lack of clarity’. This suggests that ‘clarity’ in academic writing is being held 
to a universal standard that transcends context and purpose.  
However, as Peters rightly goes on to note: 
‘clarity’ in philosophical discourse also has its history and […] 
‘normal forms of academic scholarship’ have become 
‘normalised’ or institutionalized and are in the process of 
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changing again, especially in response to the rise of the 
electronic journal. The use of ‘normal’ here betrays a politics of 
philosophy writing and a deep history of the politics of writing 
in philosophy that still embraces the false dichotomy of Analytic 
and Continental philosophy in its material forms and 
perpetuates the myth of a universal form of writing and the 
dream of a universal form of language called philosophy. 
Similar ideas were debated in a 2015 seminar organised by the Philosophy of 
Education Society (Fig. 11). The seminar questioned whether writing can 
ever be ‘too clear’.  
Below, I report verbatim some of the claims made at this talk by the 
panellists, all of whom are philosophers and educationalists (Phillips, 
Biesta, Smith, Masschelein, & Hobbs, 2015), including their responses to 
questions from the audience. My intention is to highlight that debates 
about standard forms of writing are ongoing and contentious in higher 
education generally (not just EAP). This is further evidenced in Standish 
(2018), who reflects on philosophy’s ‘ancient quarrel’ about ‘banishing the 
poets’ and the extent to which literary and poetic forms of writing are 
‘rigorous and scientific’. 
The uncritical assumption that academic writing can and should always be 
‘clear and precise’ was debated in the following terms (from my seminar 
notes): 
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The desire for clarity is an immature desire: it assumes that the 
world can be clear 
Clarity is about the conditions for understanding 
Clarity is in the eye of the beholder 
I want these people (Kant, Hegel, etc.) to write even if they don’t 
have a clear toolkit, even if the writing is opaque 
If you want to connect with people emotionally then you need 
poetry, and lack of clarity. This helps you to inspire, not just get 
students to write down bullet points 
There is no moral obligation to be clear, but there is a logical 
obligation to be so  
Clarity is a political trope to include and exclude (with reference 
to Derrida) 
Clarity helps others see what you can see, because policy-makers 
are idiots and philosophers of education need to help them 
understand that 
Figure 11: ‘Can writing ever be too clear?’ PESGB seminar, UCL/IoE, 
London, 2015. Panel from left to right: Professors Denis Phillips, Gert 
Biesta, Richard Smith, Jan Masschelein and Angie Hobbs (photo Julia 
Molinari, 2015) 
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If Wittgenstein had been my student, I would have failed him 
No journal has ever published someone for being obscure 
There is some room for obscurity, but NOT for our ego or to 
keep knowledge to ourselves  
If we had obscurity, it would engage discussion and unsettle 
students (an audience member) 
Confusion is the first step towards wisdom  
I’d be pedagogically more excited about confusion and obscurity  
My understanding of Derrida is that he chose his writing style to fit his 
content. It was a case of knowledge shaping the written form (Bazerman, 
1998), of the dog wagging its tail. Had he worked with ‘cookie cutter 
templates’, allowing the tail to wag the dog instead, he might not have 
achieved his linguistic project. This project consisted in developing a 
‘science of writing’ (via his 1967 trilogy of Speech and Phenomena, Of 
Grammatology and Writing and Difference (1973; 2001; 1976) to show the 
limits of language (Wittgenstein similarly shaped the forms of his writing, 
as aphorisms, to fit his philosophy of language). This forms the basis of 
Derrida’s rejection of Western logocentrism, which he considers to be ill-
founded because it is based on the incommensurability of phonemes and 
graphemes with what they stand for (or refer to). Derrida’s concept of 
dissémination indexes this. It shows the ways in which meanings cannot be 
reduced to the sounds, phonemes, words and grammar that generate them: 
it signals the “non-reducible plurality of different understandings of the 
same text” (Glendinning, 2011, pp. 57, emphasis in original). Meanings thus 
become ‘dispersed’, ‘deferred’ and ‘differed/differentiated’ from their 
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physical materiality and form. So, for example, the meaning of pharmakon 
(a medicine/drug/poison), discussed in Of Grammatology, cannot be 
reduced to its phonetic or graphic materiality. Its meaning is both different 
from its form but also deferred from it, because to establish what it means, 
we need to appeal to its etymology and context of use, not its form.  
Trying to explain this incommensurability led Derrida to create several 
neologisms, including the word différance (with an ‘a’) to capture the 
synchronicity of meaning as both ‘different’ and ‘deferred’. However, using 
language to show its limits is problematic. This is why it requires a ‘sous-
rature’, a graphic ruse of erasure that allows Derrida (and Heidegger before 
him) to deconstruct (Derrida’s term for ‘critiquing’ and ‘analysing’) a 
concept (like being) without actually referring to it because by referring to 
it, we presuppose its meaning in advance. But we cannot presuppose the 
meaning of the very thing being (how ‘sous-rature’ is represented 
graphically) deconstructed (Derrida & Spivak, 1976, pp. xv-xviii). Derrida’s 
philosophy is rooted in the metaphysics of being, in trying to understand 
the nature of what is without invoking the very thing that is, i.e. being. His 
metaphysics evolves from the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, 
whose philosophies centred around what it means ‘to be’. Derrida extended 
their disquisitions to language and writing and mobilised metaphors 
(‘trace’) and neologisms (‘différance’) to differ and defer his own linguistic 
tools to refer to the un-referable. This is why his writings are so difficult to 
penetrate and require extraordinary levels of reader concentration. But this 
doesn’t mean they aren’t ‘clear’: it simply means they are difficult because of 
the knowledge they are dealing with. 
So, returning to the vexed question of what ‘clarity’ means in academic 
writing. It is a concept that rests on ‘unquestioned assumptions about the 
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relation of truth and logic to language’, as Peters has argued. If we read 
Derrida in the knowledge of what he was trying to do and how he came to 
be doing it, then his writing is clear. What is unclear is how he could have 
done otherwise. When one of the panellists said I want these people (Kant, 
Hegel, etc.) to write even if they don’t have a clear toolkit, even if the writing 
is opaque, she was referring to the fact that certain knowledge, including 
‘difficult’ knowledge, like understanding the nature of language, and certain 
ways of thinking and approaching knowledge would be lost if we 
standardised writing to a single form. This is because ‘objective and 
impersonal prose’, for example, may not have allowed Hegel, Kant or 
Derrida to say what they have said. 
Training, not educating 
Deficit models have negative educational and academic repercussions 
because they risk eclipsing prior knowledge, which in so-called ‘progressive’ 
education is valued (Russell, 2002, p. 74). A progressive education is one in 
which learners are not “perceived […] as empty vessels, ready to be filled 
with new knowledge” (Shaughnessy, 1998, p. 3) but one in which learning is 
viewed “as a constant and often troubling reformulation of the world [that 
encompasses] new knowledge” rather than “a steady flow of truth into a 
void” (ibid). The ‘flow of truth into a void’ is more reminiscent of a project 
to train, not educate. 
In his book Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education, which is associated with progressive and secular instruction (as 
opposed to authoritarian and religious), John Dewey defines education as 
“the reconstruction or reorganisation of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of 
110 
subsequent experience” (Dewey, 1938, p. 76). If EAP wants to fulfil its higher 
educational ambition of helping students “understand their disciplines and 
[…] successfully navigate their learning” (Hyland & Hamp-Lyons, 2002, p. 1) 
then, based on a Deweyan understanding of education, recognition is 
needed of the experiences they bring with them. These include their past 
and present literacies, the academic knowledge they have already and their 
agencies, understood as the freedom to act (Schlosser, 2015) and to choose 
(Sartre, 1967). 
In this regard, Dewey is concerned with distinguishing education from 
training. Whilst this distinction is contentious and can become something 
of a ‘red herring’, leading to hard and fast binaries that are not always 
appropriate, the distinction in contemporary debates about EAP is relevant 
to the extent that skills tend to be associated with training and practices 
with eduation (as I discuss below).  
Dewey argues that training is the proper term for describing what we ask of 
(non-human) animals. Education, on the other hand, is what is proper to 
human beings (1938, p. 13). Training is the blind response to a stimulus 
whereas education involves mental acts that respond to meanings (1938, p. 
29). Training is ‘less intellectual or educative’ and can be understood as 
follows (1938, pp.64-65): 
the more specialized the reaction, the less is the skill acquired in 
practicing and perfecting it transferable to other modes of 
behaviour. According to the orthodox theory of formal 
discipline, a pupil in studying his spelling lesson acquires, 
besides ability to spell those particular words, an increase of 
power of observation, attention and recollection which may be 
employed whenever these powers are needed. As a matter of 
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fact, the more he confines himself to noticing and fixating the 
forms of words, irrespective of connection with other things 
(such as the meaning of the words, the context in which they are 
habitually used, the derivation and the classification of the 
verbal form, etc.) the less likely he is to acquire the ability which 
can be used for anything except the mere noting of verbal visual 
forms. 
A similar point is made in Warner, who, in discussing the purpose of 
education, talks about the ways in which ‘deep learning’ allows students “to 
extend something they’ve encountered in one situation to another 
situation, even when those situations may not obviously be related” (2018, 
pp. 127-128). 
If we apply Dewey’s reasoning to EAP, then when we over-specialise and 
focus on forms and conventions, we are training students rather than 
educating them. By training to write academically, we may be limiting 
students’ ability to notice and make broader connections, such as how 
words that fall outside of academic word lists are used and how those that 
fall within it are not. Equating writing with a set of standardised skills rests 
on the assumption that these can be transferred to any context. However, 
this assumption has problematic implications (Law, 2004, p. 6):  
Regularities and standardisations are incredibly powerful tools 
but they set limits. Indeed, that is part of their (double-edged) 
power. And they set even firmer limits when they try to 
orchestrate themselves hegemonically into purported coherence.  
Similarly, Dewey warns against the dangers of foregrounding routines and 
skills in discussions about education claiming that these lead to ‘ineptitude’ 
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rather than understanding meanings and making connections (Dewey, 
1938, p. 78): 
Routine action, action which is automatic, may increase skill to 
do a particular thing. In so far, it might be said to have an 
educative effect. But it does not lead to new perceptions of 
bearings and connections; it limits rather than widens the 
meaning horizon. And since the environment changes and our 
way of acting has to be modified in order to successfully keep a 
balanced connection with things, an isolated uniform way of 
acting becomes disastrous at some critical moment. The vaunted 
“skill” turns out to be gross ineptitude. 
Dewey was writing at a time when America was engaging in fierce debates 
about how to educate children (Hildebrand, 2018). The traditionalists, or 
‘old’ educationalists, objected to Dewey’s child-centred, liberal and 
democratic approach to education which valued the experiences that 
learners brought with them by focusing on their current learning 
development more than on preparing them for their future working lives 
(Dewey, 1938). However, contra Dewey, there is a sense in which some 
routine is needed in developing specific skill sets (such as playing musical 
scales) because it can lead to creative practice. In the case of EAP, it can 
help students gain some knowledge of future academic writing 
requirements. Nevertheless, Dewey’s claims remain relevant as warnings 
against the tendencies, reported in Chapter 1, of modern-day EAP to 
develop skills at the expense of practices. 
If EAP were to educate about writing by explaining the diversity of writing 
genres and practices rather than by teaching to write some conventional 
forms of academic writing at the expense of others, then it might avoid the 
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mechanistic ‘routine actions that limit’ the meaning-making potential that 
emerges from engaging with a far broader range of academic texts. In this 
regard, both Hyland and Jenkins, discussed earlier, have signalled a 
mismatch between what EAP might be preaching in its scholarly 
publications and what it is actually teaching in its classrooms. For example, 
although Nesi and Gardner (2012) describe a wide range of academic genres, 
they also single out the academic essay as being the most prevailing. This 
has likely compounded EAP’s privileging of developing a skill in ‘a 
particular thing’, namely the academic essay, over and above other genres. 
That Nesi and Gardner have also claimed that they are offering templates 
(2012, p. 2) for teachers to follow, further betrays an acceptance of the 
standardising role that EAP plays within the academy. This standardising 
role ignores the many forms that argumentation takes and narrows the 
modes and genres needed to represent reality (see, for example, Thomson 
(2018c) for an overview of literatures on ethnographic representations of 
educational and anthropological phenomena). 
In this sense, EAP narrows educational development because it generally 
tends to focus on conventions and students’ ‘future’ academic selves. 
Hamp-Lyons’ Journal of English for Academic Purposes editorial broadly 
glosses over students’ ‘past and present’ academic selves (2015, p. A2) by not 
considering the views held by those who tend to frame writing socio-
semiotically and as part of a broader educational experience that cares 
about and integrates students’ previous and current literacies, as in Wardle 
(2017), Williams (2017) and Parnell (2012). EAP thus projects itself as a 
perpetrator of functional transferable skills continually aimed at future 
‘target situations’ (Ding & Bruce, 2017, p. 97): 
114 
EAP as an offshoot of ESP is a more specifically needs-driven 
approach to ELT. The notion of the gap between the present 
situation analysis (where students are now) and the target 
situation analysis—what students are required to know in the 
future in terms of academic language knowledge and skills—is 
an important concept that drives much of EAP and strongly 
influences pedagogy. Therefore, pedagogic goals in EAP tend to 
centre on the types of conventionalised communication—
spoken and written—that students must process and master in 
university contexts. 
However, nurturing present literacies is a way to shape the future since it is 
the students who will be inhabiting their own future ‘target situations’ long 
after their teachers. Students’ future needs and their capabilities (Robeyns, 
2016) could therefore be better tended to by seeing past and previous 
literacies as conducive to learning and not as ‘interference’ (Bennett, 2010). 
The EAP student-writer could be reconceptualised as someone who brings 
writing experience, knowledge and literacy to the classroom so that new 
threshold concepts (Deverson, 2017) about what makes writing academic 
can be introduced and old ones updated. This understanding of the writer-
learner who brings experience and who is not a tabula rasa echoes a 
Deweyan philosophy of education which is concerned with tending to 
learner’s present knowledge and needs so that they can cope with the 
unknowns of the future (Dewey, 1938, p. 56): 
It is not a question of whether education should prepare for the 
future. If education is growth, it must progressively realise 
present possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to 
cope with later requirements. 
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An alternative EAP approach, as advocated by Turner (2018), and C. E. Ball 
and Loewe (2017), writing from a UK and US perspective, respectively, 
might be to lead, shape, engage with and challenge the values of dominant 
genres and of ‘bad writing advice’ and to ensure the voices of a broad range 
of writing scholars are heard across higher education. This knowledge 
might reassure those who lament a sense of loss or nostalgia for vanishing 
‘values’ and ‘standards’ in writing practices because it would provide 
evidence that literacies are wide-ranging as opposed to declining and afford 
diverse rather than waning academic values (Hamp-Lyons, 2011, pp. 3-4, my 
emphasis): 
Since young people are creating text more, rather than less, in 
this time of SMSing and ‘tweeting’, how can literacy be 
declining? Does the problem lie in our (ie., academics) beliefs 
about what “literacy” is? Do we need to change our vales [sic], 
expectations, or standards? And, how does this dilemma relate 
to the speciﬁc issues of English for Academic Purposes? It is 
clear that the potential of modern forms of electronically-
mediated interaction is barely acknowledged in most EAP courses: 
this is a failure we may come to regret. As Ken and I wrote in our 
ﬁrst Editorial […] “What is clear is that we need to understand 
the changes that these new genres imply for academic literacy 
practices and to either address them or be left behind by them.” 
(Hyland & Hamp-Lyons, 2002, p. 9). 
While it is reassuring to read that diverse literacies should not constitute a 
threat to EAP and its conventions, it is somewhat disconcerting to note 
what Hamp-Lyons’ own understandings of literacy practices betray.  
Firstly, she seems to downplay the importance of social media in modern 
society and its growing popularity amongst academics (Carrigan, 2016). And 
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secondly, Hamp-Lyons has placed ‘tweeting’ in inverted commas, as if to 
suggest that it is not a real or proper literary phenomenon. Such comments 
betray a narrowing of the academic writing remit because they exclude the 
broader academic literacies landscape and further indicate how the 
academy militates against its own practices (Andrews, 2010). 
Ethical consequences 
Ignoring the background literacies, capabilities and agencies of individual 
writers also raises concerns about the fairness of EAP practices (Matthews, 
2014): 
Global neoliberal trends “[…] have had astonishing success in 
creating markets for things whose commodification was once 
almost unimaginable: drinking water, body parts and social 
welfare among them” (Connell, 2013, p. 100). It is within this 
broader economic and political climate that the specifics of EAP 
commodification have attracted the attention of and also 
generated debate in the media by raising concerns around the 
ethics of taking money from foreign students who already pay 
significant amounts for their British degrees.  
The commodification of EAP (Ding & Bruce, 2017; Hadley, 2015) may also be 
having implications for fairness towards and inclusiveness of a diverse 
student population. The requirement that all students learn dominant 
modes of English literacy is, arguably, unfair to mature students who have 
become unaccustomed to academic writing (Grove, 2016); to students with 
a range of learning needs and backgrounds (Sperlinger et al., 2018); to 
academic writers who communicate or who might want to communicate 
and publish in English as a lingua franca; and to students who cannot afford 
the high costs of learning English: entry exams such as IELTS and 
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presessional EAP courses, and the burgeoning textbook industry that 
supports them, are expensive.  
Turner (2018, p. 134) further points out that students who fail their language 
proficiency tests, such as IELTS, and by implication EAP courses inspired by 
the IELTS format, may be able and intelligent writers, but “[f]rom the 
perspective of writing teachers such students are being denied the 
opportunity to develop their academic writing, as well as their studies”. 
Charging for an education is also at odds with the educational values of 
social inclusion, such as those reported in the Alternative White Paper: in 
Defence of Public Higher Education (2011), a document signed by leading 
academics responding to a government White Paper on Higher Education. 
The Alternative White Paper claimed that “Public universities have a social 
mission, contributing to the amelioration of social inequality, which is the 
corollary of the promotion of social mobility”.  
The lack of attention that most EAP writing instruction has for diversity, 
including income and social, may have consequences for what A. King 
(2010, p. 256), writing from a critical realist and humanist perspective, calls 
the ‘dignity of the self’. Indeed, according to Sir Alan Tuckett (2013), 
President of the International Council for Adult Education and formerly 
Chief Executive of the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (at 
the time of writing), international widening participation calls for a 
reflection on what the ‘social mission’ of a global university is, what values 
of social justice it is promoting and who it is including and excluding. 
Currently, it is mainly the elite international student body who has access 
to UK HE, which raises parallel concerns to those voiced by Lillis (2001) in 
reporting on the challenges posed by national widening participation. Lillis 
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specifically reports on the difficulties faced by non-traditional entrants to 
the system in both accessing and then acculturating to the academic 
discourse: by endorsing one-size-fits-all EAP programmes that ‘serve’ 
institutional norms and generate profit, we risk excluding many 
international students who do not have the means and resources to pay for 
an international education. 
Economic consequences 
An approach to academic writing that reduces it to skills in linguistic 
accuracy and genre templates fosters a culture of commodification (Turner, 
2018, pp. 190-191), where profits can be made from writing essays. This is 
because templates can be replicated and reproduced, copied and sold, 
downloaded and programmed algorithmically (Collins, 2019; Introna, 2106) 
or even generated entirely by computer, as fakes (Labbé & Labbé, 2012; Van 
Noorden, 2014). The use of essay mills (Aitchison, 2017; Medway, Roper, & 
Gillooly, 2018; Peters, 2018) and the occurrence of academic writing hoaxes 
(Alvesson et al., 2017; Cuthbert, 2018) are symptoms of an academic writing 
culture that readily relies on the surface features of a genre in order to 
deem that a text is bona fide academic. I discuss hoaxes further in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 in relation to ‘academicness’, but for now, my intention is to link 
their existence to standardisation. 
Russell (2002) also deals with plagiarism and ghostwriting, a centuries-old 
blight that was already firmly established in the mediaeval university 
(Rüegg & Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, p. 376, Vol. 2). Russell explains how 
this area of activity became lucrative (p. 88): 
infamous “literary gentlemen” began selling papers to students 
nationwide (…). The term paper-industry grew up with higher 
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education, and today there are several companies offering a 
sophisticated array of “research assistance”. One Chicago-based 
company, for example, boasts a catalog of over 16,000 papers, 
indexed not only by number of pages, footnotes, and references, 
but also by grade, level, high school to graduate school. 
One possible explanation for why writing services became, and remain, 
lucrative is that many people were excluded from the elite inner circle of 
excellence and therefore received inconsistent writing instruction. A second 
explanation might be that, as the genre of academic writing, in the guise of 
the research genre, began to standardise into predictable and recurring 
patterns, it became easier to create templates that students could fill in or 
copy or buy because writing manifested certain mechanical features that 
were easily measurable (Russell, 2002, p. 91; cf 100): 
The term ‘paper’ became fundamentally another means of 
acquiring and displaying factual knowledge, not the means of 
entering the rhetorical universe of a discipline, and the formal 
features of the genre reflected that function: the emphasis on 
mechanical correctness of form, on length of text, and on the 
number of sources. 
Such mechanical standardisation is a far cry from the kind of writing that 
Les Back asks us to imagine in the opening quotation to this chapter. 
Conclusion 
A skills-based prescriptive and atomistic conception of writing misses 
opportunities for harnessing learners’ capabilities and agencies and for 
developing the educational scope of teaching about writing. The trouble 
with approaching academic writing as an ‘autonomous and transparent’ set 
of skills that can be reduced to ‘academic’ vocabulary or specific paragraph 
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structures is that it has far-reaching implications. These include the 
universalising of an academic discourse that is ‘objective and impersonal’, 
monomodal and monolingual; the marginalising of cognate fields such as 
sociology, philosophy and education; and the standardising to a mono-
culture that militates against the international aspirations of modern 
universities.  
The next chapter turns to the history of writing to showcase the 
contingency of the forms we privilege. 
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Part 2 
Why It Is 
 
whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or 
becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or 
allow anyone else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely: such is our 
conclusion (Plato, 360 BCE 2014, available online) 
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Chapter 3 - Writing’s origins and 
ideologies  
the evidence has begun to accumulate that our beliefs about literacy are a blend 
of fact and supposition, in a word a mythology, a selective way of viewing the 
facts that not only justifies the advantages of the literate but also assigns the 
failings of the society, indeed of the world, to the illiterate (D. Olson, 1994, p. 2). 
Introduction 
In Part 1, I argued that EAP writing is not approached multimodally or 
multilingually, which means it misses opportunities for representing 
knowledge. Instead, EAP universalises its own version of writing as a stable, 
rules-driven skill, not a protean social practice.  
What follows is a historical sketch that highlights the complex ways in 
which writing is a practice. I overview the difficulty of defining it and, by 
extension, of fixing what then makes it ‘academic’. I do this to show that 
how writing becomes conceptualised, in both EAP and in UK skills-driven 
academia more generally (Collini, 2012), is historically contingent and could 
be otherwise. This prepares for Chapter 4, where I exemplify how else 
academic writings could be. 
After some introductory remarks on why I use history to explain current 
practices, I suggest that the orthodox conflation of writing with the 
alphabet and with cognition is misguided and, because of this, writing 
should be re-positioned as one of several modes for communicating and 
thinking. I then evidence how and why academic knowledge has been 
communicated in diverse ways with the intention of suggesting it could 
change further. Finally, I refer to how the Enlightenment scientific 
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paradigm and European colonial practices have imposed their own forms of 
literacy to the exclusion of others. This serves to remind us that writing 
practices are also ideological (Henderson, 2018; Lillis & Tuck, 2016; Russell, 
2002; Street, 1984; Turner, 2010, 2018). 
Using history to understand the present 
History shows it could all have been different. In his Representations of the 
Intellectual (which document his 1993 BBC Reith Lectures), Palestinian 
critical theorist, secular humanist, historian and intellectual Edward Said 
(1994) claims that history, not God or similarly unaccountable entities, 
allows us to see why things are the way they are and helps us reflect on how 
they could have been. In Said’s thinking, humanism is a response to social 
injustices and is a way of ‘speaking truth to power’ (1994, p. xiv). In this 
sense, ‘humans are the measures of all things’ and can therefore (Said, 1994, 
p. 45): 
[l]ook at situations as contingent, not as inevitable, look at them 
as a result of a series of historical choices made by men and 
women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not as 
natural or god-given, therefore unchangeable, permanent, 
irreversible. 
Said identifies with the legacy of Giambattista Vico (1959 (1725, 1730, 1744, 
1928)), the eighteenth century Italian professor of Rhetoric whose seminal 
work La Scienza Nuova was a response to the rational hypothetico-
deductive Cartesian philosophy of the time. Vico argued against Descartes’ 
method on the grounds that “it renders phenomena which cannot be 
expressed logically or mathematically as illusions” (Costelloe, 2018). Instead, 
Vico proposed that (Said, 1994, p. 45): 
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[t]he proper way to understand reality is to understand it as a 
process generated from its point of origin, which one can always 
locate in extremely humble circumstances. This […] meant 
seeing things as having evolved from definite beginnings, as the 
adult human being derives from the babbling child. 
History thus allows us to see connections between our present practices 
and those of our past. According to, inter alia, Foucault (1972, p. 7), critical 
theorist and historian, “history is one way in which a society recognises and 
develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked”. Our 
social practices - of which writing is one - are also ‘inextricably linked’ to 
our past.  
The history of writing similarly becomes an inseparable part of the writing 
itself. With knowledge of why writing practices have evolved as they have, 
present and future practices can involve choices and possibilities, not 
straightjackets. In fact, genres evolve for a host of reasons ranging from 
changes in technology (Dunleavy, 2014; Eisenstein, 1983; Shanahan, 2015) to 
conceptual shifts in which writing is no longer seen as a set of transferable 
skills (Scott, 2013) but as an affordance that requires the writer to perceive 
‘text’ as both a means to an end (English, 2011) and as ‘a way of doing’ 
generated by anthropological, namely human, change (Barton & Papen, 
2010). Once these reasons are visible, writers, and their teachers, are more 
likely to knowingly enact communicative choices because they become able 
to discern “what might be gained and what might be lost in changes of 
mode” (Bezemer and Kress, 2008, 169) and to hold rules to account. 
A misguided conflation: the alphabet and cognition 
Pettersson (1994) has argued, from a philological and semiological 
perspective, that attempts to provide core definitions of writing are 
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‘fallacies’ (1994, pp. 143-145) and therefore doomed to fail. This is because of 
three, interconnected reasons. Firstly, in order to decide what counts and 
does not count as writing, we would need to have a pre-agreed notion of 
what writing is before being able to recognise instances of it (1994, p. 144). 
But we don’t, as shown below. Secondly, even if an antecedent definition 
were possible, countless problems would arise in trying to classify new 
instances that do not sit comfortably with the definition. For example, do 
non-alphabetical scripts such as pictorial rebuses or Chinese logographs 
count as ‘writing’ (DeFrancis, 1989; Harris, 1986)? And thirdly, by extracting 
a definition from what is an ad hoc classification based on putatively 
‘uniquely identifying’ features (such as a mark on a surface, an alphabet or a 
syntax), we are, on the one hand, conflating what are contested defining 
properties with what is a post hoc classification, and on the other, begging a 
whole series of other questions such as ‘what counts as a mark, a surface, an 
alphabet, a syntax’? 
Writing is not just alphabetic 
What has been labelled as ‘writing’ has varied in form, content, purpose and 
interpretation (D. R. Olson, 2001; Schmandt-Besserat, 2001; Woodard, 2001). 
Some argue that ‘real writing’ must be alphabetical, i.e. based on 
phonological representation and, over time, on being associated with 
literacy (DeFrancis, 1989; Gelb, 1952; Havelock, 1976). Others, that it must 
not, because what counts as writing depends on who is doing the counting 
and why (Coulmas, 1989; Harris, 1986, 2000).  
The debate assumes that there was a key moment in time that separates 
non-writing communities from writing ones. It also rests on the contention 
of whether writing functions as a representation of the objects it refers to 
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and if so, what this representation consists of – a one-to-one pictorial 
correspondence with the referent or a symbolic correspondence that ‘stands 
for’ something? 
The watershed moment in the debate is usually identified with the pre-
writing stage of clay tokens during the early Mesopotamian era of 8000-
3000 BC (R. S. Fischer, 2005). These tokens were counters shaped 
geometrically and functioned as recording devices to inventory goods. They 
re-presented the goods functionally, had nothing in common with speech 
and had no syntax. Clay tokens simply ‘stood for’ an object or measure, e.g. 
of grain, not a sound (as the alphabet is said to do). By 3000 BC, the 
Sumerian populations of the current Middle-East seemed to have traded in 
the tokens for incisions on wet clay tablets which resembled the geometric 
shapes of the tokens. These incisions were referred to as ‘cuneiform’ (from 
the Latin) because they were wedge-shaped. Once these cuneiform 
ideograms (representations of ideas) became directly inscribed by styli, they 
were said to retain the same trading and book-keeping functions as the 
physical tokens (Schmandt-Besserat, 2001).  
In this sense, Cuneiform script came to be understood as an extension and 
evolution of the token system. Subsequent moves towards pictographs 
(pictures representing ideas, such as ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs or 
ancient Chinese characters) are a move away from one-to-one 
correspondence with an object and numerosity of tokens is no longer 
necessarily expressed. This leads into logographs, of which both ancient 
and modern Chinese are examples, whereby a sign represents a sound or 
word. In philology, it is generally agreed that the emergence of logograms 
marks the shift from the visual (a mark standing for an object) to the aural 
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(a mark standing for a sound) representation of language (Schmandt-
Besserat, 2001, p. 16622).  
Cuneiform ‘writing’ has come to be known as representational, a view of 
how language works that has endured over centuries and that forms the 
basis of many influential theories from Socrates through to modern-day 
structural linguistics (Harris, 2000; Harris & Taylor, 1989; Orman, 2016). It 
does not seem to have evolved from pictures or drawings but rather from 
symbols (geometric shapes) and it co-evolved with certain arithmetic 
notations (Damerow, 2006).  
Syllabic scripts (where signs represent syllables) are concurrent (2600-
2500BC) with logographic ones (R. S. Fischer, 2005, pp. 296-297). Current 
Indian, Japanese, Arabic and Hebrew are all examples of syllabic languages. 
All of these varied languages and their written representations are said to 
have converged in the invention of what is commonly referred to as the 
‘Greek’ alphabet in 2000 BC. This moment is said to have marked a seismic 
shift in the way phonetic languages came to be represented in writing and 
in the way literacy subsequently developed.  
More accurately, the alphabet is Proto-Sinaitic-Phoenician-Palestinian-
Greek-Lebanese and dates to between 2000-1000 BC (R. S. Fischer, 2005; 
Goody, 1977, p. 16623; Harris, 1986, pp. 30-31; Schmandt-Besserat, 2001). Its 
designation as ‘Greek’ and has having been ‘invented’ at one moment in 
time, i.e. 2000 BC, is therefore inaccurate because of the vast geographical 
area where the alphabet developed and because it established itself over 
one thousand years.  
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Some historians (e.g. Harris, 1986) have shown that writing systems 
developed incrementally, synchronously and serendipitously alongside 
other writing systems. This suggests that it may be misleading to reduce all 
writing to ‘alphabetic’ writing because rather than having evolved in a 
linear fashion, from pictograms to ideograms to logograms, to syllabic 
representations and finally to the phonetic representations of the alphabet, 
writing systems co-existed. And during this co-existence, they are likely to 
have borrowed and (erroneously) copied from each other, adapting these 
borrowings to specific needs (R. S. Fischer, 2005, pp. 296-297).  
In this sense, ‘alphabetic’ writing is just one of many kinds of writing. 
However, the alphabet has become co-extensive with many definitions of 
‘writing’, including our own, since it forms the basis of world writing 
systems such as Latin, Arabic, Hebrew and Cyrillic. Unlike pictographic and 
logographic forms of notation, the ‘Greek’ alphabet had 22 letters “each 
standing for a single sound of voice, which, combined in innumerable ways, 
brought an unprecedented flexibility to transcribe speech” (Schmandt-
Besserat, 2001, p. 16624). It is this flexibility that is said to explain why 
alphabetic script formed the basis of so many languages. 
Gradually, the assumption prevailed that writing could ‘record a linguistic 
utterance directly’ whereas a picture could not (Woodard, 2001, p. 16633): 
The term ‘writing system’ specifically denotes a set of symbols 
which is used for the graphic (written) recording of language 
[…]. Forms of graphic expression which may have some semantic 
content – such as cave drawings, petroglyphs, icons, and even 
sophisticated picture messages – but which do not or could not 
record a linguistic utterance directly, are thus excluded from the 
realm of writing. 
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Thus, the co-existence of pictorial and alphabetical symbols led philologists 
to create different categories with which to include and exclude different 
forms of graphic representations. These categories included distinctions 
between non-writing systems, as noted by Woodward, above, partial 
writing systems22 and full writing systems (DeFrancis, 1989, p. 5): 
Partial writing is a system of graphic symbols that can be used to 
convey only some thought. Full writing is a system of graphic 
symbols that can be used to convey any and all thought. 
To side-step the difficulty of creating categories to include and exclude 
what does and does not count as writing, others, such as Erard (2018), 
began framing writing in functional terms, not graphic ones. Erard sees 
writing as a ‘layered’ concept that has explosive effects. His conception 
further unsettles the idea that for writing to be classified as ‘writing’, it 
needs to be reduced to any specific form: 
I like to think of writing as a layered invention. First there’s the 
graphic invention: the notion of making a durable mark on a 
surface. Humans have been doing this for at least 100,000 years 
[…]. Then the symbolic invention: let’s make this mark different 
from all other marks and assign it a meaning that we can all 
agree on. Humans have been doing this for a long time, too. 
Then there’s the linguistic one: let’s realise that a sound, a 
syllable and a word are all things in the world that can be 
assigned a graphic symbol. This invention depends on the 
previous ones, and itself is made of innovations, realisations, 
solutions and hacks. Then comes the functional invention: let’s 
 
22 For DeFrancis, mathematics and rebuses are forms of ‘partial writing’ because they are 
not based on the sounds of speech. 
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use this set of symbols to write a list of captives’ names, or a 
contract about feeding workers, or a letter to a distant garrison 
commander. All these moves belong to an alchemy of life that 
makes things go boom. 
The comforting evolutionary and linear account of how clay tokens 
transformed into symbols which became scripts that morphed into the 
representation of the specific phonemes of the Greek language has been 
disrupted by many, including D. R. Olson (2001, p. 16640) and Harris (1986) 
who have argued that rather than an evolution from mark to picture to 
sound, changes in scripts reflect borrowings and adaptations from several 
co-occuring scripts. A modern-day example of such borrowings and errors 
is English spelling, a system which more often than not bears little or 
erratic resemblance to its phonology, has been so significantly influenced 
by Latin, French and Anglo-Saxon that it defies linear evolutionary 
explanations and has resisted any attempt to systematisation via an 
Academy of Language (like French and Italian). This means that it has 
remained a porous and open system that can swiftly accommodate 
neologisms and changes in meaning (Barber, 1993; Crystal, 1988). Harris, 
Olson and others have therefore argued that similar borrowings and 
unsystematic uses are likely to have occurred in ancient times, too, 
especially over the course of the thousand years that culminated in the 
establishment of a ‘Greek’ alphabet.  
What this less linear account implies is that the orthodox conflation of 
‘writing’ with the alphabet (a putative sound system that is possibly equally 
the result of transcription errors) may be unwarranted (Harris, 1986, pp. 29-
30): 
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writing was originally merely a term designating the process of 
scoring or outlining a shape on a surface of some kind. (In this 
very broad sense, writing ought to include drawing, and even the 
art of the silhouette. Nowadays, it does not, although that 
original use of the verb write survives in English as late as the 
sixteenth century). Ancient Egyptian had one word meaning 
both ‘writing’ and ‘drawing’. Similarly, the Greek verb γράφω (‘to 
write’) originally meant in Homer ‘engrave’, ‘scratch’, ‘scrape’. 
The later restriction of such words to designate alphabetic 
writing hardly warrants the narrow perspective adopted by those 
historians of the subject who take for granted that graphic signs 
count as writing only when used for purposes which alphabetic 
writing was later to fulfil. 
Writing, therefore, can include drawing and, in principle, other forms of 
representation. 
Harris (1986) and Halverson (1992) argue that many enduring assumptions 
about how writing originated need challenging. In particular, Harris refutes 
the classical Aristotelian and De Saussurean thesis that the alphabet, 
understood as a precursor to writing, evolved as a substitute for speech with 
each letter (grapheme) representing a sound (phoneme). Rather, he argued, 
since an alphabet cannot capture all the nuances of speech, writing cannot 
be a surrogate of speech (Harris, 1986, 1989; 2000, p. 18). The thesis that the 
alphabet is a surrogate of speech is unwarranted because: a) we do not 
know what ancient Greek sounded like; and b) languages that have adopted 
the Greek alphabet as a basis for their written codes have a far greater range 
of sounds in their speech than the alphabet can account for. Moreover, the 
traditional view that writing evolved out of the Greek alphabet simply 
assumes that all writing is alphabetic, ignoring that Chinese characters, for 
instance, are an example of a writing system that can be processed 
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semantically without an intermediate phonetic stage (although, as I 
indicate below, this is precisely why Chinese was not considered to be a 
writing system).  
Moreover, if alphabetic writing were indeed a representation of speech, it 
would be an inherently inadequate representation (D. R. Olson, 2001, p. 
16641). This inadequacy becomes clear when we consider the vast range of 
non-alphabetic ways that have developed to try and compensate for the fact 
that the alphabet cannot fully represent speech:  
The history of writing is largely the history of inventing devices, 
such as punctuation and text structures, as well as rules for 
interpretation that have taken sometimes as long as millennia to 
develop. 
If the ‘alphabet cannot fully represent speech’, and by implication, writing, 
then it becomes as (in)adequate as drawing in representing human thought. 
This is one reason why Harris (1986, 2000) and Coulmas (1989) see no 
difference between writing and drawing (D. R. Olson, 2001, p. 16641). In 
fact, for both Harris and Coulmas, semasiographic systems, such as road 
signs and mathematics, are systems of writing capable of representing 
meaning without relying on a prior link to spoken forms.  
A further difficulty with reducing the function of writing to a representation 
of speech is that it assumes ‘speech’ is synonymous with ‘language’. But this 
is also problematic (see Evans (2014), not least because if ‘speech’ is equal to 
‘language’, this would mean that deaf/mute people don’t communicate 
linguistically (since they can’t hear/speak). And since they can’t hear/speak, 
then presumably they can’t read either (since writing equals speech) 
because reading would require hearing sounds that a deaf/mute person 
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doesn’t have access to. The fact that a deaf /mute person can read, write 
and understand alphabetic script suggests that it is meanings, rather than 
sounds, that are conveyed by the graphic sign, whether alphabetic or not. 
This is because there is nothing phonologically inherent in the letter ‘c’, for 
example, that it has to be pronounced /k/ in order to be understood as a 
letter; nor is there anything phonologically inherent in ‘cat’ that it needs to 
be heard or pronounced as /kæt/ to be understood as meaning ‘cat’. 
Pictographic and logographic scripts can be said to convey meanings in 
similar, holistic, semantic and cognitive ways that do not rely on alphabetic 
script or sound. Similar arguments are developed in Evans (2009) and 
Malpas (2002). 
Nevertheless, prominent historians of writing, like Gelb (1963), have 
defended the thesis that for a script to count as ‘writing’ it needs to be 
alphabetic. Gelb claimed that pictures cannot be considered part of writing 
because the urge to draw is aesthetic, not communicative (Pettersson, 1994, 
p. 131), but he ran into several difficulties when attempting to “lay a 
foundation for a full science of writing” (Gelb, 1963, p. 23 cited in 
Pettersson, 1994, p. 138). Not only did Gelb equate writing with the 
alphabet, and therefore speech, but he also insisted that for writing to be 
considered ‘writing’ it had to consist of a ‘mark on an object’ rather than ‘be’ 
that object (as a token or a drawing might be, in the sense that they re-
present that object). However, since some writing systems are not 
alphabetic but pictographic (e.g. Chinese23), Gelb’s definition of writing 
 
23 In an attempt to assuage the divisive polemic that has surrounded dismissive Western 
attitudes to Chinese (cf Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Joseph Priestley in Harris 2000, p.2), 
DeFrancis (1989) has argued that although Chinese is not alphabetic, it is nonetheless 
‘phonetic’ in the sense that the early pictograms and the later stylised signs of Chinese 
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would exclude Chinese as a written form of that language. Gelb therefore 
revised the definitions he gave in A History of Writing by omitting reference 
to the alphabet (Gelb, 1980, pp. 21-22 cited in Pettersson (1994, p. 144): 
The proposed new definition of writing is as follows: Writing in 
its broadest sense is a recording system or device by means of 
conventional markings or shapes or colour of objects, achieved 
by the motor action of the hand of an individual and received 
visually by another. 
This broad non-alphabetical definition of writing would now include 
picto/logographic languages such as Chinese but it still remains 
problematic for at least the following reasons: 
a) ‘conventional markings’ would now cover the entire field of 
semiotics, including semasiography (whereby communication is 
achieved entirely without words, such as in road signs); 
b) the requirement for writing to be ‘achieved by the motor action 
of the hand’ would rule out Stephen Hawkin’s ‘writing’ because 
he used eye movement to write; 
c) and the condition that the marks be ‘received visually by 
another’ excludes braille from the definition. 
 
characters represent phonic elements (such as morphemes and syllables) or whole words. 
This, according to B. King (1991) is, however, a trivial observation that can be applied to all 
written forms because they can all be pronounced whether they are alphabetical or not. In 
this sense, then, DeFrancis does little to extinguish the polemic. Rather, Chinese 
characters, whilst having originated as pictograms have since become so stylised and far 
removed from their original pictorial depiction that Chinese cannot meaningfully be said 
to be a pictorial language any more. This is because the original representation can no 
longer be discerned. 
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Harris and Coulmas get around these problems by arguing, simply, that 
“what makes a writing system is its adequacy in conveying information 
visually rather than its purported links to speech” (D. R. Olson, 2001, p. 
16640). This broader definition would justify calling Chinese a written 
system because it ‘coveys meaning visually’, and would resolve a), above, 
allowing for semiotics to count as writing. The issue of how writing is 
achieved (b), above, would become irrelevant, since what matters is how 
writing is ‘received’, not how it is produced. And a system such as braille 
would count as ‘writing’ if we included haptic (tactile) reception of 
meaning, not just eidetic (visual), so c), above, would no longer be a 
problem. 
What this cursory24 discussion has served to highlight is that there are 
reasons to challenge the conflation of writing with the alphabet because 
there exist writing systems that are non-alphabetic and because the 
symbolic and functional purposes that writing serves can be achieved non-
alphabetically. This means that, in principle, meaning emerges from signs, 
images and other marks, not just sounds and letters, and that what counts 
as writing is therefore not restricted to the alphabet. 
The relationship between writing, literacy and cognition 
 
24 Key linguistic theories of the twentieth century have been necessarily omitted because 
the scope of this chapter is to provide a very brief historical foundation for justifying the 
possibility, in principle, of diverse forms of (academic) writing. I am, however, aware of De 
Saussure’s structuralism, which distinguishes between writing and speech by drawing 
attention to the diachronic contingencies of the latter (parole) and the synchronic stability 
of the former (langue) (Harris & Taylor, 1989; Saussure, Baskin, Meisel, & Saussy, 2011) and 
with Derrida’s deconstruction of Western logocentrism, which de-centres language and 
meaning and re-positions them as differential relationships involving absences, differences 
and defferals (Derrida & Spivak, 1976).  
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Despite challenges to the theory that writing represents speech via the 
alphabet, the alphabetic theory of writing has prevailed and continues to 
form the basis of what counts as literacy. As noted by Olson, opening this 
chapter, being or not being ‘literate’ has implications for social inclusion 
and exclusion. It is noteworthy, in this sense, that both the Italian and 
French languages use the term ‘analfabeta’ and ‘analphabète’, respectively, 
to mean ‘illiterate’, i.e. having ‘no alphabet’ or ‘no letters’. The English 
equivalent would be ‘knowing your ABC’, i.e. your alphabet.  
Many studies on ‘Western literacy’ centre around the transition from oral to 
written culture. They include work by Havelock (1976, 1982), who has dated 
the origins of Western literacy to the Greek alphabet (which, as we have 
seen, is problematic and covers an immense geographical area which is not 
even ‘Western’ – cf. Appiah (2016a)’s Reith Lectures and de Sousa Santos 
(2009)’s ‘A Non-Occidentalist West’ for a discussion of the mis-
appropriation of ‘Western’ by the ‘West’). Yet, Havelock’s influence on how 
we have come to understand literacy has been significant because he has 
contributed to the belief that oral culture restricts thought and leads to 
indoctrination whereas written culture frees thought from rote repetition. 
His views, however, are problematic, as I show below. 
Havelock claims that the ‘psychological and epistemological revolution’ 
brought about by written, i.e. alphabetised, prose, “inheres only in an 
alphabet” (Halverson, 1992, p. 151). He shows this by explaining that it is 
during the Roman reign that the word ‘literate’ (litteratus) acquires the 
valence of ‘educated’ as in ‘a man of letters’ as opposed to a man who could 
simply read but was not necessarily educated (the Greek grammatikos) 
(Havelock, 1976, p. 3). Writing is also an ‘act’ (1976, p. 17) that becomes 
important in the context of social urbanisation because literacy is social, 
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not solipsistic (ibid, p. 29). Havelock argues that there is a law that governs 
all texts, namely that they are all written with a reader and their 
expectations in mind and that this law explains why expected and 
recognisable discourses become traditional in form and content (what 
Devitt (1996); Hyland (2002b); Martin (1992); Swales (1990) might call 
‘genres’). This kind of predictable and expected writing is what he calls a 
‘craft’ that can be learnt via instruction and schooling; it is writing that has 
“echoes of other works”. Writing that does not fall into such predictable 
and recognisable patterns, such as new writing, is left to the interpretation 
of experts (Havelock, 1976, p. 38). He also claims that if all the written word 
can do is ‘fall into predictable patterns’ by explaining, refuting and 
affirming, then novel ideas will never emerge: Dante’s and Chaucer’s 
vernacular is committed to endure on paper because it broke with 
predictable patterns (1976, p. 84-85).  
All of this, for Havelock, is evidence of the ‘inherent’ qualities of the 
alphabet. An obvious objection to this is that civilisations that are non-
alphabetic, but nonetheless ‘written’, have also generated their own 
‘psychological and epistemological revolutions’ – China’s millennial history 
of medicine, philosophy and literature being a case in point (Van Norden, 
2017). 
Despite such objections, the shift from oral to written societies (where 
‘written’ always seems to be equated with ‘alphabetic’) has been credited 
with developing a ‘logical’ mind because it has allowed us to ‘see’ language, 
enabling us to do what Havelock calls ‘backward scanning’, whereby we can 
reflect on how a text is organised, categorise the topics that it deals with 
and create logical ordering. This has allowed us to turn language into an 
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object of study which has generated grammatical concepts such as ‘clause’ 
and ‘sentence’ (D. Olson, 1994, p. 68, Chapter 6).  
In addition to providing opportunities for reifying language as an object of 
study, the shift from oral to written has also freed us from the need to 
preserve cultural wisdom through repetition, proverbs and prescriptive 
metrics – associated with oral prose - so that we can create novel 
statements through writing. Havelock illustrates this shift through a 
detailed analysis of the socially unifying and culturally preserving function 
of Homeric prose, which used repetition, proverbs and prescriptive metrics 
as way to preserve cultural wisdom. By having a writing culture, we are no 
longer bound by the need to memorise familiar ideas and to be 
‘indoctrinated’ in the way that Homeric prose did by creating regular, 
repetitive rhythms and metrics to generate memorable and memorisable 
knowledge.  
In short, according to Havelock, "The Greeks did not just invent an 
alphabet; they invented literacy and the literate basis of modern thought” 
(cited in Halverson, 1992, p. 152). This view has had negative repercussions 
on how the ‘West’ has treated non-Western civilisations, ‘mistaking’ the 
alphabetically literate identity with a superior way of being, rather than one 
that is simply different (Appiah, 2016b; Said, 1978, 1993) 
However, Havelock’s account of what constituted orality and writing in 
ancient civilisations and of how we transitioned from one to the other may 
be mistaken. Firstly, even if the development of writing has afforded the 
development of a systematised grammar, it does not follow that thinking in 
ordered ways would not have happened if alphabetical writing had not 
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developed. This leaves open the possibility for other forms of 
representation, including images, to produce ordered ways of thinking. 
Secondly, according to Halverson, Havelock based his arguments that the 
Greek alphabet has shaped Western thought on some unfounded 
assumptions about Homeric prose (600-500 BC) and about the primacy of 
orality over the written word. Essentially, Halverson argues that there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that Homer’s ballads were indeed spoken 
first and then transcribed: they could just as easily have been written and 
co-existed with an oral tradition. If Halverson is right, this would 
undermine the orthodox view that society transitioned from orality to 
writing, and that the latter is a thought-structuring substitute for the 
former.  
If writing did not substitute speech but co-existed with it instead, then the 
arguments that suggest writing is superior to speech are weakened. Rather, 
as Olson has argued, writing and speaking may make us think differently, 
not better or worse (1994, p. 258).  
Thirdly, even if it were true that writing preceded logical alphabetical 
thought, this would not entail that writing caused logical thought (post hoc 
propter hoc fallacy) since, for example, logical thought was clearly already 
happening with Socrates before Plato transcribed it. Indeed, argues 
Halverson (1992, p. 161), because there is no evidence for the need to 
memorise spoken language in the first place, it is hard to see what role 
writing played at all. Rather, it is possible that alphabetic writing 
functioned as cuneiform writing in corresponding to and recording 
astronomical-mathematical observations or accounting. In other words, the 
function of writing was to create social unity, facilitate economic 
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accountability and allow knowledge to travel, without its agent, rather than 
make us better thinkers. That new thoughts were possible because of the 
structures and societies that developed as a result of writing is not the same 
as saying that writing caused us to think ‘better’. This implication goes 
some way towards dethroning theories that writing structures thought in 
ways that are superior to other forms of communication. 
However, Ong (1982, 1986), who was greatly influenced by Havelock, is 
credited with the cognitive theory that writing is superior to speech because 
it raises consciousness by developing reasoning in ways that orality does 
not. Ong’s most cited work, Orality and Literacy (1982), argued that the 
transition from speech to writing in literate societies had a profound impact 
on the ways in which people thought and argued.  
Specifically, in Chapter 4 of his influential book, ‘Writing restructures 
consciousness’, as well as in a later article titled ‘Writing is a technology 
that restructures thought’ (Ong, 1986), Ong seems to make the quite 
reasonable claim that the technological advent of writing simply shapes the 
way we think, suggesting that it is comparatively, rather than qualitatively, 
different to other ways of communicating (1986, p. 24): 
Without writing, the literate mind would not and could not 
think as it does, not only when engaged in writing but even 
when it is composing its thoughts in oral form. 
But he soon betrays value judgments relating to the superiority of literate 
thinking (writing-influenced) over non-literate thinking (oral) (1986, pp. 29 
and 32, emphasis added to indicate his value judgements): 
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We know that totally oral peoples, intelligent and wise though 
they often are, are incapable of the protracted, intensive linear 
analysis that we have from Plato's Socrates. […] Like other 
artificial creations and indeed more than any other, writing is 
utterly invaluable and indeed essential for the realization of 
fuller, interior, human potentials […] By distancing thought, 
alienating it from its original habitat in sounded words, writing 
raises consciousness. Alienation from a natural milieu can be 
good for us and indeed is in many ways essential for fuller 
human life. To live and to understand fully, we need not only 
proximity but also distance. This writing provides for, thereby 
accelerating the evolution of consciousness as nothing else 
before it does (1986, p. 32). 
 
The idea that writing is objective and impersonal also begins to emerge. 
Ong draws attention to the “cool, analytic processes generated by writing”, 
with reference to Plato’s shunning of the oral poets in Phaedrus (Ong, 1986, 
p. 29). In the Laws, Plato praises writings on the grounds that they function 
as precepts, namely rules to regulate behaviour, but since they are texts 
without law-makers or subjects (Harris, 1989, p. 105), this consolidates the 
reputation of writing as impersonal, as a representation of reality that is 
devoid of human intentionality. Ong goes on to observe that because we 
also take for granted the technological effort of producing parchment and 
that current technology obscures the processes involved in producing 
writing, writing has an impersonal quality because it ‘separates the world 
from the living present’ in the way that speech doesn’t.  
Ong’s references to writing being ‘impersonal’, ‘cool’, ‘detached’, ‘distant’ 
and as providing a ‘full consciousness’ echo modern-day understandings of 
academic writing as autonomous, objective, impersonal (in the sense that 
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author intentionality does not play a part in the interpretation of the text), 
‘detached’ and ‘precise’ (e.g. lacking ‘evanescence’) (see references in Part 1, 
e.g. Bailey (2006) and Bennett (2009, 2015), all of which further conflates 
writing with thinking that is ‘precise and scientific’.  
Goody (1977) has attempted to heal the traditional anthropological 
dichotomies between societies that are oral and written by showing that 
elements of both have co-existed in oral and written communities (Goody, 
1977, pp. 148-149) and that many of the achievements attributed to literate 
societies can be explained in terms of the “cumulative growth of systematic 
knowledge’ (1977, p. 150) rather than by singling out writing as a key trigger. 
However, like Ong, Goody ultimately endorses the view that ‘linear, logical 
explanation depends on writing’ (D. R. Olson, 2001, p. 16642).  
Despite acknowledging that oral cultures are potentially more ‘open-
minded’ because they are not constrained by the permanence of thought 
that writing affords (1977, p. 43), Goody remains committed to the view that 
literate societies are better than non-literate ones because writing makes us 
more attentive, more ‘logical’ and aware of ‘alternatives’ (1977, p. 44, 
emphasis added): 
the form in which the alternatives are presented makes one 
aware of the differences, forces one to consider contradiction, 
makes one conscious of the ‘rules’ of argument, forces one to 
develop such ‘logic’. And the form is determined by the literary 
or written mode. Why? Because when an utterance is put in 
writing it can be inspected in much greater detail, in its parts as 
well as in its whole, backwards as well as forwards, out of 
context as well as in its setting; in other words, it can be 
subjected to a quite different type of scrutiny and critique than 
is possible with purely verbal communication. Speech is no 
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longer tied to an ‘occasion’; it becomes timeless. Nor is it 
attached to a person; on paper, it becomes more abstract, more 
depersonalised. 
The conflation of writing with the alphabet and with higher-order thinking 
clearly has deep historical roots which endure (e.g., Emig, 1977) and 
explains why Turner has referred to it as an ‘ontological complicity’ (2018, p. 
181): it is a ‘complicity’ because it assumes ‘good’ thinking cannot take place 
without ‘good’ writing and it has become influential because Western 
society has built its science, economy and entire identity around literacy. 
Yet, as we have seen, there are reasons to question the qualitative 
supremacy of ‘Western’ literacy over other forms of social practice, where 
ideographic scripts and orality are the basis of communication (Harris, 
1986, 1989, 2000) and where thinking may take different, not inferior forms 
(D. Olson, 1994, p. 258).  
Next, I consider how writing came to dominate academic practices. 
Variations in academic writings 
The history of academic writing is as complex as the history of writing. It, 
too, has contested origins and purposes, yet has established itself as a 
marker of a ‘higher’ education.  
History of ‘Western’ academia 
One way of approaching the history of English academic writing is to locate 
it within academia and specifically around the time when universities, as we 
might recognise them today, were founded. The first ‘Western’ European 
universities are one thousand years old and were late-comers to the world’s 
academic scene.  
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Indeed, ancient European universities appeared after those in Africa (de 
Sousa Santos, 2017), testifying to the well-established non-European 
‘ecology of knowledge’ that pre-dates current ‘Western’ academic 
hegemonies (de Sousa Santos, 2009): Al-Qarawwiyyin, in Fez, Morocco, 859 
AD, which is still a university; the University of Timbuktu (West Africa) 
founded in 982 AD “and attended, throughout the 12th century, by about 
25,000 students” (de Sousa Santos, 2017, p. ix) and Al-Azhar University, 
Cairo, 970 AD. And earlier still, China, where the Dà xué, the Great 
Academy, was founded in 200 BC by Emperor Wu Di of the Han Dynasty 
(Peters, 2017, p. 4); India, where ancient centres of learning existed in 300 
AD; the Gukhak in Korea was founded in 682 AD and the Daigaku-no kami 
in the Japanese Imperial Court existed before 794 AD (Peters, 2017, p. 5).  
Today, it is the European academies that dominate the global stage, 
alongside their American and Australian progenies, which are younger still. 
In Europe, Bologna and Paris were founded in 1088 and 1150, respectively, 
although these dates are contested (Rüegg & Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, 
Vol. 1), followed by Oxford 1150 (where teaching occurred as early as 109625) 
and Cambridge in 1209 (Collini, 2012, p. 23).  
These early mediaeval universities did not require students to write. 
Teaching and learning were informal arrangements and their official 
establishment as universities grew out of a need to ensure the financial 
security of their students and teachers, to promote rationality in the belief 
of God as a way of combatting heresy and to cultivate la vita contemplativa, 
which involved reading, rehearsing and interpreting scriptures. These 
universities also provided practical social solutions to trade and commerce, 
 
25 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oxford [accessed 30/11/2018] 
 145 
especially at Bologna University, which built its reputation around the 
study of Law and Padova University around the study of Medicine. This can 
be said to have established the early tradition of ‘town and gown’, whereby 
the aim of university was to serve local needs as well as cultivate the mind, 
but also because funding came from different stakeholders, including the 
Church, so universities were accountable to their funders, as they are today 
(Collini, 2012), and had to further their interests. The lecture, where a 
professor would literally lecture and read from books for several hours, and 
the oral disputatio, not writing, where students discussed and displayed 
their knowledge mnemonically rather than interpretatively, were the main 
forms of academic communication (Clark, 2006; Friesen, 2017; Leedham-
Green, 1996).  
The Early Modern/Renaissance university (1500-1800)  
This period is said to coincide with the advent of the printing press (1450-
1700) which allowed the knowledge, languages and vernaculars of pre-print 
society to become visible and widespread. It became easier to classify 
information and collect data, which explains why botany was able to 
establish itself in the 1500s, later to become a science in 1735 (Eisenstein, 
1983, p. 130); to create index pages and multiple maps (1983, p. 204); and to 
circulate portraits of leading cultural figures such as Erasmus and Luther, 
whose faces became well-known at this time (1983, p. 132-133). 
The Gutenberg Bible – which lent its name to the ‘Gutenberg Revolution’, 
aka ‘The Printing Revolution’ - was the first Bible to be printed between 
1450 and 1460 using a system of incunabula (movable print), allowing for 
several reprints which facilitated the dissemination of religion and 
individual, unmediated reading practices (i.e. individuals could access God 
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directly, as intended by Martin Luther). A new, smaller pocket-sized format 
for books, called the octavo, also emerged during this time, making books 
more portable by re-shaping writing on the page. This format became 
known as the 'Aldine' edition named after its Venetian printer-inventor, 
Aldus Manutius. It was smaller than the previous Gothic formats because it 
used the italic typeface invented by Manutius’ punchcutter and 
typefounder, Francesco Griffo, which reduced the space taken on the page 
allowing more books to be printed more cheaply (1000 rather than 250 in a 
single print run), including many translations of the classics, thus further 
contributing to the dissemination of knowledge26. 
However, Eisenstein (1983, p. 131; 151) has argued that what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘Renaissance’ took place before the advent of printing27 
and that print simply allowed existing knowledge to be distributed rather 
than to be created ex novo. Eisenstein’s views are a response to commonly 
held beliefs that the invention of the printing press took Europe out of the 
‘dark ages’ and into a ‘re-birth’ (Renaissance) where reason evolved because 
knowledge and information became accessible via print. Rather, according 
to Eisenstein, print simply made visible what was already there. The 
conflation between print and knowledge has clear echoes of the conflation 
between writing and reason, discussed above.  
 
26 See http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/firstimpressions/Pioneers-of-Print/Aldus-
Manutius/ (accessed 12 October 2016] and https://marciana.venezia.sbn.it/eventi/aldo-
manuzio-e-la-costruzione-del-mito-aldus-manutius-and-making-myth [accessed 30 April 
2016] 
27 Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374), commonly referred as a Renaissance poet, died before 
printing was invented. 
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By now, writing and reading were firmly established in European cultures 
because of print and this triggered significant social and cultural 
consequences. For example, between 1500 and 1600, the Reformation 
movement of the German Friar and Professor of Theology at Wittenberg 
University in Saxony (Northern Germany) Martin Luther toppled the 
dominance of the Catholic Church. This was made possible because 
Luther’s Protestant message spread via ‘academic’ writings called ‘theses’, 
despite the fact that they were not intended to be read by ‘the people’ 
(Martin Luther cited in Eisenstein (1983, p. 151) and Postman (1993, pp. 64-
65): 
It is a mystery to me how my theses, more so than my other 
writings, indeed, those of other professors were spread to so 
many places. They were meant exclusively for our academic 
circle here … They were written in such a language that the 
common people could hardly understand them. They … use 
academic categories. 
On the 31st of October 1517, Luther famously nailed his 95 theses to 
Wittenberg’s church door. Each thesis argued against the Catholic Church’s 
practice of ‘indulgences’, payments whereby ‘sinners’ could ‘indulge’ the 
Catholic Church in exchange for a pardon and a place in heaven. Luther 
challenged this practice, arguing instead that people’s ascent to heaven was 
through reading the bible and through their faith in and direct 
accountability to God, not to the Church. Luther’s writings, his ‘theses’ 
became full-blown ‘performatives’, namely writings that ‘made things 
happen’ (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, pp. 43-44; 48-50; Austin, 1962) 
because they sparked social and religious revolt (The University of 
Manchester Library, 2018).  
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Writing for Luther becomes a powerful revolutionary tool, allowing his 
Reformation to gather momentum. To further ensure more people had 
direct access to the Scriptures without recourse to the interpretations of a 
priest, Latin, the official language of the Church and of Academia, ceded to 
German and local vernacular varieties. Luther’s religious disputations were 
translated, transcribed and divulged, allowing ever greater numbers of 
‘common people’, who were outside of the ‘academic circle’, to partake in 
the Reformation (Postman, 1993, p. 65): 
What Luther overlooked was the sheer portability of printed 
books. Although his theses were written in academic Latin, they 
were easily transported throughout Germany and other 
countries by printers who just as easily had them translated into 
vernaculars. 
Luther’s academic writings, nailed as they were to a door and fairly 
standard practice, at the time,, re-genred as disputations and distributed as 
pamphlets in non-standard vernaculars to be read by non-academics, 
possibly had more ‘impact’, to use modern jargon, than if they had been 
curated into a traditional book. 
Further social and cultural consequences included the rise of individualism 
and standardisation. A sense of individual empowerment spread 
throughout Europe as knowledge became multilingual and accessible, yet 
also standardised by being easily replicated in print. A new era in reading 
practices emerged whereby “the role played by mnemonic aids was 
diminished” because “[r]hyme and cadence were no longer required to 
preserve certain formulas and recipes” since books could be referred back to 
(Eisenstein, 1983, p. 35). It was also an era in which silent, individual 
reading became possible (1983, p. 92). However, the need for images 
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(illuminations) did not diminish with the rise of typography because 
xylography (engraving), which was advancing technically in the arts, 
ensured that illustrators remained as gainfully employed as the scribes, and 
because the Reformation movement continued to rely on imagery to spread 
its message.  
The influence of Montaigne on writing  
Tensions between individuality and standardisation preoccupied both the 
pre-print and post-print era (as they do in current academic writing 
practices). A tangible manifestation of this tension was in how subjects and 
landscapes were reproduced in print. This skill relied on the patience of 
artists and copiers to faithfully reproduce (self)portraits and locations. 
However, it was not uncommon for different cities and different persons to 
be replicated by the same woodcut and engraving (Eisenstein, 1983, pp. 61-
62), thus erasing personalisation. Possible reasons for this are that copiers 
tired of paying attention to differences in the subjects they were replicating 
and for ease of duplication, they simply used the same woodcut to 
represent different people or different cities. Another reason may have been 
that, depending on the publication, an illustration served to represent a 
topic rather than an individual person or location.  
According to Eisenstein, these “impersonal images did not disappear when 
print replaced script” because the increased standardisation that was 
afforded by the print typeface facilitated the replication of diversity. This is 
evident in the publication and popularisation of thousands of books 
depicting costumes, maps and cities from all over the world, especially in 
Venice, where a cosmopolitan printing industry thrived. So, although 
information was being standardised, it was also being replicated which 
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meant it could reach multiple audiences: the same map was being reprinted 
and widely distributed, thus disseminating knowledge of a wider world.  
In turn, such impersonal standardisation created a “heightened 
appreciation of individuality” (Eisenstein, 1983, p. 133; Good (1988), which 
helps to explain the success of humanist philosopher and essayist Michel de 
Montaigne (1533-1593). His Essais proposed a new informal essay style that 
reclaimed a sense of the personal, private self as a way of counteracting the 
increasingly standardised, public self enabled by print. Montaigne’s 
personal, introspective and contemplative style became popular because it 
spoke to the needs of an ever wider, geographically scattered and 
impersonal readership (Eisenstein, 1986, p. 58): 
Traditional rhetorical conventions had allowed for the difference 
in tone between addressing a large assemblage in a public arena, 
where strong lungs and broad strokes were required, and 
pleading a case in a courtroom, which called for careful 
attention to detail and a more soft-spoken, clearly argued, 
intimate approach. But no precedent existed for addressing a 
large crowd of people who were not gathered together in one 
place but were scattered in separate dwellings and who, as 
solitary individuals with divergent interests, were more receptive 
to intimate interchanges than to broad-gauged rhetorical effects. 
The informal essay which was devised by Montaigne was a most 
ingenious method for coping with this new situation. He thus 
established a new basis for achieving intimate contact with 
unknown readers […] provided a welcome assurance that the 
isolated sense of singularity which was felt by the solitary reader 
had been experienced by another human being and was […] 
capable of being shared. 
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Montaigne’s essay format was to greatly influence the genre of the scientific 
experimental article (discussed below) because of the way it represented 
human experience as being both narcissistically personal and distantly 
objective (Eisenstein, 1986, p. 58): 
Its [the essai] abbreviated structure reflects both a prescriptive 
world view, empirical in spirit and observational in method, and 
a sceptical despair of achieving any unified cosmological view. 
The kind of discursive informalism and ordinary subject matter 
epitomized by the French familiar essay had immense 
philosophical appeal for growing scientific interests in 
seventeen-century England, which, Bacon had cautioned, would 
not succeed without a profound literary reform (Paradis, 1987, p. 
60). 
At the same time as Montaigne was challenging standardisation and 
reclaiming individual expression, standards were being reclaimed by 
religious and political authorities via attempts to reclaim, stabilise and 
sanitise language: Latin, the language of authority and catholicism, had 
been increasingly co-existing with local ‘vulgar’ vernaculars, as evidenced by 
Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy written in Florentine vernacular in 1320 as 
an attack on and parody of the corruption and double-standards of the 
Church. The quest for linguistic standards culminated in the establishment, 
in 1584, of the Italian Accademia della Crusca, the first and still active 
Academy of the Italian Language, which published the 'Vocabolario degli 
accademici della Crusca', a dictionary recording words supported by the 
“written authority of great works rather than by current usage” (Lillis, 2013, 
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p. 6)28. Later, in 1635, came the French Académie Française which boasted a 
similar language-preserving and tradition-entrenching mission (Rüegg & 
Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, p. 11, Vol. 2): 
For the French humanist the correct cultivation of language was 
the heart of the new educational movement […], in the 
mediaeval universities, language was raw and barbarous; 
scholastic textbooks darkened the intellect. It was through 
reading the ancient and biblical writings in the original 
languages that light was brought into university education.  
 
28 In 2016, the Accademia della Crusca – which is notoriously reluctant to include new lexis 
into its official dictionary – broke with its tradition of excluding words of ‘current usage’ 
and approved the entry of a new word coined by an 8-year-old boy during a school poetry 
recital. The word was petaloso, an adjective to describe a flower that has many petals (as in 
‘petally’), such as a daisy. The reasons given for this unusual inclusion were that the word 
was grammatically well-formed, was likely to have significant uptake, and clearly described 
its referent (Dal Monte & Morosi, 24 February 2016). 
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The English Royal Society was 
founded in 1660 with the aim 
of improving ‘natural 
knowledge’ (science) rather 
than preserving language29: in 
this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the English language has, 
to date, never managed to 
establish its own language 
academy (Crystal, 2003, p. 73; 
81; 187). As a consequence of 
this lack of language policing, 
it has evolved into a more 
porous and flexible system 
able to accommodate new lexis (Fig. 12). Yet, despite its porousness (Yun & 
Standish, 2018, p. 130), the English language still lends itself to heated 
controversies about standards and correct usage, as previously discussed in 
relation to EAP. 
The modern university was also projected towards action and novelty. It 
nurtured la vita activa, pushing the boundaries of knowledge through 
human discovery and technology (e.g. ship-building and engineering) 
rather than divine intervention (Rüegg & Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, pp. 7-
8; 30, Vol. 2). Famously, Columbus’ explorations of the Americas in 1492 
sparked a wave of ‘humanism’, understood as the waning of mediaeval and 
divine reverence and as the waxing of human reason and capacity to 
 
29 See  https://royalsociety.org/about-us/history/ [accessed 25 January 2017] 
Figure 12: Standard and non-standard usage 
available at 
https://twitter.com/GregMyers/status/1013370743
256768513 [accessed 01/09/2018] 
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understand, explore, and conquer, the world. In 1503, Amerigo Vespucci’s 
Mundus Novus chronicled Columbus’ earthly travels and, thanks to the 
printing press, became rapidly available in Latin, German, Dutch and Czech 
editions (ibid, p. 12). Forty years later, ‘knowledge of the heavens’ reached 
unprecedented heights with Copernicus’ 1543 publication of De orbium 
coelstium revolutionibus, heralding the heliocentric revolution that 
culminated in Galileo’s controversial 1638 Dialogue Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems. 
The emergence of new genres 
Three important academic literary and scientific genres emerged during 
this period, the Chronicle, the Dialogue and the Letters (Bazerman, 1988, p. 
130; Eisenstein, 1983, pp. 21-27).  
Chronicles were used to record the travels of explorers such as Columbus 
because this format lent itself to being written on the move and to 
recording un-analysed geographic, anthropologic and botanical 
observations.  
The dialogue afforded opportunities to engage in conversion and discussion 
with the classics rather than showing uncritical deference to them by 
reporting or transcribing them verbatim. This genre was revived by Galileo’s 
well-known literary outputs. Crucially, Galileo broke away from the 
established scientific writing conventions of his time, including his own, to 
re-propose the discredited Copernican heliocentric theory in both dialogue 
form and in Tuscan, the local vernacular of Pisa (where he taught). In doing 
so, he too broke away from the use of Latin and was able to reach non-
academic and non-scientific audiences who proved to be more open to 
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persuasion than his recalcitrant and sceptical scientific colleagues 
(Eisenstein, 1983, pp. 251-253): 
Galileo’s Dialogue on Two World Systems was such a provocative 
and polemical treatise, however, it almost seemed to court 
censorship in a way that is quite typical of most serious scientific 
work. The same thing cannot be said of his later treatise which 
helped to found classical physics: the Discourses on Two New 
Sciences. […] No great cosmic or philosophical questions intrude 
into this unimpassioned treatise … it is about as controversial 
and stirring as some freshman lecture on mechanics, of which 
indeed, it is the ultimate source. […] The crowing irony of 
Galileo’s career is that the failure of the great Dialogues should 
be so much more interesting than the success of the 
unobjectionable Discourses. 
Other sixteenth-century scientists, such as philosopher Francis Bacon and 
mathematician Johannes Kepler, also broke with the tradition of using 
Latin, preferring instead to use vernaculars which lent themselves to greater 
dissemination via the printed word “in an effort to convey the new spirit 
and methods of scientific philosophy” (Postman, 1993, p. 64). 
A possible reason for why the dialogic structure favoured by Galileo became 
popular at this time is that it had its roots in Cartesian rationalism, where 
the dualisms of mind mirrored dualisms of opinion. This dualism was also 
visible in the “unresolvable contradictions between science and theology, 
that is, between intellectual and moral points of view” (Postman, 1993, p. 
32) as well as in the quest for knowledge through exploration and discovery 
instead of God (Rüegg & Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, pp. 8-9, Vol 4) (Fig. 13): 
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For the mathematician Descartes and other scientists, the 
dialogic structure, which also manifested itself in the style of 
academic publications, changed not only the educational basis 
of the European elites, but also the concept of academic research 
itself. Whereas in the vertical perspective of the Middle Ages the 
academics sat like dwarves on the shoulders of giants and only 
in this way were able to see further, the humanist dialogue with 
the authors of the past enables scholars to undertake voyages of 
discovery on the high seas, in order to discover new worlds, for 
which the title page of Francis Bacon’s Instauratio magna of 1620 
provides both an illustration and commentary. 
 
And finally, the epistolary genre also thrived during these centuries as 
academics and natural philosophers (later to be called scientists30) began to 
 
30 The term ‘scientist’ wasn’t coined until 1833 by William Whewell (Ross, 1962, p. 71) 
Figure 13: Francis Bacon’s 1620 frontispiece 
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=francis+bacon+instauratio+magna&title
=Special:Search&go=Go&searchToken=a30dzr15zhf1zo0xuun09e7dy#/media/File:Bacon_Great_I
nstauration_frontispiece.jpg] 
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publish work in and correspond via the two most influential academic 
journals of the time, the Journal des Savan(t)s and the Philosophical 
Transactions, both established in 1665.  
In particular, Henry Oldenburg, the first editor of the Philosophical 
Transactions, was keen to encourage correspondence and debate. He 
became known for being a ‘present’ editor who enthusiastically mediated 
between the readers and the article writers, publishing letters that became 
scientific documents in their own right, and gradually allowing contributors 
to have more voice (Bazerman, 1988). Significantly, he published the work 
of international scientists, such as biologist Marcello Malpighi (Eisenstein, 
1983, pp. 243-244), who were being ignored or censored in their native 
countries, and published the correspondence with Isaac Newton in both 
English and Latin (Bazerman, 1988, p. 84), consolidating multilingualism in 
the scientific community.  
The significance of the Philosophical Transactions as a historical record of 
how the scientific genre of the experimental article has evolved into current 
academic writing practices has been meticulously documented by Charles 
Bazerman (1988) in Shaping Written Knowledge. Bazerman tracks this 
evolution from its early reports and descriptions of unusual events using 
the language of ‘curiosity and wonder’, where science was reported as 
uncontested and devoid of theory or methodology (Volumes 1-20 of the 
Philosophical Transactions), to the increasingly careful illustration and 
reporting of methods and experiments. Attention to how methods were 
reported signalled the need to dispel controversies that were beginning to 
emerge as scientists were no longer individuals working alone to describe 
and report what they saw in nature. Instead, they were increasingly being 
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held to account publicly via the journals they corresponded in (Volumes 20-
50) and in their presentations to learned societies.  
The function of drawings and illustrations also changed. Hitherto, they had 
been deployed to represent nature. By the 1700s, they became the methods 
and instruments for understanding it, as explained below with reference to 
Robert Boyle and his physico-mechanical experiments with pneumatics in 
the 1600s (Shapin, 1984, p. 492): 
The sort of naturalistic images that Boyle favoured provided a 
greater density of circumstantial detail than would have been 
proffered by more schematic representations. The images served 
to announce that 'this was really done' and that it was done in 
the way stipulated; they allayed distrust and facilitated virtual 
witnessing. Therefore, understanding the role of pictorial 
representations offers a way of appreciating what Boyle was 
trying to achieve with his literary technology. 
Along with images, language also developed to reflect greater attention to 
how methods were reported. In 1672, Newton writes with the intention of 
eliminating uncertainty in his optical findings. He develops a new rhetorical 
style to deal with criticisms, a form of compelling argument which becomes 
a closed system reducing opposing arguments to errors. He writes with the 
intention of making his writing appear as fact, not controversy, and finds 
ways of shaping it to avoid ambiguity by artfully guiding the reader step-by-
step through an experiment expressed in self-referential language - 
recalling the meandering, explorative and tentative style of Montaigne – all 
the while intending to report what he believes to be an objectively 
observable phenomenon: the style evoked is that of a neutral observer 
‘stumbling across a fact’ (see also Turner (2010, pp. 61-62). 
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In his Chapter 4, Bazerman (1988, p. 91) compellingly analyses a section of 
the carefully-crafted rhetorical style of Newton’s “A New Theory of Light 
and Colours”, an article published in the Transactions in 1672, where first 
person pronouns feature significantly to reflect the careful discoveries of 
the author-scientist (emphasis added): 
This earlier part of the article relies heavily on the language of 
personal thought and agency as it unfolds the attempts of a 
baffled investigator to come to terms with a robustly visible 
phenomenon. The first person followed by an active verb forms 
the armature of most sentences: “I suspected,” “I thought,” “I 
took another Prisme,” “I then proceeded to examine more 
critically,” “Having made these observations, I first computed 
from them.” At key moments he offers quantitative descriptions 
of his experiments, switching to third person existential 
statements: “Its distance from the hole or Prisme was 22 feet; its 
utmost length 13¼ inches.” But even experimental quantities are 
framed by his limited agency: “The refractions were as near as I 
could make them, equal and consequently about 54 deg. 4’” (93). 
The orderliness with which he pursues and isolates the 
phenomenon gives rhetorical warrant to the degree of facticity 
of language Newton allows himself in this section. That is, the 
credibility of the investigation helps establish the credibility of 
the fact and the credibility of the investigator.  
The procedure Newton follows is exactly that of ‘exclusions’, as prescribed 
by Bacon: “What the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which 
shall analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of 
exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion” (Great 
Instauration B, 1,137). 
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By now, language has evolved into a conduit for channelling mental 
thoughts from the mind of the truth-knowing writer/observer to the mind 
of the sceptical reader, rather than a representation of speech (Russell, 
2002; Turner, 2010, pp. 56-57). It becomes instrumental during this time 
because it needs to persuade as well as report what the scientist sees as an 
objective natural reality. The mnemonic verses of Homer, Pindar and 
Aeschylus required no reporting verbs, despite being transcriptions of oral 
poems31 which suggests that for the pre-Socratics, reality did not need to be 
interpreted: it needed to be told (D. Olson, 1994, p. 193).  
By the 1400s, the term ‘verbatim’ had been coined, suggesting that a new 
linguistic awareness was dawning, relating to how a text could fix and 
stabilise meaning (ibid, p. 106). English began to borrow reporting verbs 
from Latin, such as imply, to signal mental state verbs which indicated that 
an interpretation was taking place as opposed to an unhedged factual 
description of nature (D. Olson, 1994, pp. 108-109). With the 1700s came the 
development of theories of interpretation to understand what was ‘in’ the 
text, not what could be ‘read’ into it (hermeneutics).  
Because knowledge was becoming increasingly contested, the following 
features begin to emerge in scientific writing: the use of nominalisations as 
grammatical metaphors to reify and de-personalise activities, presenting 
them as facts rather than processes; acknowledgments and criticisms to 
build allegiances but also to comply with the new 1710 intellectual property 
copyright encoded into British law (Pennycook, 1996, p. 205); hedging 
language such as probably and might be to indicate speculation before a 
 
31 Although some have questioned whether Homer’s ballads were indeed oral (Halverson 
(1992). 
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bold conclusion. Botany becomes an established scientific discipline in 1735 
because plants could be classified by names which could be printed and 
circulated; and introductions to conflicts between theories began appearing 
in Volume 40 of the Transactions (1737) to signal that a hypothesis 
preceded the account of the experiment, even when there was no 
contention (Bazerman (1988, p. 76); Halliday in Olson, p. 118; 173-174).  
The need to report accurately and clearly meant that language became 
“invested with the role of ‘mapping’ knowledge, without drawing attention 
to itself as part of the map. In other words, it has to be transparent” 
(Turner, 2010, p. 63). 
However, notwithstanding even Newton’s painstaking attempts to ensure 
that his language was precise and transparent enough to ensure his readers 
could clearly see the Book of Nature and reach the same ‘inevitable 
conclusion’ as him, fellow scientists continued to subject Newton’s claims 
to intense scrutiny. Eventually, Newton became so averse to criticism that 
he refused to publish in the Transactions (Bazerman, 1988, p. 82): 
From a biographical perspective, Newton seems to have dallied 
only once with journal publication, got burned badly, and never 
returned. That is, he first published his optical findings in a 1672 
Transactions article, entitled “A New Theory of Light and 
Colours,” which sparked a controversy with much of the 
correspondence printed in later issues of the Transactions; 
afterward Newton refused to publish in journals and withheld 
further publication of his optical findings for thirty years until 
the Opticks appeared in 1704. 
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Humboldtian influence (1800s and beyond) 
A period of great university expansion occurred during the 1900s following 
their decline during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Of 
immense significance during this time was the influence of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, a German scholar and statesman credited with founding, in 1810, 
the modern Western concept of the research university, which has 
particularly influenced US universities and Oxbridge (Rüegg & Ridder-
Symoens, 1992-2011, pp. 5;11-12, Vols. 3 and 4; Russell, 2002).  
The Humboldtian university fully embraced the growing faith in science, 
reason, discovery and empiricism of the previous centuries making 
‘research’ its core, essential nuclear foundation (Vol. 3, p. 15). According to 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, the liberal theologian and philosopher who 
inspired Humboldt (Vol. 3, p. 5): 
[T]he function of the university was not to pass on recognised 
and directly usable knowledge such as the schools and colleges 
did, but rather to demonstrate how this knowledge is 
discovered, to stimulate the idea of science in the minds of the 
students, to encourage them to take into account the 
fundamental laws of science in all their thinking. 
Questions arose as to how the university was to achieve this function and 
Humboldt argued strongly that the State had a pivotal role in enabling 
universities to fulfil their research mission (Vol. 4, p. 12): 
And in order for this aim to be achievable, “[i]t was Humboldt’s 
belief that the state had only two tasks with regard to the 
university: ‘to ensure the richness (strength and variety) of 
intellectual resources through the selection of staff, and to 
guarantee their freedom to carry out their work’”.  
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At the same time, the increased professionalisation of research and of 
salaried university staff, coupled with an increase in standardisation 
processes and widening participation - compared with the 1700s, when no 
academic qualifications were needed to study at university (Vol. 2, pp. 289; 
328) and no written exams existed before 1820 (Leedham-Green, 1996, p. 
125)32 - led to a steep rise in assessment procedures with written 
assignments, rather than oral seminars or the more traditional disputatio, 
becoming the main means through which to assess students.  
This, according to Kruse (2006, p. 348), “turned writing into a constraint 
that threatened to exclude [students] if they did not master the writing 
assignments”, echoing Turner’s (2018) concerns.  
In terms of content and the structure of language, the written research 
paper began to stabilise and increasingly emphasise methods, a 
phenomenon that had begun in the early 1700s, at least by the time Volume 
25 of the Philosophical Transactions had been published. Findings and 
conclusions, especially in Medicine, discussed consequences of hypotheses 
and experiments at the end of a paper in terms of logical deductions of the 
facts. These were presented using impersonal language such as 
nominalisations and making explicit reference to methods; citations began 
to develop into codified networks of acknowledgments and sentence 
structure became increasingly complex: noun and subordinate clauses 
increased, suggesting increasing intellectual complexity, even while 
sentence length and syntactical complexity remained stable at around 70% 
 
32 The grading of papers had been introduced for the first time in 1792 at Cambridge 
University (Postman, 1993, p. 13) 
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simple and 30% complex (Bazerman, 1988, pp. 167-168). All this suggests 
that scientific discourse was fairly homogenous during this time.  
Relative stability endures to this day. This is because fixed forms have 
become ‘encapsulated’ by a dependency on the way knowledge is produced 
whereby findings and bold claims are foregrounded to serve the interests of 
(Bazerman, 2015, p. 267): 
[U]niversity departments and professional societies (with their 
structures of rewards and advancements), government and 
business interests and funding (based on perceived needs for 
scientific and technological knowledge), knowledge-based 
professions that pervade contemporary society (with their 
reliance on systems of authority and credentials), expanding 
educated populations who look toward science for knowledge, 
and evolving technologies and systems for the production and 
distributions of texts (including cheap printing, commercial 
publishing companies, university and professional libraries, 
national mail systems and international agreements), despite 
advances in digital technology.33 
But just as the Modern humanist University was characterised by the 
contradictory dualisms of expressive individualism (epitomised by 
Montaigne) and technological standardisation (triggered by print), so too 
was the university of the 20th century caught between competing ways of 
thinking: on the one hand, a staunch faith in the precision and exactitude 
of science meant that hitherto ‘unscientific’ disciplines such as philology 
 
33 Despite the stability of genres described by Bazerman, Hyland and Feng (Kevin) (2017, p. 
47) have begun to detect some linguistic informality in academic writing in what they call 
‘illicit initials’, i.e. starting a sentence with ‘and’, ‘but’ or ‘so’. 
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and (applied) linguistics became scientised (Orman, 2016), systematised 
(Harris & Taylor, 1989) and unified into an object of study that assumes 
language lies outside of us and can be a conduit for thought that is 
independent of its users (Yun & Standish, 2018, p. 128). On the other, the 
emphasis on clarity, transparency of language and logic as opposed to the 
open, digressive system of rhetoric (see Turner 2010, pp.77-76), triggered a 
literary ‘relativist turn’. This encouraged the reader to bring their own 
understanding to the text and to question the authority of both the author 
and the written word (D. Olson, 1994, p. 193). Writers, historians, social 
critics and philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques 
Lacan, Roland Barthes, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, even the 
Ludwig Wittgenstein of The Philosophical Investigations (Sigmund, 2017), 
became controversially known as the post-modernists who ‘relativised’ 
knowledge, reified ‘discourse’ and generally questioned the ability of 
language to ‘refer’ to reality. In so doing, they developed an influential 
rhetorical style of their own which, unlike the grammar of the research 
article, privileged sentence length and syntactical subordination34 as a way 
of displaying through form the complex interconnectedness of reality, 
particularly social, psychological and philosophical reality. 
Writing and its ideologies 
The word ‘ideology’ is often associated with controversial, but historically 
defining and influential theories, such as ‘socialism’ or ‘conservatism’. Here, 
I take it to mean a ‘worldview’, as reported in Wikipedia35: 
 
34 Wittgenstein’s aphoristic style is clearly an exception to this. 
35 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology [accessed 01/12/2018] 
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An ideology is a collection of normative beliefs and values that 
an individual or group holds for other than purely epistemic 
reasons. The term was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in 
1796, who conceived it as the "science of ideas". In contemporary 
philosophy it is narrower in scope than that original concept, or 
the ideas expressed in broad concepts such as worldview, 
imaginary and ontology".  
Because of how writing shapes knowledge, several scholars are concerned 
with how it enacts political and social ‘worldviews’. 
In his history of the American university curriculum, Russell (2002) 
documents how academic writings enact ideal social practices. When these 
are dictated by the needs of industry, writing becomes specialised and 
technical (2002, pp. 123-124; 127; 129). When they are dominated by a 
research ideal, such as the Humboldtian faith in the fundamental laws of 
science (Rüegg & Ridder-Symoens, 1992-2011, p. 5; 15, Vol. 3), not only do 
they prevent any other genre from taking root, but they impose a 
straightjacket on the genres of all disciplines (Russell, 2002, p. 71; 79; 85, 
emphasis added): 
[T]o understand why certain forms of student writing endured 
and others faded, or why certain pedagogies included writing 
and others did not, one must look to the character of the 
research ideal and the ways it interacted with writing in the new 
mass education system […]. German scholarship rapidly set a 
new standard for academic writing, not only in the sciences but 
also in the emerging humanities and social sciences because 
disciplines viewed student writing through the narrow lens of 
their own research writing, they rarely explored other 
possibilities […]. 
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Russell then suggests that ideals can become ideologies (2002, p. 269). He 
shows how two progressive US writing programmes in the 1950s and 60s 
were abolished because they prioritised the developmental and learning 
potential of writing over its specialised, skills-based technical nature. These 
programmes drew significantly on the progressive ideas of Arthur N. 
Applebee, an educationalist who regarded writing as integral to the learning 
process and was associated with left-wing political ideals of equality and 
inclusion. According to Russell (2002, p. 269), this might explain, given the 
political tendencies of the United States at the time, why such programmes 
were not maintained.  
Other scholars, too, have claimed that writing “reproduces the ideologies 
and inequities of the institution and society” (A. Archer & Breuer, 2016b, p. 
42); that its approach is ‘ideological, transparent, objective and 
autonomous’ (Bennett, 2015; Lea & Street, 1998; Street, 1984); that it 
embodies ‘exclusionary ideologies’ (Lillis, 2001; Scott, 2013; Thesen & 
Cooper, 2013; Turner, 2018) and that by focusing on accuracy and standards 
it privileges conservative, elitist and undemocratic ‘ideologies’ (Mike Rose, 
1985; Russell, 2002). 
Because of word constraints, the next section limits itself to signposting, 
rather than developing, the argument about why writing is equated with 
ideology. 
Literacy and cognition 
Literacy is ideological in the sense that its different understandings reflect 
different worldviews. This transpires from the above discussion where I 
showed how being literate conflates with being able to write rather than, 
for example, draw. This ‘worldview’ contrasts with other worldviews where 
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literacies are not reduced to the alphabet, but are multiple and creative 
(Kara, 2015; Kuttner, Sousanis, & Weaver-Hightower, 2017).  
Writing is also equated with the ability to think correctly. However, this can 
lead to ‘exclusionary’ practices such as assuming that if someone cannot 
write (in ways deemed to be ‘correct’ which assume standards that in turn 
assume worldviews), then they are unable to think (correctly). This 
contrasts with visual cognitive theories, such as those examined in Arnheim 
(1969), and further suggests that non-alphabetic (such as Chinese) cultures 
are illiterate and therefore unable to think (Dabashi, 2015). 
Language and power 
As shown by Fairclough (2001) and Pierre Bourdieu and Thompson (1991), 
language has the power to enact ideologies.  
The 1900s witnessed the emergence of English as the lingua franca of 
academic research, replacing French and German (and Latin). This 
signalled a shift in economic and political power from mainland Europe 
(once the heart of academia) to the UK and the US (now setting higher 
education agendas). The key events that cemented the shift to English 
include: the establishment of the American university based on the German 
research model (Russell, 2002); the two World Wars, which intensified and 
prioritised scientific research to serve the war industry (ibid); the 
consequences of nineteenth century colonialism (Mbembe, 2008; Morris, 
2010; Said, 1978), then of de-colonialism (such as India gaining its 
independence in 1947) and then again of post-colonialism, which meant 
that European countries, including the UK, had obligations to educate 
those it had colonised but also to maintain a form of ‘soft power’ to ensure 
allegiances (Peters, 2017). The ensuing economic and political dominance of 
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the United States and British Imperialism has ensured that English 
continues to be the main language through which research is conducted 
and disseminated (Altbach, September 8 2007; Genç & Bada, 2010; Turner, 
2010, p. 54; 62).  
Since English is the language of academia, it has power to enact its 
‘worldview’. If Portuguese, for example, were the lingua franca of the 
academy, then different ideologies might emerge (Bennett, 2010). However, 
as documented in Turner (2010), Politzer-Ahles et al. (2016), Lillis and Curry 
(2010b, 2015) and more recently in Hanauer, Sheridan, and Englander 
(2019), the dominance of English as the language of academia enacts 
linguistic injustices that exclude many from global academic conversations. 
This is why Turner, in discussing EAP, claims (2010, p. 78): 
Academic writing should not be seen as autonomous or given. It 
is not an autonomous set of skills or a discrete set of rhetorical 
values that have been arrived independently, or been designated 
as such by some kind of decree. It is rather a cultural practice 
that has been invested in rhetorical values that are themselves 
the effects of wider cultural processes. 
Gender, science and objectivity 
Ideologies are gendered because worldviews reflect the values of all 
individuals. Feminist writings enact ideologies that are ‘situated’ (Haraway, 
1998), meaning that they acknowledge, through language, the bodies that 
produce them, the emotions that accompany them and the processes, 
constraints and locations that engendered them. They are typically 
contrasted with the confident certitude of male-authored objective, 
rational, impersonal scientific texts. They include the kind of passionate 
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writing redacted by Le Ha (2009) and the playful stylistic surprises of Sword 
(2009).  
For feminist scholar Haraway, discourses of ‘objectivity’ are “enshrined in 
elementary textbooks and technoscience booster literature” (ibid, p. 576), 
yet even scientists know that this is not how science is ‘actually made’, 
because the history of science tells us that science is achieved through trial, 
error and incertitude (T. Kuhn, 1962). Instead, Haraway (1988, pp. 589-590) 
argues, in an academic style that EAP textbooks don’t showcase (and which 
I quote at length deliberately, to ‘take the reader there’ (Back, 2018), that 
feminism embraces uncertainty, interpretations, diversity and multiplicity: 
Feminism loves another science: the sciences and politics of 
interpretation, translation, stuttering, and the partly 
understood. Feminism is about the sciences of the multiple 
subject with (at least) double vision. Feminism is about a critical 
vision consequent upon a critical positioning in unhomogeneous 
gendered social space. Translation is always interpretive, critical, 
and partial. Here is a ground for conversation, rationality, and 
objectivity - which is power-sensitive, not pluralist, 
"conversation." It is not even the mythic cartoons of physics and 
mathematics - incorrectly caricatured in anti-science ideology as 
exact, hyper-simple knowledges - that have come to represent 
the hostile other to feminist paradigmatic models of scientific 
knowledge, but the dreams of the perfectly known in high-
technology, permanently militarized scientific productions and 
positionings, the god trick of a Star Wars paradigm of rational 
knowledge. So location is about vulnerability; location resists the 
politics of closure, finality, or to borrow from Althusser, feminist 
objectivity resists "simplification in the last instance." That is 
because feminist embodiment resists fixation and is insatiably 
curious about the webs of differential positioning. There is no 
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single feminist standpoint because our maps require too many 
dimensions for that metaphor to ground our visions. But the 
feminist standpoint theorists' goal of an epistemology and 
politics of engaged, accountable positioning remains eminently 
potent. The goal is better accounts of the world, that is, 
"science." 
Haraway’s writing style defies the ‘scientific’ academic writing paradigms of 
exactitude and reduction by using repetition and even omitting referencing 
details [sic], something EAP would disallow. Arguably, she is writing in a 
tradition that has its own conventions, but EAP students are unlikely to be 
exposed this kind of writing on the grounds that it does not display the 
features of academicness that EAP requires.  
Modality 
The tension between writing and drawing has already been referred to 
(Harris, 1986, pp. 29-30), but Postman (1993, p. 16, emphasis added) 
describes it as a form of ‘competition’ that reflects ideologies and world 
views rather than any inherent superiority or inferiority of one medium or 
another: 
[N]ew technologies compete with old ones—for time, for 
attention, for money, for prestige, but mostly for dominance of 
their world-view. This competition is implicit once we 
acknowledge that a medium contains an ideological bias. And it 
is a fierce competition, as only ideological competitions can be. 
It is not merely a matter of tool against tool—the alphabet 
attacking ideographic writing, the printing press attacking the 
illuminated manuscript, the photograph attacking the art of 
painting, television attacking the printed word. When media 
make war against each other, it is a case of world-views in 
collision. 
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Framing modes as being in ‘ideological competition’ with each other, goes 
some way towards explaining resistance to forms of literacy that are non-
written, multilingual, or non-standard. This resistance takes place in EAP, 
but also seems to exist more broadly in education, as highlighted by Times 
Higher Education journalist Grove (2016), who, contentiously, suggests that 
the privileging of writing in academic assessments may lead to inequalities 
and discrimination. For example, mature students who have been out of 
education for a while but who have developed skills in other areas of 
communication might benefit from alternative forms of assessment. Some 
of the comments following Grove’s article reveal just how controversial this 
suggestion is: 
#2 Submitted by Descartes on October 3, 2016 - 11:06am  
“[…] It seems UEL is willing and happy to award 2:1s and 1sts to 
students who are unable to use the most basic of scholarly skills ... 
writing […] 
Epistemic injustice 
A further way in which ideology can be enacted through writing is by 
measuring academic competence almost exclusively through the written 
form and through varieties of writing (and language choice) deemed to be 
better than others. Since academic writing is used to assess academic 
competence, it is high stakes, especially for those uncomfortable with 
writing or who prefer to express themselves using different forms (as I show 
in Chapter 4). In this sense, excluding literacies that embody knowledge 
and ways of thinking not traditionally communicated in writing could 
amount to a form of ‘epistemic injustice’ (Carel & Kidd, 2014), namely an 
unfairness towards the way somebody communicates their knowledge 
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because their background, interests and abilities differ from the standard 
and because we (the receivers) don’t understand why somebody is 
communicating the way they are.  
The phrase ‘epistemic injustice’ was coined by moral philosopher Miranda 
Fricker (2007) to refer to the ways in which the words of a speaker (in this 
case, a writer) are ignored, derided or simply misunderstood because the 
hearer (or the reader) is negatively or ignorantly pre-disposed towards the 
speaker (writer). This negative predisposition could involve racist, sexist or 
educational biases, such as those implied by Rose (1989) when discussing 
Lucia’s exclusion from the psychology class (see Chapter 1). She was 
excluded on the grounds that she didn’t have the language and conceptual 
frameworks of academic psychology, yet she was knowledgeable because of 
her personal experience of mental illness.  
Instances of epistemic injustice also resonate throughout Sperlinger et al. 
(2018), who argue that higher education should be made accessible to a far 
greater range of people and throughout life, not only at 18. One example, 
specifically, seems to capture what might count as epistemic injustice in 
writing practices.  
In a classroom reading of Spivak’s essay Can the Subaltern Speak (in Morris 
(2010), in which the feminist writer and academic argues against the West’s 
racist and colonial attitudes, most students struggled to understand the 
text. Possibly influenced by the fact that the essay had famously won a ‘bad 
writing award’ from the Journal of Philosophy and Literature (Sperlinger et 
al., p. 55), the majority of students did not understand this essay. One 
student, Nina, however, did. She claimed to ‘like what Spivak’ was saying 
and as a consequence of connecting with the content, understood Spivak’s 
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writing style. Since Nina was also a non-traditional student whose 
background literacies were not those of the academy, she found most 
standard academic writing ‘difficult’ anyway. Spivak touched on themes 
that resonated with her experience of life and was therefore able to access 
its knowledge. I see two potential counts of epistemic injustice in this story. 
The first is towards Spivak herself, whose traditional white, male Western 
academic reader may simply have dismissed her knowledge on the grounds 
of how she expressed it and out of ignorance of her experiences as a non-
white female anti-colonial academic. As Turner (2018, pp. 258-259) argues, 
readers must also make an effort to understand the writer. The second is 
towards the student population at large. If the range of what counts as 
‘academic’ writing is narrowed and students are denied exposure to a range 
of writing styles, then some knowledge becomes excluded from the 
curriculum. This, too, becomes a form of injustice. 
Conclusion 
Understanding the history of writing generally and of academic writing 
specifically frames writing as a contingent practice, one that could have 
been otherwise and that can evolve to reflect social needs and values. This 
chapter has highlighted some of the contested narratives surrounding the 
supremacy of the alphabetic script by challenging its conflation with 
writing. I have suggested instead that drawing and semasiography, 
including mathematics, are forms of writing because the etymology of 
writing includes the concept of drawing and because there are inherent 
flaws in alternative definitions of writing. I have also challenged the belief 
that written expression affords better thinking than other modes, such as 
the visual and the aural, with reference to Olson, who has shown that 
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writing shapes thinking in ways that are comparatively, rather than 
qualitatively, different. Specifically, I have highlighted a possible 
misinterpretation of the commonly held view that orality gave way to 
literacy suggesting that orality and literacy coexisted and afforded different 
ways of representing reality. If literacy, specifically Western literacy, came 
to be seen as the superior form of representation, this may have more to do 
with ideologies than with inherent qualities. 
The next chapter showcases diversity in current academic writing practices 
in order to exemplify that academicness has many shapes and forms. 
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Chapter 4 - What makes writing 
academic 
what is academic writing (…)? What is an academic community? …As Rose 
concludes: “Wide-ranging change will occur only if the academy redefines writing 
for itself, changes the terms of the argument, (and) sees instruction in writing as 
one of its central concerns (Mike Rose, 1985, p. 359).  
 
Introduction 
I open this chapter on what makes writing academic with Rose’s related 
question: ‘what is academic writing?’. Like Rose, I am calling for a re-
conceptualisation of academic writing that is more inclusive and diverse. 
Specifically, in this and the remaining chapters, I will argue that what 
makes writing academic are the varied, current and future practices of the 
academy, including its values36. 
This follows from my questioning in Chapter 3 of what writing itself is. 
With reference to Roy Harris and others, I suggested that writing be re-
thought as pictorial as well as alphabetic and that demarcating what counts 
and does not count as writing is problematic and ideological. Because the 
historical purposes and genres of writing are multiple and cannot be 
reduced to one single aim or form, namely book-keeping or religion or 
 
36 Compare the similarly titled advice (discussed in Chapter 1) on ‘What is academic 
writing?’, where formality, logic, clarity, balance and concision are valued 
(https://library.leeds.ac.uk/info/14011/writing/106/academic_writing [accessed 11/12/2018]) 
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science, attempts to provide core definitions of writing are ‘fallacies’ 
(Pettersson, 1994, p. 171).  
Since diverse purposes and practices shape the forms that writing takes, 
and since what it means to be ‘academic’ is similarly diverse, then what 
makes writing academic is likely to be varied. For example, the 
transformative agendas of American Composition Studies and Academic 
Literacies have shown that writing is more than a display of grammatical 
and lexical conventions. This is because it involves questions of equity and 
access that expand the ways in which writers engage with the world and 
that shape the way writers write. 
When there is consensus about what makes a text academic, this generally 
clusters around the idea that for writing to be ‘academic’ it has to present 
an argument (Fish, 2017, pp. 159-190). However, when there is controversy, 
this generally clusters around the fact that academic writing can go ‘beyond 
argument’ and be about essaying instead (S. Allen, 2015), namely exploring, 
understanding and digressing. And, as I will show, even when it is all about 
the argument, the shape and form that argument embodies can be 
disrupted.  
Chapter 4 underscores some of this debate firstly by considering that what 
makes writing academic, namely its ‘academicness’, cannot be reduced to 
any particular feature. I will showcase this academicness with examples of 
diverse texts that do not display conventional features of academic writing. 
Secondly, I will explain some of this diversity by referring to Adler-Kassner 
and Wardle (2015)’s threshold concepts in writing studies, which I have 
located in the textual environment from which writers draw to make 
decisions about how to write (see Appendix A). The reason for doing this is 
178 
to show that what makes writing academic emerges from the interaction of 
multiple purposes (i.e. writers have multiple purposes) and from diverse 
forms (e.g. language, genres, conventions), which, when taken together, 
invite us “to imagine beyond [their] own terms of reference” (Back, 2016, p. 
64). I take this to mean that something ‘beyond the writer and the textual 
environment’ emerges from the text. This, thirdly, involves recognising that 
argument is a feature of what makes writing academic (but not the only 
one). This is because it emerges from the choices that writers make when 
considering what the textual environment offers them. Since it is a marker 
of academicness, language becomes just one of several modes in the textual 
environment that writers draw on to do their arguing.  
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Academicness 
I use the term ‘academicness’ to refer to a holistic property of a text, i.e. the 
totality of what makes it academic rather than, for example, legal or poetic. 
A property is a quality that can be predicated of whole objects, like colour, 
shape, sound or taste. It is a quality that does not pick out any single or 
uniquely identifying part of the whole object (Sellars, 1963). In this sense, 
academicness is like ‘meaning’. It only makes sense within a context and 
cannot be reduced to a ‘single element that stands alone’ because it is 
‘relational’ and ‘holistic’ in structure (Malpas, 2002, p. 407). 
In this sense, what makes a text academic, namely its ‘academicness’, is not 
the presence or absence of specific features relating to language, genre 
moves or argument. If what made writing academic could be reduced to 
these specific features, then hoaxes such as Alan Sokal (Cuthbert, 2018; 
Franca & Lloyd, 2000; Sokal, 1996, 2008) (Fig. 14) and Ike Antkare (Labbé, 
Figure 14: Sokal hoax 
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2010; Labbé & Labbé, 2012; Van Noorden, 2014) (Fig. 15) would count as 
academic in virtue of the fact that they display the features that EAP 
classifies as ‘academic’.  
However, whilst displaying conventional academic forms - which is likely to 
explain why they are so readily published - hoaxes promulgate ‘nonsense’ 
(Alvesson et al., 2017, pp. 4-5) and in so doing, fail to adhere to the 
standards of socio-academic practices (SAPs in Appendix A). Socio-
academic practices include a commitment to the truth (Connell, 2013), to 
academic integrity (Zgaga, 2009), to social justice (Case, 2013, pp. 19-25) and 
to innovation and research (Warnock, 1989). Such commitments require an 
ethical orientation towards honesty and the active volition of an agent. 
Neither an automated generator of academic jargon (Labbé, 2014; Labbé & 
Labbé, 2012) nor the deliberate human intention to mislead and distort 
disciplinary knowledge (Sokal, 2008) are commensurate with the spirit of 
such aims.  
Figure 15: Antkare fake 
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It is in this sense that academic hoaxes do not count as academic.  
Clearly, however, those who published these articles, the editor-readers of 
Social Text and Springer (for Sokal and Antkare, respectively) believed them 
to be genuinely academic. Sokal (2008) has documented these reasons. 
They include the editors’ appreciation of post-modern academic jargon and 
relativist conclusions which suggested to them that the text was bona fide. 
Similarly, Van Noorden (2014) has indicated that the fake papers published 
by Springer (and detected by Labbé) had ‘characteristic vocabulary’, 
meaning the kind of recognisable academic jargon that the fake text 
generator SCIgen had been programmed to produce.  
Sokal has since also admitted that some of his readers felt his thesis was 
‘defensible’ (Sokal, 2014, personal communication). This further suggests 
that the form in which these texts were written contributed to the 
perception that they were legitimate. In Sellars (1963)’s sense, their manifest 
image was that of an academic text.  
If the text itself, i.e. its form, has the power to generate this level of 
confidence in the reader, then this might suggest that the academicness of a 
text resides in the text itself and/or in the reader’s perception of it. 
Accordingly, hoaxes might indeed count as academic in virtue of the 
reader’s perception of their academicness. However, this is an 
uncomfortable position to reach because readers can be wrong, in the sense 
of being misled, as was also the case of art critics believing that Marcel 
Duchamp’s Fountain/Urinal was ‘art’ when in fact it, too, was a hoax 
generated by the artist/author (Grant, 2011). 
Alternatively, rather than relying on the reader’s perception, the 
academicness of a text might reside in the author’s intent (Fish, 2017, pp. 
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162-166). For example, whether Wittgenstein’s writings count as examples 
of academic writing, is contentious. Yet, they are established in the 
disciplinary (academic) practices of analytic philosophy (Sigmund, 2017, p. 
128): 
Wittgenstein confided to Russell [one of his PhD supervisors 
(the other was G. E. Moore)] that no one would ever understand 
the book, although it was, as he put it, “crystal clear.” Elsewhere, 
however, he noted: “I am aware that all these sentences are 
unclear.” As he seemed to realize at least to some extent, his 
style struck an odd balance between moments of dazzling 
lucidity and moments of total opacity, reflecting the tension 
between his yearning for clear expression and his awareness that 
some things simply cannot be expressed […] Wittgenstein’s style 
was at once cryptic and crystalline.  
How could this be? One possible reason is that Wittgenstein was well-
known and sufficiently well-regarded in his intellectual circles for his ideas 
to be trusted and his writing respected (compare with my earlier discussion 
about Derrida). This suggests that knowing who the author is, what they 
might have intended and, possibly, agreeing with them may have some 
bearing on whether a text is deemed to be academic or not. At the same 
time, though, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was rejected by several publishers 
because of its cryptic style (Sigmund, 2017, p. 127). This, then, suggests that 
a judgment about the text was made on the basis of the text itself and/or 
the reader’s perception of it. Eventually, it was accepted for publication 
thanks to Bertrand Russell’s introduction and endorsement, which signals 
that ‘knowing who the author is and their intentions’ does have bearing on 
what is considered ‘academic’.  
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The relationship between authorial intent, reader perception and text 
meaning has an established literary history which I cannot do full justice to. 
However, a brief reference to key issues in this debate can show that the 
binaries it sets up are unsatisfactory. 
That the author’s intended meaning is irrelevant to the interpretation of a 
text, is referred to in literary theory as the ‘intentional fallacy’. Proponents 
of this fallacy are Barthes (1967); Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946) and 
Foucault (1969). Strictly speaking, on their account, it would not matter 
that Sokal and Antkare are hoaxes because if the academicness (or 
meaning) resides in the text, not the author, then nothing more than the 
text is needed to judge its academicness.  
Conversely, proponents of the thesis that authorial intent does matter 
include Knapp and Michaels (1982) and Fish (2017). Knapp and Michaels 
collapse ‘the author’s intended meaning’ with ‘the text meaning’ arguing 
that we cannot “derive one term from the other, since to have one is already 
to have both” (1982, p. 724). For them, only authorial intent establishes text 
meaning in the sense that the intent is the text.  
Fish points to the culture of plagiarism as evidence that authorial intent 
and originality are measures of academicness. If intent didn’t matter, he 
argues, then why would the ‘West’ be so concerned with plagiarism and 
originality (see Pennycook, 1996 for a history of Western conceptions of 
plagiarism)? Recent controversies surrounding the work of Italian mafia 
writer/journalist Roberto Saviano (Moynihan, 2015) and critical 
theorist/philosopher Slavoj Žižek (Jones, 2014) are cases in point: both 
authors deny the intent to plagiarise and claim that it is what their texts say 
that matters, not where the information comes from. This would suggest 
184 
that Saviano and Žižek align themselves with proponents of the 
‘intentionalist fallacy’ because they deny that author intent matters. Yet, 
this does not seem to be an acceptable stance in current Western 
conceptions of authorship (see, for example, university statements about 
what counts as ‘academic misconduct’), where the ‘intent’ to copy remains 
significant in establishing the trustworthiness (or academicness) of a text.  
The Sokal and Atkare texts complicate matters further. Despite both being 
hoaxes, they differ in at least one crucial way: one was written by a human 
and the other by a computer. If we appeal to author intent, following Knapp 
and Michaels (1982) and Fish (2017), then Antkare is not academic because 
it cannot enact any socio-academic practices (SAPs) since it is generated by 
a computer and, typically, computers do not have intent. But following 
Barthes and other proponents of the ‘intentionalist fallacy’, Sokal’s article 
could count as ‘academic’ because it displays ‘predictable and recognisable 
patterns’ that readers would normally expect in an academic text: it is 
researched in the traditional sense of ‘referring to relevant literature’; it 
made sense to its intended audience; and (worryingly) it is still in 
circulation and available in Social Text via an established academic 
publisher, JSTOR (Sokal, 1996). This further confers institutional legitimacy 
to the text, giving it academic credibility. Moreover, at the time, the article 
generated genuine academic debate around what counts as knowledge (see 
for example Dawkins 1998). What makes us reluctant to call it ‘academic’, 
however, is not its content but the intention with which it was produced, 
and perhaps more importantly, the dishonesty of this intention: Sokal 
intended to parody and discredit critical theory and did not believe his own 
arguments.  
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In this sense, intent becomes a contributing factor in whether a text is 
deemed to be academic (i.e. a dishonest intent detracts from academicness). 
But this, too, is an uncomfortable conclusion to reach because it suggests 
that intent matters: if the intent were honest, would this change our 
perception of whether the text is academic?  
Both the hoax and Sokal’s subsequent justification for it raise 
uncomfortable issues: on the one hand, the hoax was read as an ‘academic’ 
text, but none of it was ‘true’. If we accept that one of the values of higher 
education is at least a commitment to ‘truth’ (Connell, p.106) or to ‘realness’ 
(understood broadly from a critical realist perspective as the recognition 
that external ontologies exist (Bengtsen & Barnett, 2017), then the hoax was 
not academic. However, if we accept this, then we would also have to 
accept that the IELTS and Pearson Tests of Academic English are not 
academic either. This is because they are written to display language and 
mimic essay forms, not to advance truthful, or real, accounts of the world. 
The articles published by Springer and IEEE also display many of the 
features that EAP and popular writing advice literature would classify as 
‘academic’. These include the fact that they may have been read and cited 
by their intended audience (thus meeting criteria of citation impact 
(Collini, 2012, p. 1; 4; Labbé & Labbé, 2012) and may even, albeit 
unintentionally, contain established scientific truths in so far as they were 
generated by a computer corpus of genuine scientific articles. Yet, it is the 
fact that they were computer-generated and devoid of human agency that 
negatively influences our judgement about their ‘academicness’, not the fact 
that their structure (i.e. their form) conforms to a standard. This indicates 
that writer agency, in the sense of there being an intention, is playing a part 
in determining the academicness of a text.  
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To sum up, what I am claiming so far is that when we invoke the structural 
markers of academicness as standards by which to judge whether a text is 
academic or not, hoaxes would count as academic but unconventional texts 
would not. This is because unconventional texts display the ‘wrong’ sort of 
language and moves, and certainly not the kind of academic language that 
EAP writing programmes and textbooks are likely to engage with. However, 
when we invoke the writer’s agency to determine whether a text is bona fide 
academic, this involves an appeal to their intention. But intention alone 
could potentially allow anything to be academic.  
Since reductive appeals to either structure or agency are unsatisfactory in 
explaining academicness, an account of their interaction is needed. This is 
further developed in Chapter 6 with reference to Appendix A. 
Examples of unconventional texts that would not pass a modern standard 
‘structural test’ of academicness include the graphic doctoral dissertation of 
Nick Sousanis (2015) (Fig. 18), the musical PhD exegesis of A.D. Carson 
(2017) (Fig. 17), the playful and feminist PhD thesis of Harron (2016) (Fig. 
20), the aphorisms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’ Tractatus (also his PhD thesis 
(Sigmund, 2017, p. 135) (Wittgenstein & Russell, 1922) (Fig. 19) and the 
scientific dialogues of Galileo Galilei’s Two Chief World Systems37 (Galilei, 
Drake, & Einstein, 1967) (Fig. 16).  
 
37 Clearly, Galilei’s dialogues were written before modern academic conventions existed. 
My point here, however, is that Galilei chose the dialogue genre to propose his heliocentric 
thesis as opposed to the more conventional prose and less controversial thesis of his other 
work on classical physics (cf. Chapter 2). 
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Other examples of recent unconventional academic texts come from 
theoretical physicist Daniel Shanahan. Shanahan (2015) argues that 
scientific journals need to become ‘living documents’ that allow more space 
to report methods rather than results because what matters most in 
Figure 18: Sousanis’ non-linear 
graphic EdD dissertation 
Figure 17: Carson’s socially-committed rap 
PhD 
Figure 20: Harron’s socially-inclusive and playful PhD 
Figure 19: Wittgenstein’s aphoristic 
PhD 
Figure 16: Galilei’s helio-centric paradigm-
changing Dialogue 
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scientific research is the appropriateness of the methods used and the 
extent to which these can be replicated. By not giving due space to methods 
and by granting more visibility to the findings of scientific research, the 
‘form’ of the academic paper amounts to a ‘fraud’. This fraud can be further 
compounded by superlative language that inflates the significance of the 
findings (Vinkers, Tijdink, & Otte, 2015). Shanahan’s example allows me to 
start illustrating how the academicness of a text can be reconceptualised as 
an interaction between the structural elements available in the textual 
environment (such as form, grammar, genre and reader expectations) and 
the disciplinary knowledge, values and intentions of the writer who has 
agency in shaping the text. What makes Shanahan’s living document 
academic is an interaction between the writer’s disciplinary values and 
intentions to give more space to methods and what the textual 
environment affords in terms of structures that enable this to happen. As 
such, what makes the text academic is not reduced to either the writer’s 
intentions or to the structural form of the text. 
Shanahan further claims that by allowing more published space for 
methods, scientists would curb the unscientific drive that publishers’ have 
towards prioritising controversial or trending results which are more likely 
to capture the attention of a superficial audience than satisfy the needs of 
the scientific community. Shanahan, therefore, advocates that we re-genre 
the scientific article so that we can: 
move beyond the now-obsolete print model and truly embrace 
the freedom that online publication gives us, moving towards 
living documents that can be updated, amended, extended and 
indeed directly linked to other articles and data.  
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Shanahan’s living document is an example of what Bazerman (1988) means 
by ‘shaping’ knowledge or of what Lunsford means when she claims that 
writing is ‘epistemic’, namely that it doesn’t “simply record thought or 
knowledge but […] has the capacity to actually produce thought and 
knowledge” (2015). By accusing scientific papers of being ‘frauds’ because 
they give more space to findings than to methods, Shanahan is also 
highlighting the need for there to be integrity in the writer’s intentions, 
which suggests that the ‘right sort of intentions’ can justify the forms that 
shape a text. 
Another example of how writers interact with their textual environments to 
shape knowledge comes in the guise of a 17-year-old ruse deployed by a 
Swedish medical team to get their research noticed (Grow, 2014; Michaels, 
2014). In an effort to promote the importance of their work and make it 
more retrievable on search engines (as well as showcase their sense of 
humour), they introduced lyrics from the singer-songwriter Bob Dylan into 
the titles of their writings. Lundberg, Lundberg, Alving, and Weitzberg 
(1997) published a paper entitled “Nitric oxide and inflammation: The 
answer is blowing in the wind”. The paper was on flatulence. 
Interestingly, “the researchers also point out that it is primarily in review 
articles and commentaries that it is possible to use quotations since these 
articles are often slightly lighter in tone (less heavyweight) than others” and 
“it’s important that the quotation is linked to the scientific content, that it 
reinforces the message and raises the quality of the article as such, not the 
reverse” (Sjöblom, 2014). I would argue that their use of Dylan lyrics should 
be welcomed in ‘heavyweight’ academic writings, too, because their imagery 
affords the communication of an important scientific message in ways that 
a more traditional title might not. This affordance forms part of the broader 
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academic practice of being understood and critiqued by a wider audience 
than would otherwise be possible. Consequently, their use of lyrics remains 
academically relevant in the sense that it affords a socio-academic practice 
(SAP), namely the practice of communicating knowledge to the wider 
public (i.e. public engagement). 
These examples could be dismissed as hapax legomena, namely one-off 
instances that are not representative of academic discourse as a whole. 
While this may be true, it does not alter that fact that they exist and that 
they have established themselves within the knowledge discourses of their 
disciplinary communities. In so doing, they are enacting diverse socio-
academic practices (SAPs).  
Examples of socio-academic practices (SAPs) 
Since such texts exist, I am concerned with understanding why this might 
be so. Because their existence can’t be explained by recourse to any isolated 
conventional form or writer intent or institutional requirement, I will 
suggest that what makes these texts academic are the socio-academic 
practices that emerge from an interaction between the writer (their 
knowledge, intentions, values and abilities) and the textual environment. It 
is the textual environment that includes the reader and the institutional, 
social and linguistic structures about which writers need to be 
knowledgeable so that they can make informed decisions (see Appendix A).  
Mindful of the fact that, as Tardy (2016, p. 76) reminds us, issues of  
‘symbolic and cultural’ capital are also involved, I am not downplaying the 
role of the reader or of institutional expectations in establishing the 
academicness of texts. This is because I recognise that (ibid): 
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In the traditional academic classroom, clearly defined roles of 
the teacher (as expert and assessor) and the student (as novice 
and learner) shape how student texts are both written and read, 
and they limit the likelihood that a student will depart from 
genre expectations. 
However, innovation, even at a relatively novice level, does occur, as the 
student writings referred to above exemplify. And in occurring, it gives rise 
to a range of socio-academic practices. 
Examples of what I am calling socio-academic practices include 
commitments to truth and inquiry; problem-solving and problem-
generating research; understanding, imagination and interpretation; care, 
wisdom and thinking; social and epistemic justice (such as activism (Spivak, 
1987); ideologies and identities; creativity and reflection; inclusion and 
diversity, phronesis and eudamonia; risk-taking and public engagement 
(references to which can be found throughout the following literatures: 
Barnett, 2012; Bengtsen & Barnett, 2018; Besley & Peters, 2013; Biesta, 
Filippakou, Wainwright, & Aldridge, 2019; de Sousa Santos, 2017; Nixon, 
2012; Sperlinger et al., 2018; Thesen & Cooper, 2013; Warnock, 1989).  
Instead of these practices being ‘encapsulated’ (Bazerman, 2015) in any 
specific or prescribed set of lexical or grammatical items, or forms, it is 
possible that they emerge from an interaction between the writer and the 
range of properties available to them in the textual environment. This is 
because neither the writer nor the textual environment, each in isolation 
from the other, can establish the academicness of a text. Rather, the textual 
environment affords the writer a range of possibilities, including knowledge 
of their readers and threshold concepts (Appendix A), which can shape the 
academic text. By perceiving the affordance of the textual environment, the 
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writer can orient their readers’ perceptions in a world where readers also 
cooperate in the understanding of a text (Turner, 2018). Tardy (2016, p. 61) 
might describe this as an ‘innovation’ that builds rapport between the 
writer and the reader. Thus, it can be the writer who, in a performative act, 
wilfully intends the disruption of certain disciplinary attitudes, such as 
attitudes to Mathematics, and who chooses elements from the textual 
environment that can include playful and innovative language to further 
ideological purposes.  
For example, Harron (2016, p. 8) uses language to disrupt readers’ 
expectations and to enact a social practice of inclusion: this is signalled by 
the claim that “Respected research math is dominated by men of a certain 
attitude” (2016, p. 1). Harron is using her academic writing to establish her 
‘identity’ as a female mathematician and advance her ‘ideology’ of social 
inclusion (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, pp. 48-58). This is further 
compounded by writing her PhD thesis with three different readers in 
mind: the lay person, the initiated person and the expert. Harron is 
knowledgeably both anticipating and orienting her readers’ expectations by 
disrupting the traditional genre of the PhD thesis that assumes one type of 
reader. She does this because she wants to write a thesis that is “as 
mathematically complete as I could honestly make it” (ibid) and for a 
community of mathematicians that includes those who “do not feel that 
they are encouraged to be themselves” (ibid). By interacting with her textual 
environment and choosing the form and genre that allows her to express 
her identity and ideology, she is enacting a socio-academic practice (of 
inclusion and social justice). 
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Threshold concepts 
Having argued that academicness is a holistic and relational socio-academic 
practice that cannot be reduced to any single element in the text or to a 
writer’s intent, the following section draws on threshold concepts in writing 
studies (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015) to further argue that what makes 
writing academic may emerge from the ways in which writers conceptualise 
their written texts.  
The model proposed in Appendix A, and further explained in Chapters 5 
and 6, classifies threshold concepts within the textual environment. This is 
because they are part of the affordance relation that allows socio-academic 
practices (SAPs) to emerge. 
 ‘Threshold concepts’ is a phrase mobilised by Meyer and Land (2006) to 
designate a powerful heuristic in higher education. In an interview with 
Deverson (2017), Ray Land explains that a threshold concept acts like a 
‘portal’ that opens “a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about 
something” (Meyer & Land, 2006, p. 4). This new way of thinking has a 
‘transformative function’ because ‘once students have understood a key 
disciplinary concept, they are taken into a new intellectual and emotional 
space’. For example, Reimann and Jackson (2006, p. 166) discuss the 
threshold concept of ‘opportunity cost’ in Economics. This is explained as 
‘the sacrifice made, when resources are scarce, to seek opportunities 
between competing uses of finite resources’. An ‘opportunity cost’ is 
therefore not actually a cost. It is a ratio that measures ‘the best alternative’ 
in the range of resources available. It is a ‘relative cost of one opportunity 
set against an alternative or competing economic activity’. Understanding 
this, for an Economics student, is part of a ‘liminal’ state in their learning 
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whereby they may feel confused, stuck and challenged (Kiley & Wisker, 
2009, p. 432) as they try to ‘integrate’ their previous understandings with 
the new ‘troublesome’ understandings that seem “conceptually difficult, 
counter-intuitive or even ‘alien” (Meyer & Land, 2006, p. 39). It is a state 
that can be “likened to that which adolescents inhabit: not yet adults; not 
quite children” (Cousin, 2006, p. 1). Once they have crossed the ‘threshold’ 
that separates this liminal state from their understanding of the new 
concept, their knowledge becomes ‘irreversible’, meaning “that the change 
of perspective occasioned by acquisition of a threshold concept is unlikely 
to be forgotten” (Meyer and Land, 2006, p. 7).  
Understanding that what makes writing academic may not amount to a set 
of prescribed conventions similarly requires entering a liminal state where 
the familiar comfort of previous knowledge (e.g. predictable paragraph 
patterns and IELTS essays) becomes troublesome. Although threshold 
concepts are referred to as ‘troublesome’ because they disrupt previously-
held understandings, this does not presuppose that there is a ‘correct way’ 
to understand a concept: the point is that any shift in conceptual 
understandings is likely to be troublesome.  
This point is implied by Cousin (2006, p. 1) when she reminds us that 
threshold concepts are ‘bounded’ (meaning that concepts border with other 
concepts that index new conceptual areas). Their boundedness requires us 
to resist ‘essentialist readings’ by remaining open to questioning the 
concepts themselves. This is because of the ‘provisional explanatory 
capacity’ of disciplinary concepts rather than because of any ‘congealed 
property’ that might be defining them. For example, understanding that in 
Economics an ‘opportunity cost’ is not actually a ‘cost’ but a ‘ratio’ does not 
mean that understanding it as a ‘ratio’ is correct: this, too, may be a 
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‘provisional explanation’. But the conceptual shift in crossing the threshold 
that allows the student to rethink it as a ‘ratio’ instead of a ‘cost’ is 
necessary for disciplinary understanding. 
In what follows, I am proposing that a conceptual shift is needed to 
understand what makes writing academic. I am not (necessarily) 
prescribing new ‘congealed’ concepts to replace the old ones, but I am 
foregrounding conceptual shifts that might be included in the textual 
environments that writers can then draw on when making decisions about 
what forms their writings ‘encapsulate’.  
One such shift is the recognition that when writing is reduced to a 
relatively finite set of skills it may fail to ‘encapsulate’ new socio-academic 
practices that might otherwise emerge from the more open, mobile and 
fluid interaction of the writer and the textual environment. Shanahan 
(2015)’s ‘living document’ is an example of a new socio-academic practice, 
one where science reclaims its focus on methods. 
Socio-academic practices, unlike autonomous transferable skills, cannot be 
googled, downloaded, copied, collated and then measured against big data 
banks of lexical corpora. Nor can they be used to create ‘link farms’, namely 
search engine algorithms that artificially increase rankings and citations by 
inflating the prominence of articles that may not be bona fide (Labbé & 
Labbé, 2012) but which boost audit metrics.  
Fish (2017, p. 212) implies that big data exonerates us from thinking, and 
that this may well be seductive in an ‘accelerated academy’38. Moreover, 
 
38 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/the-accelerated-academy-series/ and  
http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/category/accelerated-academy [accessed 
29/12/2018] 
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since language is inherently corrupt – because of its interpretative 
ambiguities – we might all be better off avoiding it, allowing big data to 
communicate on our behalf instead: 
we will have raw data untainted by the corruption of subjectivity 
and therefore capable of generating meaning and agreement 
simply by virtue of getting bigger and bigger. Language, always 
vulnerable to manipulation, kills, but big data saveth. 
The problem with this is that it strips humans of their creativity and agency 
to choose, change, mix and adapt languages and modes. In an effort to 
reclaim a role for writer agency in determining academicness, I’d like to 
propose threshold concepts as a way to ‘saveth’ us instead because these 
can extend the affordances of the textual environment which writers draw 
upon, adding to the skills set needed to write academically. 
In Naming What We Know: Threshold Concepts in Writing Studies, Adler-
Kassner and Wardle (2015) articulate thirty seven threshold concepts of 
academic writing. These threshold concepts foreground the diversity, the 
affordances, the social practices and the mobility of both writing and 
writers in ways that EAP, typically, does not.  
An example of a threshold concept in writing includes its performativity 
(Lunsford, 2015), meaning that written texts can make things happen 
‘beyond their own terms of reference’ (Back, 2016, p. 64), such as a policy 
change (an emergent SAP). Another example is the power of texts to build 
identities (Villanueva, 2015), such as feminist writings (Haraway, 1988; 
Harding, 1995) and ecologies of knowledge (de Sousa Santos, 2009), which 
allow different epistemologies and ontologies (also emergent SAPs) to 
become visible. When a writer is knowledgeable about what the textual 
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environment affords, they can then make informed choices about the shape 
of their written text.  
Academicness emerges from this interaction. 
Below, I have listed some of these concepts and provided examples of how 
they can make writing academic in ways that differ from standard 
conventions. In each example, the academicness of the text emerges from 
how the writer perceives the affordance of any given threshold concept. 
Concept 1: Writing is a Social and Rhetorical Activity 
1.1 Writing is a Knowledge-Making Activity (by Heidi Estrem) 
“Understanding and 
identifying how 
writing is in itself an 
act of thinking can 
help people more 
intentionally 
recognise and engage 
with writing as a 
creative activity, 
inextricably linked to 
thought. We don’t 
simply think first and 
then write. We write to think” (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, p. 19). 
In this sense, what makes writing academic is its capacity to make us think. 
The academicness of the text emerges from how the writer perceives the 
affordance of this threshold concept. An example of such a text might be 
Figure 21: Law’s messy methods make knowledge and 
thinking visible.  
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Law (2003), who uses a graphic abstract to embody the inherent messiness 
of research methods, the difficulties of deciding what is relevant and what 
order to present them in (Fig. 21). By choosing to write his methods a he did 
(i.e. as a graphic rather than a paragraph), Law is perceiving his writing as a 
‘Knowledge-Making Activity’. 
1.5 Writing Mediates Activity (by David R. Russell) 
“The concept that writing mediates 
activity [eg a STOP sign or a 
performative] is troublesome because it 
goes against the usual concepts of 
writing as ‘just’ transcribing […] 
thought or speech.” (Adler-Kassner & 
Wardle, 2015, p. 27). 
What would make writing academic 
here is its capacity to make things 
happen. An example of such a text 
might be O’Dwyer, Pinto, and 
McDonough (2018), who invite us to 
resist the pressures of academia by 
performing a manifesto (Fig. 22). By 
choosing to write a manifesto, the 
authors are perceiving their writing as 
a ‘Mediating Activity’. The academicness emerges from perceiving the 
affordance of such a concept. 
 
Figure 22: Writing performing as Self 
Care 
 199 
Concept 3: Writing Enacts and Creates Identities and Ideologies 
3.0 Writing Enacts and Creates Identities and Ideologies (by 
Tony Scott) 
“When we seek to ‘apprentice’ students into academic writing, what 
ideological imperatives are being asserted in the ways we choose to 
conceive of academic writers and writing?” (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, 
p. 50). 
What can make writing academic is its capacity to respect that writers are 
different. Examples of such a text include Harron (2016), Carson (2017) and 
Kunju (2017), the latter having chosen to write his thesis in isiXhosa, one of 
South Africa’s eleven languages. In doing this, he is enacting an ideological 
stance that consisted in reclaiming as academic an indigenous language and 
in challenging the dominant geopolitics of academic English (Lillis & Curry, 
2010a). By choosing to write in isiXhosa, Kunju is perceiving his writing as a 
way to ‘Enact and Create Identities and Ideologies’. The academicness 
emerges from this perception. 
4.3 Learning to Write Effectively Requires Different Kinds of 
Practice, Time, and Effort (by Kathleen Blake Yancey) 
“ [W]riters necessarily also work in multiple modalities – whether the 
modality be on the page through document design or on the networked 
screen bringing words, images, videos, and sound into a single text. In an 
age when so many spaces and affordances are available, writers need 
considerable practice keyed not only to fluidity and technique but also to 
differentiated practice across different spaces of writing, working with 
different technologies of writing” (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, p. 65). 
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In other words, for a text to count as academic, it has to be understood as 
an affordance. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Concept 5: Writing is (Also Always) a Cognitive Activity 
5.4 Reflection is Critical for Writers’ Development (by Kara 
Taczak) 
“Reflection has the unique ability to connect across the various threshold 
concepts because it offers writers the ability to be active agents of change, 
making meaningful contributions to any rhetorical exchange” (Adler-
Kassner & Wardle, 2015, p. 79). 
Here, what makes writing academic is its capacity to make us reflect. This 
capacity can be provided by the rhetoric of visuals which can “prompt 
sustained reflective thinking” (Hill, 2008, p. 38) and which can remove ‘the 
walls that words create’ to free our understandings and ‘imagine an 
education that encourages and cultivates the different ways in which each 
of us operates and finds meaning’ (Sousanis, 2018). Ryan (2014, p. 61) also 
frames writing as an opportunity to reflect and to “consider the writer as a 
self-conscious designer of text, which foregrounds their reflexive and 
agentic position”. 
When read cumulatively, threshold concepts afford creative possibilities for 
academic writing to emerge in diverse ways and broaden what the textual 
environment can offer. 
Argument, and its problem with language 
Having so far suggested that academicness is neither in the text nor in the 
intention of the writer but that it emerges from how writers perceive and 
understand the textual environments from which they draw (including 
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knowledge of their readers and of threshold concepts), I now propose that 
argument is an example of academicness because it emerges from the 
writer’s purpose and their perception of what the textual environment 
affords.  
I provide definitions of argument towards the end of this section to 
illustrate how it can be non-linguistic, but I begin by assuming a generic 
understanding of argument as the means through which we persuade 
others (Fish, 2017). 
Adler-Kassner and Wardle (2015) seem to have very little to say about 
argument. This is at odds with the centrality of argument to scholarly work. 
Although some claim that academic communication doesn’t need to be 
about argumentation (S. Allen, 2015; Bammer & Joeres, 2015), generally, 
argument is deemed to be a marker of academicness (as discussed 
throughout Andrews, 2010; A. Archer, 2016; Björkvall, 2016; Fish, 2017; 
Gourlay, 2016; Wingate, 2012a). What might explain this omission is the fact 
that argument emerges from the threshold concept that the writer has 
chosen (i.e. intended). 
In this section, I consider argument to be one of the properties emerging 
from the interaction between the writer and their textual environment. I 
also focus on the ways in which ‘argument’ has been conflated with 
language to show that this conflation has led to the multimodal affordances 
of argument being neglected. This enables me to highlight that what is 
meant by ‘argument’ has changed over time, is discipline-specific and is 
multimodal. It further allows me to propose that language, and its 
associated conventional academic genres, be re-cast as one of several modes 
202 
through which argument and argumentation can be achieved (cf. Threshold 
4.3, above).  
I conclude by claiming that an over-reliance on language limits our ability 
to argue and that a multimodal approach to argument affords greater 
academicness. By re-casting language as one of several modes from which 
academicness can emerge, I am drawing attention to the richness of the 
textual environment and to the opportunities that it affords writers. 
How language came to define argument 
Linguistically, the dominance of EAP writing models that tend to 
overemphasise both language and its formal features can be explained with 
reference to the established tradition which considers language, and 
language alone, to be the conduit or enabler of complex, higher order 
thinking that ‘raises consciousness’ (Emig, 1977; Gourlay, 2016; Ong, 1982, 
1986; Turner, 2018). This ‘higher order thinking’ is associated with 
‘argumentation’, which can be briefly understood as the ‘art of persuasion’ 
(Fish, 2017, p. 6) and which, because of its persuasive intent, defines 
academic communication (Andrews, 2010; Wingate, 2012a). 
However, since scripts vary in the ways they represent the world, it is 
reductive to claim that only writing can ‘raise consciousness’ (D. Olson 
1994, p. 275, my emphasis): 
by examining the diversity of scripts [maps, diagrams, 
illustrations] and the ways they are used and what they provide 
models of, we have been able to specify a set of relations 
between literacy and cognition 
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This suggests, as already indexed in Chapter 3, that writing and cognition 
are related and may make us think differently (1994, p. 258) compared to 
other relations, but not necessarily think better.  
That language is fallible in capturing and, therefore, doing justice to the 
ontologies we seek to represent and cognitively engage with has been 
highlighted by philosopher Miranda Fricker (2007, pp. 150-151). She 
describes several social situations in which knowers who do not have the 
linguistic resources to interpret and then describe a social event can 
become victims of a ‘hermeneutical injustice’. This is when somebody (a 
knower) becomes disempowered and then disadvantaged by social realities 
that have not developed the linguistic repertoires to describe an event. 
Some of her examples relate to instances of sexual harassment whereby 
women must develop the language needed to describe situations that may 
not be adequately captured by previously established words, such as sexual 
‘coercion’, ‘intimidation’ or ‘exploitation’: in the contexts that Fricker 
describes, ‘harassment’ helps women describe behaviours that were not 
obviously captured by the other terms. She shows that language can create 
conceptual spaces to frame thoughts and experiences in new ways, but, in 
doing so, she equally indexes how readily language fails to describe what is 
happening39. 
For my present purposes, this leaves open the possibility that human 
cognition can develop through a range of representations whereby reality is 
not captured through the use of one single mode, namely language. When 
 
39 Interestingly, the word ‘harassment’ does not exist in Italian. It is generally translated as 
molestia (as in ‘being molested’). However, since the #MeToo scandal, whereby several 
women took to social media to call out male harassment, the English word is used in 
Italian media, often untranslated. 
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argument is allowed to draw on the most fitting modes rather than the most 
conventional, the richness and fullness of socio-academic practices are more 
likely to emerge. As artist and psychologist Rudolf Arnheim reminds us 
(1974, p. 2): 
The scientist builds conceptual models he wants to understand 
about a given phenomenon. But he knows that there is no such 
thing as the full representation of an individual instance. 
Latour and Woolgar (1986) are also aware of the limits of relying on a single 
mode, language, to capture the nature of socio-scientific work (1989, p. 28):  
there has been a growing dissatisfaction with outside observers’ 
reliance on scientists’ own statements about the nature of their 
work. Some participants have themselves argued that printed 
scientific communications systematically misrepresent the 
activity that gives rise to published reports.  
Their sociological investigations of science, through anthropological 
observations of a chemistry laboratory, highlight how much can get lost in 
translating the phenomenology of this work into linguistic statements. Law 
(2004), in the context of trying to linguistically capture the methods of 
social science, describes this loss in terms of the ‘messiness’ of social reality 
and the challenge of capturing it in language. Since language is 
ontologically distinct from the reality it describes, the onus of representing 
reality cannot fall entirely on its shoulders.  
The idea that language is best-suited to being a transparent carrier of our 
thoughts, a conduit for reality rather than constitutive of it - in the 
Orwellian sense of being a ‘window pane’ through which we view and 
represent the outside world - has had many challenges. These include 
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socio-semiotic integrationist linguists, such as Harris (2011), who claim that 
such a view of language falls into what he calls the ‘fallacy of telementation’.  
This fallacy assumes that words are adequate carriers of our thoughts and 
that our listeners and hearers are able to intend our words as we intended 
them to be understood, as though the meaning of these words were 
transparent and complete, needing no further integration with the context 
in which they were uttered or with the receiver’s own understanding of 
those words. Rather, argues Harris, traditional linguistics is segregationist 
(in the tradition of De Saussure, Wittgenstein and Chomsky) and has failed 
to recognise that ‘languages must be conceived as systems that are entirely 
dependent on their use in communication’ (Harris, 2011) and that meaning 
emerges from the integration, rather than the segregation, of the word and 
the social context it is uttered in by the speaker or writer. This explains why 
writers need knowledge of their readers by interacting with their textual 
environments and integrating meanings accordingly to allow academicness 
to emerge. 
Wittgenstein, too, captures the problem of signification when he wonders 
what it means to ‘point to something’, in the sense of trying to give an 
ostensive definition. He asks (1953, #33):  
[W]hat does ‘pointing to the shape’, ‘pointing to the colour’ 
consist in? Point to a piece of paper. – And now point to its 
shape – now to its colour – now to its number (that sounds 
queer) – How did you do it? You will say that you ‘meant’ a 
different thing each time you pointed. And if I ask you how that 
is done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the 
colour, the shape, etc. 
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The difficulty that Wittgenstein raises refers to what one might ‘mean’ 
when they point to a feature in the external world and how that meaning is 
then received by an interlocutor. Rather than looking for meaning 
internally, or mentally, within the individual mind, he argues that “these 
matters be settled by looking at what goes on outside the mind [and by] 
thinking of meaning in terms of activities in which people engage” 
(Verheggen, 2000, p. 206). In other words, Wittgenstein proposes that we 
think of meanings in terms of ‘language in use’ (ibid), which frames 
language as a social practice and not the mental representations of referents 
(Wittgenstein & Russell, 1922). 
Defining meaning, fixing referents and ensuring we all understand what we 
mean is a very troubled process (Kripke, 1972). This is why we cannot take 
what it means for a text to be ‘academic’ for granted and why diverse scripts 
can be ‘academic’. This is because, as Harris (2011, pp. 68-69) claims, the 
‘semiological value’ of using any linguistic structure ‘depends on the 
circumstances and activities in which they fulfil an integrational function’ 
rather than on external referents. Harris gives the example of how the word 
‘tree’ can refer both to a plant and to a landmark that signals ‘the need to 
turn left’: to understand ‘tree’ as ‘landmark’, we need to integrate a wide 
range of signs, circumstances and activities in order to understand the 
meaning of ‘tree’. 
As such, the visual literacies of Sousanis (2015), the messy methods of Law 
(2003) and the call by English (2015) to conceive of academic writing as a 
creative venture all have ‘academic semiological value’ because they depend 
on the academic ‘circumstances and activities’, namely the practices, that 
generated them and not because the writing conforms to prevailing 
academic conventions. 
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Despite this, the burden of a ‘full representation’ has historically been on 
language (Blair, 2008, p. 44): 
Arguments are traditionally associated with speech, either 
written or oral, for a couple of linked reasons. First, because the 
reasons they use are propositions. Second, because propositions 
are standardly expressed by propositions in language. 
Like language, what is meant by ‘argument’ is also contested and varies 
according to its purpose (Fish, 2017), its disciplinary norms40 (Andrews, 
2010; Toulmin, 1958) and its cultural forms (Galtung, 1981; Kaplan, 1980 
[1966]). The inter-related fields of anthropology (Everett, 2008; Hymes, 
1964), linguistics (Chomsky, 2006; Pinker, 2000, 2008), socio-linguistics 
(Evans, 2014; Fairclough, 2001; Holmes, 1992), sociology (Pierre Bourdieu & 
Thompson, 1991), discourse and cultural theory (Foucault, 1970) all testify 
to the complex relationship between language, thought and reality.  
Once we start to draw attention to some of the structural diversity of 
propositional arguments and how this might affect representations of 
reality, questions arise about how form and content relate to each other. 
Nussbaum (1990, p. 3, emphasis added) has a particular interest in this area 
and has focused on how form, i.e. not language (although she argues using 
language) and content influence each other in the field of philosophy: 
How should one write, what words should one select, what 
forms and structures and organisation, if one is pursuing 
understanding? […] Style itself makes its claims, expresses its own 
sense of what matters. Literary form is not separable from 
 
40 For example, a deductive mathematical argument is different to an inductive historical 
argument. 
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philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content – an 
integral part, then, of the search for and the statement of truth.  
I now highlight how the meaning of argument has changed over time and 
how it becomes conflated with language. I refer to Toulmin (1958), Andrews 
(2010) and finally Blair (2008), Gilbert (1994) and Groarke (2015) in order to 
show that arguments can be non-linguistic and can emerge from visual and 
aural modes. This opens up possibilities for argument in academic writing 
that go beyond language and can be inclusive of ‘ecologies of knowledges’ 
(de Sousa Santos, 2017), ‘intellectual styles’ (Galtung, 1981) and ‘creativity’ 
(Besley & Peters, 2013) which might enable higher education, and EAP, to 
widen access and participation (Sperlinger et al., 2018) in their pursuit of 
understanding.  
Why language alone cannot do the arguing  
Stephen Toulmin (1958) was a turning point in the way argumentation is 
currently understood in academia. This is because Toulmin repudiated the 
logical positivist reduction of argument to a series of symbols that divorced 
argument from natural, or ordinary, language. Instead, he proposed that we 
re-think what we mean by logic and asked “What sort of science is logic?” 
(1958, p. 6). His answer consisted in recognising that argumentation shares 
some of the features of psychology, understood as the study of ‘healthy laws 
of thought’, and of sociology, namely the study of “habits and practices 
developed in the course of social evolution and passed on by parents and 
teachers from one generation to another” (1958, p. 3). Language is but one 
of the ways of achieving all this. 
However, he was also concerned that framing argument in terms of 
psychology and sociology imbued the thinking process with a subjective 
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and relative quality as well as a reliance on induction that ‘proper’ 
deductive logic did not (Toulmin, 1958, p. 5): 
[I]t cannot be custom alone that gives validity and authority to a 
form of argument, or the logician would have to wait upon the 
results of the anthropologist’s researches.  
At the same time, however, Toulmin objects to the kind of logic that posits 
formal relations between propositions and that reduces the validity of an 
argument to its deductive form. This is because logic is not concerned with 
the thinking process per se but with statements about logic itself. The 
mistake of equating logic with correct and rational thinking is one of 
‘qualified psychologism41’, namely the assumption that logic, rather than 
psychology, is the study of thought. He quotes logical positivist Rudolf 
Carnap in this regard (Toulmin, pp. 86-87): 
The characterisation of logic in terms of correct or rational or 
justified beliefs is as right but not more enlightening that to say 
that mineralogy tells us how to think correctly about minerals. 
The reference to thinking may just as well be dropped in both 
cases. Then we say simply: mineralogy makes statements about 
minerals, and logic makes statements about logical relations. 
The activity in any field of knowledge involves, of course, 
thinking. But this does not mean that thinking belongs to the 
subject matter of all fields. It belongs to the subject matter of 
psychology but not to that of logic any more than to that of 
mineralogy. 
Rather, Toulmin proposes that we shift our conflation of logic with correct 
and rational thinking to thinking of logic as a way of making sound claims 
 
41 Cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/ [accessed 14/12/2018] 
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that give prominence to warrants instead of prominence to form and truth 
(Toulmin, 1958, p. 7): 
Logic is concerned with the soundness of the claims we make – 
with the solidity of the grounds we produce to support them, the 
firmness of the backing we provide for them – or, to change the 
metaphor, with the sort of case we present in defence of our 
claims. The legal analogy implied in this last way of putting the 
point can for once be a real help. So let us forget about 
psychology, sociology, technology and mathematics, ignore the 
echoes of structural engineering and collage in the words 
‘grounds’ and ‘backing’ and take as our model the discipline of 
jurisprudence. Logic (we may say) is generalised jurisprudence. 
In re-framing logic as jurisprudence, where what persuades is a convincing 
and reasonable case, not the truth, Toulmin discards much of the language 
associated with logic (1958, p. 98), such as ‘premise’ or ‘proposition’, and 
replaces it with legal terminology, such as ‘data’ (D), ‘warrants’ (W) and 
‘qualifiers’ (Q): data are the situations we wish to make a claim (C) about; 
warrants are legitimate ‘steps’ that act as ‘bridges’ which ‘authorise’ further 
‘steps’ culminating in further ‘claims’; and ‘qualifiers’ provide conditions 
under which a claim can be considered reasonable. By introducing this 
terminology, he shows that what constitutes an argument is not its reliance 
on logic and language (propositions) but its reliance on the legitimacy of 
the warrant. 
Toulmin also reminds us that non-mathematical and non-logical arguments 
are substantial. This makes their truth and validity contingent on external, 
not internal, conditions. Since the majority of meaningful academic 
arguments, ones that extend our knowledge - in the sciences, social 
sciences and humanities - are substantial and inductive, they require 
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warrants and qualifiers as well as modalities for expressing attitudes of 
probability, possibility and necessity, rather than formal logic (Toulmin, p. 
154): 
The only arguments we can fairly judge by ‘deductive’ standards 
are those held out as and intended to be analytic, necessary and 
formally valid. All arguments which are confessedly substantial 
will be ‘non-deductive’, and by implication not formally valid. 
But for the analytic syllogism validity can be identified with 
formal validity, and this is just what the logician wants to be 
possible universally. It follows at once that for substantial 
arguments, whose cogency cannot be displayed in a purely 
formal way, even validity is something entirely out of reach and 
unobtainable. 
A further key move in Toulmin’s critique of classical logic, and its 
arrogation of argument, is that substantive arguments require more than a 
reliance on the univocal meaning of language. He develops this thesis by 
drawing attention to the field-dependency of arguments (1958, p. 15): 
How far, for instance, can one compare the standards of 
argument relevant in a court of law with those relevant when 
judging a paper in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, or those 
relevant to a mathematical proof or a prediction about the 
composition of a tennis team? 
A specific example of ‘standards of argument’, in this discussion, might be 
that what counts as evidence for a Warrant or Qualifier in each discipline 
will differ. In a court of law, a blood-stained garment, rather than a 
linguistic proposition about how the victim had blood on his clothes, may 
provide a Warrant for claiming that the victim had been injured; in a 
scientific paper, references to previous studies can serve to Qualify a new 
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theory; in mathematics, an axiom such as A=∏r2 to calculate the surface 
area of a generic circle can provide the Warrant for establishing the surface 
area of a specific circle; in tennis, the use of past performance statistics can 
establish which players are the most competent for the formation of a new 
team.  
The point being that by narrowing and reducing the meaning of argument 
to propositional logic, we fail to capture the wider-ranging uses of 
argument that occur in other fields of human enquiry, uses which may or 
may not include language itself.  
Toulmin’s focus on warrants and qualifiers thus creates space for arguments 
to be non-linguistic, since neither warrants or qualifiers need be expressed 
in language. 
Language is field-dependent rather than clear, precise or transparent 
The notion of ‘linearity’ is frequently referred to in discussions about 
writing and thinking (in EAP and in literacy), yet few attempts are made to 
acknowledge its field dependency (cf. ‘linearity’ in mathematics, which can 
mean ‘sequentiality’; and ‘linearity’ in writing, which can mean being 
‘orderly’). In this sense, words are unreliable. The fact that disciplinary 
fields go to great lengths in establishing the meaning of their terms, with no 
guarantee of unanimous agreement, shows that language is at best a blurry 
lens through which to view reality and at worst a blunt tool with which to 
re-present it. Words are not conduits to reality, because if they were, they 
would not fail to unequivocally represent it or correspond to it; nor are they 
reality itself, because reality can exist without them. If we accept that words 
do not hold exclusive or privileged monopoly on how we describe or refer 
to reality, then this leaves open the possibility for other modes and media 
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to play their part in describing the world and our thoughts (perceptions) of 
it. 
The case for non-linguistic argumentation 
Richard Andrews, building on the seminal work of Toulmin, has been 
influential in studies on Higher Education and in EAP because of his work 
on clarifying what constitutes an academic argument, how it must be 
understood as field-dependent, and crucially for my purposes, how 
“arguments may be of different kinds” (Toulmin, 1958, pp. 158-159). These 
can include, but need not be reduced to, the linear and logical 
characterisations favoured by EAP (Part 1) and the Enlightenment 
experimental genres (Chapter 3).  
From the outset, Andrews clarifies his distinction between ‘argument’ and 
‘argumentation’ as being one of ‘product’ and ‘process’ (2010, p. 2), but that 
often the two are conflated: 
‘Argument’ and ‘Argumentation’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably. In this book, a distinction is made between 
argument as an overarching, more general, everyday term that 
refers largely to the products or manifestations of 
argumentation, like debates, essays, position papers, research 
papers, and dissertations. It is also used to embrace a wider 
range of forms in spoken, written, and other (e.g. visual, spatial) 
modes. Argumentation is seen as part of argument and suggests 
a sequence or exchange of arguments. It refers to something 
more technical. It is the process of arguing in educational, 
political, business, legal, and other contexts. 
He goes on to show that, etymologically, ‘argument’ has evolved from its 
Aristotelian association with rhetoric, language, logic and deductive 
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syllogism to its current field-dependency and multimodality (2010, pp. 50-
52; 96-115) and claims that argument is about “composition: the putting 
together of elements to communicate” (2010, p. 29). When framed in the 
context of composition and communication, argument comes to mean 
‘show’, ‘accuse’, ‘prove’, ‘provide evidence’ and ‘summarise contents’. Early 
on, it was associated with navigation and mathematics whereby a third 
point between two given points is identified42; it is also a means of 
disagreement and dispute, but can also mean the summary of a narrative 
(2010, p. 109). Argument is a ‘discussion with edge’ (Andrews, 2010, pp. 2-3) 
and does not have to be about competing ideas (2010, p. 43). 
Dialogisation is another way that argument has been framed. This is a form 
of literary critique associated with Bakhtin (Holquist, Bakhtin, & McGee, 
1987) who has shown that what underpins argumentation is the plurivocal 
nature of texts. Writing is not the product of a single voice but of many 
inter-connected traces of what others have said and arguments are a 
manifestation of this (Andrews, 2010, pp. 12-14).  
For historians, the argument ‘is the discipline’ and the presentation of 
historical knowledge amounts to the argument itself (Andrews, 2010, p. 19). 
Indeed, the rhetorical use of footnotes in the field of History functions as 
“the humanist's rough equivalent of the scientist's report on data: they offer 
the empirical support for the stories told and arguments presented” 
(Grafton, 1997, p. vii). This clashes with most EAP advice to use in-text 
paragraphs to provide evidence and to avoid footnotes. 
Argumentation is interdisciplinary (Andrews, 2010, p. 21). This means that 
the form and the aim of an argument are not paradigmatic, they cannot be 
 
42 This is the deductive method favoured by Descartes in his geometric proofs. 
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held as transferable universal exemplars for how arguments function. 
Because arguments are not paradigmatic, Andrews leaves open the 
possibility for arguments to be non-linguistic and dedicates an entire 
chapter of his book Argumentation in Higher Education to multimodal 
arguments to show that these “can operate inductively, not just as evidence 
for a verbally conceived set of propositions but as a set of propositions in 
[their] own right” (Andrews, 2010, p. 52). 
Academic arguments, and the texts that contain them, need to fulfil a far 
broader range of requirements than those of prescriptive ‘linear’ academic 
writing instruction. These include requirements that are usually ascribed to 
creative writing but that are also important in academic writing, such as the 
need to be ‘refreshing’, ‘modest’ and ‘curious’ (Andrews, 2010, pp. 99-101). 
But also the need to leave space for interpretation (Marin, Masschelein, & 
Simons, 2018) and develop authorial identities (Ivanič, 1998; Kamler & 
Thomson, 2006). In order to achieve such qualities, propositional 
arguments themselves frequently rely on non-propositional forms, such as 
implicit or unstated premises. Enthymemes are an example of this. These 
are the ‘missing parts’ of an argument, such as a premise or conclusion 
(Hurley, 2000) that require readers’ knowledge or interpretation to ‘fill in 
the gaps’. They rely, that is, on the reader’s ‘cooperation’ (Turner, 2018). 
Given the enduring recognition of the fallibility of language, it seems 
reasonable to question why academia continues to privilege the linguistic 
mode of argumentation over other modes. Could our socio-academic 
options for representing reality benefit from widening the range of modes 
through which we argue? 
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According to Andrews (2010), 
they could. He claims that 
using visual argumentation 
creates more opportunities for 
inference (2010, p. 51), which 
matters in education. This is 
what Dewey (cited in 
d’Agnese, 2017, p. 451) calls a ‘forecast’, a ‘leap from the unknown’, a 
‘creative incursion’. For a visual argument to be ‘implicitly present’, there 
“must be either some tension 
within a single image (Fig. 24) 
or, there must be at least two 
images juxtaposed so that 
tensions can be explored and a 
‘point’ can be inferred” (2010, p. 
51) (Fig. 23). He goes on to state 
that “a sequence of images can 
develop and secure an argument further” (ibid). In this sense, the 
juxtaposition of images can function like punctuation in writing, where 
pause, suspense and segmentation of ideas are techniques which create 
‘parts in an argument’, with one part representing a claim (‘this is equality’), 
the other evidence (‘this is justice’), and the final conclusion (‘Equality 
doesn’t mean justice’).  
He also refers to a paper by Tarnay (2002), who argues that moving images 
can argue without being reduced to propositional content. An example of 
this might be Fuocoammare (2016) (Fig. 25). 
Figure 24: A fair education (widely available 
online) 
Figure 23: Equality v fairness (widely 
available online) 
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Within the full context of Gianfranco 
Rosi’s 2016 documentary about the 
plight of refugees arriving on the small 
island of Lampedusa in Sicily, this short 
clip suggests that although ordinary life 
continues on the island - with the two young boys shown playing together 
throughout the documentary while rescue boats, helicopters and medical 
services concurrently deal with migrant emergencies - Lampedusa’s 
children are being affected by what they see and hear around them. 
Conversation, i.e. language, is sparse in the young boys’ lives, so at no point 
is the viewer explicitly told that their young lives are being affected. Yet, the 
inference that their lives are being affected is there and the viewer cannot 
help but make that inference. 
This documentary film meets the conditions for what Toulmin (1958) calls 
substantive arguments. It provides data of migrants arriving on a small 
island (D) and claims that this has an effect on the local children (C). The 
steps the director takes in moving from D to C are realised by the editing 
and juxtaposition of images and overlay of sounds to provide warrants (W), 
or bridges, between the data and the claim. A full analysis of this 
documentary might further show that backing and qualifications are also 
present in the film when it is considered as a whole. 
The reason we can make inductive inferences, rather than formal 
deductions, from the data to the claims is because images and motion are 
being arranged according to what Tanay (2002, p. 4) calls intentional 
‘compositional’ features (in the sense of intended by the director) that 
cannot be reduced to propositions that merely guide the eye in a linear and 
sequential way or that are left open to unqualified interpretation. Such 
Figure 25: Fire at Sea (Fuocoammare) 
(widely available online) 
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features include ‘depth’, ‘motion’, ‘distance’, and, following Groarke (2015), 
‘non-verbal sounds’, which are ‘perceived’ by the viewer through the senses 
rather than directly processed as propositions (Tanay, p. 5): 
[T]he operation of our sense organs (or whatever it is that 
computes and processes sense data) can be described as an 
inferential activity under the level of phenomenal consciousness 
(The strongest version that our eyes ‘argue’ can be found in 
Bonfantini, 1987). […]. The retrieval of arguments should not be 
confined to higher – semantic and pragmatic – level of 
processing, but it should be grounded on certain ‘automatic’ 
processes. 
Some in academia contest that a documentary such as Fuocoammare would 
count as an academic argument (Gourlay, 2012). There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, as discussed 
above, argument is 
traditionally understood as 
a propositional endeavour. 
In the case of 
Fuocoammare, the scope for 
interpretation is, arguably, 
far wider than it might be in 
a traditional academic 
format. A film or an image 
allows the viewer to see 
much more in a single 
frame or panel than does a 
Figure 26: Visual and propositional reference to 
standardising assessment practices 
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sentence containing a proposition (Fig. 26, Sousanis, 2015, p. 12).  
Secondly, whilst acknowledging that language is ‘unstable’, Gourlay (2016, 
p. 88) remains of the view that “written text is still more suited than visual 
images” to the complex requirements of argumentation and critique, 
especially within the context of a literature review (Gourlay, 2016, p. 87, 
emphasis added): 
The dense, precise and closely-argued nature of much academic 
argumentation in reference to other academic texts seems to 
demand a system which delivers nuance and can be readily and 
unambiguously shared with a readership beyond the immediate 
context of text production – the complexity of language still 
appears better suited to the task than images alone. 
Thirdly, films and images tell stories which rely on narrative rather than 
argument to do this. This third contention creates a binary division 
between argument and narrative by suggesting that by doing the former 
one is not doing the latter, and vice-versa. This binary re-enforces the 
unfounded idea that there is only one way to argue. The contention indexes 
that since narrative is not traditionally valued by as a method of inquiry43, 
the documentary genre which relies on narrative to advance a thesis is less 
likely to be accepted by EAP. This has been discussed by Ingraham (2005, p. 
49) with reference to a BBC documentary entitled Walking with Beasts who 
claims that:  
 
43 This is despite the fact that narrative methods are used in academic research (for 
example, Chanock (2014); Richardson (1990a), especially ethnographic methods in 
anthropology, sociology and education. But the academic canon of EAP, as shown in Part 1, 
does not typically present narrative as a valid form of argumentation. 
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[A]n obvious way in which documentary often differs from 
conventional scholarly discourse is in the use of narrative. 
Documentary programmes are much more likely to use narrative 
as a strategy to maintain and direct an audience’s attention than 
are scholarly articles or books. There is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with using narrative within the context of scholarly 
discourse. Many historical and biographical studies almost 
inevitably involve narrative.  
The extent to which Ingraham’s documentary can be considered as a 
‘carrier of academic argument’ has been further analysed by Gourlay (2012, 
p. 95) who concludes that it cannot because academic argument should be 
explicit, something narrative would not seem to be, and unambiguous, 
something only words can be (Gourlay, 2012, p. 97). 
The above three contentions that a documentary and non-verbal forms of 
argumentation cannot be academic can be challenged in the following three 
ways.  
Firstly, by reminding ourselves that even traditional argument, and its 
investment in language, is fallible and requires constant refining 
clarifications. If linguistic argument were as precise and clear as Gourlay 
and others claim, then why is so much academic time spent on revisiting 
and surmising over the meanings of academic writers? As Fish (2017, p. 19) 
reminds us: 
if we could confine ourselves to a language that did not admit 
[uncertainties], there would be no need for argument; for 
argument is required when there are competing accounts of 
what is the case. If everyone agreed on how a set of facts should 
be characterised, there would be no competing accounts and 
there would be nothing to argue about. And such agreement 
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would be assured if there were prior agreement about the 
correct vocabulary for stating things. 
Secondly, Toulmin has shown that traditional propositional logic fails to 
capture the rich range of human argumentation which includes 
understanding argument as an ‘invitation to inference’ (Pinto, 2001 cited in 
Groarke (2015, p. 135). Similarly, Tseronis (May 22, 2013) shows that 
argumentation is a social and discursive activity in which images, in 
addition to playing a role in conveying premises and conclusions, 
communicate something about the argumentative process that goes beyond 
mere representation to include the ways in which images contribute to the 
context in which they are being used. The scene where the two Sicilian boys 
in Fuocommmare are pretending to shoot down targets in an imaginary war 
is therefore not to be viewed for its representational value, namely two boys 
shooting, but as contributing to the overall narrative argument, namely that 
migration is affecting life on the island.  
Crucially, though, Tseronis (May 22, 2013, p. 8) reminds us that meaning 
and truth are distinct concepts and that “the meaning of a proposition 
cannot be reduced to its truth-evaluable propositional content”. In other 
words, establishing a meaning rather than the truth can be the aim of an 
argument. This is because “[t]he social sciences concern themselves with 
people, and […] people argue in an intricate matrix composed of numerous 
forms of communicative methods” (Gilbert, 1994, p. 3). To quote Fish again 
(2017, p. 8): 
Argument is protean – ever changing, mutable, kaleidoscopic, 
voracious – and almost anything can be its vehicle, swinging a 
big stick, putting on a badge, intoning a holy phrase, making the 
sign of a cross, wearing a uniform, speaking in a stentorian tone. 
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Thirdly, since academia is, or ought to be, moving on from the discredited 
logical-positivist endeavour of establishing a strict correspondence between 
word and object, what counts as an academic argument and how to 
communicate it also need to move on (Paré, 2017). One way of moving on is 
to recognise that privileging monomodal practices narrows what can and 
cannot be said (Bezemer & Kress, 2008; Laurillard, 2000 (2)). This is 
because our meaning-making capacities and ability to think in abstract 
conceptual ways do not exclude language but extend beyond it (Arnheim, 
1969, p. 228): 
[L]anguage is widely assumed to be a much better vehicle of 
thought than other shapes or sounds […]. Nobody denies that 
language helps thinking. What needs to be questioned is 
whether it performs this service substantially by means of 
properties inherent in the verbal medium itself or whether it 
functions indirectly, namely by pointing to the referents of 
words and propositions, that is to facts given in an entirely 
different medium. Also, we need to know whether language is 
indispensable to thought. The answer […] is “no”. 
Roque (2015) extends this reasoning further by questioning whether visuals 
need to be propositional at all to count as arguments and rejects 
reductionist views that claim that they do. He claims that both images and 
words, from a formal logic perspective, have no truth-value and that we 
have to look beyond ‘truth’ as our criterion for establishing the soundness 
of an argument (Roque, 2015, p. 193): 
We must therefore dissociate arguments and truth conditions 
and, accordingly, abandon the concept of proposition, since 
propositions are ‘‘the primary bearers of truth-value’’ (McGrath 
2012, p. 1). After all, there are many other ways of deﬁning 
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arguments that do not require them to be true or false, and it is 
well known that the ﬁeld of argumentation has evolved, since 
the late ﬁfties, to oppose a strict logical conception (Perelman, 
Toulmin). 
If there is a sense in which ‘both words and images have no truth-value’ and 
that we need to ‘look beyond truth’ in understanding what an argument can 
be, then this potentially allows writers far greater choices in judging what 
the textual environment might offer them in developing an argument. 
Argument, then, becomes a manifestation of academicness that is not 
reduced to any single mode or other element in the textual environment. 
Instead, it can be seen as emerging from the knowledge a writer has of what 
their textual environment can afford. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that what makes writing academic cannot be 
reduced to formal features of language and grammar because doing so 
would allow hoaxes and IELTS essays to count as academic. These are not 
academic because they transgress the values of academic integrity, which is 
an emergent socio-academic practice. Rather, what makes writing academic 
are the ways in which writers knowledgeably interact with their textual 
environments to allow socio-academic practices to emerge. These 
environments include threshold concepts about writing, such as the 
expression of identities and ideologies.  
I then considered the role that argument plays in our understandings of 
what makes writing academic. I claimed, with reference to Toulmin and 
Andrews, that although argument is generally associated with 
academicness, the notion of argument itself is nevertheless contested. This 
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is because it cannot be reduced to any particular feature (word or image, 
genre or structure), nor can it be confined to its associations with logic and 
truth because most arguments are substantive and inductive. As such, 
argument can be considered a socio-academic practice that emerges from 
the interaction of the writer with their textual environment. 
The remaining two chapters in Part 3 further propose ways to avoid 
reducing academic writing to its forms so that it can remain open to 
change. 
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Part 3 
How it could be 
 
Sousanis (2015, p. 66)  
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Chapter 5 - Complexity 
A complex system is one in which there is a multiplicity of causal factors 
contributing to the dynamics of the system, in which there are causal 
interactions among the underlying causal factors, and in which causal 
interactions are often non-linear. Non-linearity is important here, because it 
implies that a small change in one or more factors may lead to very large changes 
in the outcome (Little, 2018b). 
Introduction 
To explain why academicness cannot be reduced to any specific 
characteristic of the writer or to any single feature of the textual 
environment, this chapter proposes that academic writing, understood as a 
socio-academic practice, be re-imagined as a non-linear, generative 
complex open system. Thinking of writing in this way allows me to also 
explain change and innovation in academic writing because complexity 
acknowledges the interactions between a significantly large range of 
variables which enable novelty to emerge. To do this, I draw on complexity 
theory (L. Kuhn, 2008; Mason, 2008a; Parnell, 2012) and the philosophy of 
critical realism (M. Archer, 1995, 1998; Bhaskar, 1989b, 1998; Collier, 1994; 
Sawyer, 2001). 
Complexity is non-linear 
A ‘complex’ system is not the same as one that is ‘complicated’. A 
complicated system can be explained in terms of its constituent parts 
whereas a complex one cannot.  For example, a bicycle is complicated, but 
it is not complex. This is because although it is intricate and is made of 
many inter-connected mechanical parts, a full understanding of what these 
parts are and how they connect to each other is sufficient to explain how 
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the bicycle, as a whole system, will work. This allows us to predict what will 
happen when we turn the pedal or move the handlebars.  
Complex systems, on the other hand, do not allow for such predictions 
because their ‘whole is greater than the sum of their parts’ (Beckett & 
Hager, 2018, p. 138). Complex systems include social phenomena, such as 
education and economics, whose constituent parts inter-relate to such an 
extent that they cannot be explained in isolation and without a full account 
of how they relate to other parts: the reasons for rising inflation rest as 
much on human purchasing behaviour and psychology as they do on the 
mechanics of price increases and the value of national currencies. This 
means that in a complex system, changes in the constituent causal parts are 
not directly proportional to changes in the whole, i.e. changes in individual 
spending habits do not provide a full explanatory account of why inflation 
occurs44.  
This is what is meant by a complex system being non-linear: cause and 
effect are disproportionate in the sense that the whole effect cannot be 
explained by an isolated cause. For example, the seemingly simple act of 
dropping a single coin in a fairground coin pusher can lead to a 
disproportionate effect whereby the entire mass of accumulated coins 
suddenly drops. What caused the drop, though, was also the cumulative 
pressure of the mass of coins, not just that single coin. Moreover, the effect 
of this huge drop results in the player winning a prize that exceeds the 
value of the initial coin. It is in this sense that cause and effect are 
disproportionate. 
 
44 This disproportionality between constituent parts and the whole is also what 
characterises the notion of an Organic Unity discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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By contrast, a complicated system is said to be linear because a change in a 
constituent part can more straightforwardly explain a change in the whole. 
For example, by taking the pedal off the bike, the crankshaft can’t properly 
turn.   
Rather than an aggregate composed of concatenated parts that add up to a 
whole, as skills-based, cookie-cutter and template approaches to writing 
encourage, academic writing can be seen as a social system of dynamic 
inter-relations whose multiple causes cannot be reduced to its constituent 
parts in a linear, i.e. mechanistic, manner. What makes Harron (2016)’s PhD 
thesis academic (the whole), for example, cannot be traced back in a linear 
way to any specific words or arrangement of her text (the parts), as might 
be done in an IELTS essay or academic hoax, for example. Instead, and if we 
agree that Harron’s work is academic (as discussed in Chapter 4), then what 
makes it academic are the socio-academic practices that emerge from the 
interaction of her values and agency as a writer and a range of threshold 
concepts available in the textual environment, including ideology and 
identity, as well as her academic need to meet the requirements of a 
doctorate in Mathematics. What emerges from this interaction is a novel 
entity, a thesis that is unique and could not have been predicted from its 
constituent parts, and interactions thereof. It is also a thesis that re-sets the 
‘requirements of a doctorate in mathematics’. 
As discussed in Part 1, when writing is conceptualised as a socio-academic 
practice rather than as a skill what tends to be foregrounded are its 
dynamic, interactive, transformative and relational qualities rather than its 
static materiality, ahistoricity and transferable conventions. Complexity 
theory can therefore be mobilised to explain these relational qualities 
because it shows how systems and networks comprising of several agents, 
 229 
competing interests and multi-level domains operate. Because of its 
explanatory appeal, the theory is well-established in the History of 
Education (Osberg & Biesta, 2010), including Applied Linguistics; the 
Sciences (Chaos Theory and Quantum Mechanics) (P. Ball, 2004); and the 
Social Sciences (Economics) (Mason, 2008b, p. 36).  
The reason complexity theory has gained traction in Applied Linguistics, for 
example, is that it deals with the dynamism of language and offers multi-
level explanations for language development (Cameron & Larsen-Freeman, 
2007, p. 227, emphasis added): 
Complex systems are composed of elements or agents that 
interact in different ways. Their interactions lead to self-
organization and the emergence of new patterns at different 
levels and timescales. Such systems are also adaptive and 
dynamic. The elements and agents change over time, but 
crucially so also do the ways in which they influence each other, 
the relations among them. Complex systems are open rather 
than closed; energy and matter can come into the system. The 
dynamic nature of element interactions and the openness of a 
system to the outside lead to non-linearity, which in complex 
systems theory signifies that the effect is disproportionate to the 
cause. 
Complexity theory is compelling because it recognises the nuances and 
multiple factors that are required in explaining phenomena. It also attempts 
to explain how change and novelty (L. Kuhn, 2008, p. 182) occur within 
established or dominant paradigms (T. Kuhn, 1962) by confronting the 
historical and generative mechanisms, such as those showcased in Part 2, 
that allow new phenomena to emerge from a ‘particular environment’ 
(Mason, 2008b, p. 38, emphasis added): 
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Complexity theory seeks the levers of history, the sources and 
reasons for change, in the dynamic complexity of interactions 
among elements or agents that constitute a particular 
environment. It is in this sense that seemingly trivial accidents of 
history may increase dramatically in signiﬁcance when their 
interactions with other apparently minute events combine to 
produce signiﬁcant redirections in the course of history, 
signiﬁcant shifts in the prevailing balance of power. 
On a complexity account, academic writing becomes non-linear because 
what makes it academic as a whole (the effect) cannot be reduced to any 
specific part (the cause). This can be illustrated with reference to the effect 
that conventional academic forms (the causes) can have on representations 
of knowledge (the effect). For instance, the use of personal or non-personal 
language (discussed in Part 1), such as the active or passive, can have a 
disproportionate effect on how knowledge is re-presented. The personal, 
active voice in ethnography, realised by the use of ‘I’, for example, indexes 
that the researcher, not the ‘reality’, influences what counts and does not 
count as ‘data’: data isn’t ‘out there’, it is the researcher who confers upon 
their samples the status of  ‘data’. As Thomson (2013) reminds us, “[t]hey 
aren’t data until we make them data”, and it is our choice of personal or 
impersonal language that can be mobilised to signal where we stand in this 
regard. So, when I claim “these are samples of x, y, z” without recourse to 
any personal pronouns, my choice of language signals an objective stance 
towards the data. In so doing, an ontological stance emerges, namely that 
‘data are out there’, they exist. On the other hand, when I claim “here is 
how I have established that these samples of x, y, z can be part of my data”, 
an epistemological stance emerges, namely ‘this is how I know they are 
data’. 
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Paltridge and Starfield (2007, p. 129) remind us of this, too, in considering 
how researchers represent themselves in academic writing: 
Academic writing is typically viewed as largely depersonalised. 
Textbooks tell students that for scientific writing to be objective, 
it should be impersonal and use the passive voice – thus 
removing or reducing the presence of the researcher in the text. 
This sensitivity is further evident in the following remarks by sociologist 
Becker (2017), who worries about the disproportionate effect of using the 
passive to describe social phenomena which may be better represented by 
an active voice telling us ‘who has done what’. Becker admonishes academic 
sociology journals for insisting “on the most academic prose, for no reason 
that anyone can explain very well”: 
I […] mentioned the fault of using passive grammatical 
constructions, in which the verb in the sentence is some form of 
"to be." Stylistically, this flattens the prose, makes it dull and 
boring to read. Well, who said sociology was supposed to 
produce exciting, lively prose? The fault lies much deeper. In an 
era when people argue endlessly about the relative importance 
of "structure" and "agency," this stylistic convention 
systematically hides agency when everyone knows that it 
operates in the situation we're studying. 
What Thomson, Paltridge and Starfield, and Becker are signalling is non-
linearity: small changes in language choice that generate disproportionate 
effects at the level of how we re-present reality. 
The more general point being, that thinking about language, and by 
extension, writing, in this way, draws attention to the fact that the 
relationship between the parts and the whole can have unexpected 
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consequences and that this can allow new socio-academic practices to 
emerge. 
In order to further locate academic writing within complexity theory, I re-
visit some of the levers of history (with reference to Mason, above) that 
make writing complex.  
Historical and linguistic reasons for complexity 
In his Enlightenment treatise on what a university should be, Cardinal 
Newman considers the nature of writing a worthy object of reflection and 
ponders the rationales for classifying it according to genres. In a lecture to 
the School of Philosophy and Letters, he asks what kind of writing counts as 
Literature, Philosophy or Science (Newman, 2009, pp. 268-269): 
[I] attempt to determine what we are to understand by Letters or 
Literature, in what Literature consists, and how it stands 
relatively to Science. We speak, for instance, of ancient and 
modern literature, the literature of the day, sacred literature, 
light literature; and our lectures in this place are devoted to 
classical literature and English literature. Are Letters, then, 
synonymous with books? This cannot be, or they would include 
in their range Philosophy, Law, and, in short, the teaching of all 
the other Faculties. Far from confusing these various studies, we 
view the works of Plato or Cicero sometimes as philosophy, 
sometimes as literature; on the other hand, no one would ever 
be tempted to speak of Euclid as literature, or of Matthiæ's 
Greek Grammar. Is, then, literature synonymous with 
composition? With books written with an attention to style? Is 
literature fine writing? Again, is it studied and artificial writing? 
Cardinal Newman goes on to say that Literature and Science should remain 
distinct because Literature expresses personal thoughts and, as such, 
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requires eloquence, whereas Science deals with objective truths and, as 
such, requires symbols (2009, p. 275, emphasis added): 
Science, then, has to do with things, literature with thoughts; 
science is universal, literature is personal; science uses words 
merely as symbols, but literature uses language in its full 
compass, as including phraseology, idiom, style, composition, 
rhythm, eloquence, and whatever other properties are included 
in it. 
Newman emphasises that Science and Mathematics use words and symbols 
as ‘mere vehicles of things, not of thoughts’ (2009, p. 274), meaning that 
Science and Maths are mimetic and express ‘true things’ about the world. 
All other subjects, including Law, Metaphysics, Political Economy and 
Theology, can be subjected to ‘severe scientific treatment’ (2009, p. 275), 
but when they are not, then they remain in the domain of ‘language and 
literature’, which is prone to the ‘slang and personal sentiments’ of their 
authors and ‘decked in conceits, fancies, and prettiness’ (2009, p. 269). 
With such distinguished history on its side, it is little wonder that EAP has 
chosen to conflate the ‘objective, universal and impersonal’ language and 
genres of science with the language and genres of academic writing.  
However, as is being showcased throughout this thesis, academic writings, 
including the writings of Science, Mathematics and Economics, are varied, 
and, pace Newman, they too rely on language and its ‘fancies’ to convey 
their meanings: ‘string theory’, ‘black holes’ and ‘dark matter’, and countless 
other scientific metaphors, are a reminder that language is ‘fanciful’ in its 
effort to correspond to ‘true’ things.  
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The levers of history are notably played out in the 500-year-old-writings of 
the Philosophical Transactions, which, through the lens of language change, 
document the transition from merely reporting phenomena as they were 
seen by the single observer to detailing how experiments were set up and 
how conclusions were reached (Bazerman, 1988). These shifts testify to why 
language changed from personal narratives (and personal pronouns) to 
accounts that were conscious of a more critical readership who required 
details of diagnostic methods (and impersonal voices). They show that 
small changes in language choice have disproportionate effects on how we 
express our view of the world.  
Gunnarsson (2001) provides detailed evidence of such a shift by tracking 
language changes in the Swedish medical genre across three centuries 
(eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth). She documents how the highly 
personalised accounts of care in the patient-doctor relationship, evidenced 
by the use of personal pronouns and a focus on the patient’s feelings, 
gradually ceded to more impersonal accounts, evidenced by the use of the 
passive voice and a focus on the illness. 
The personal account is representative of eighteenth century medical prose 
and is exemplified in a 1782 medical article by a doctor describing a visit to 
his consumptive patient (2001, p. 122):  
She could see her husband’s concern for her, she thought about 
her small children, of whom she was so fond; she contemplated 
her weak and decrepit condition. 
The following impersonal account is representative of current medical 
academic prose and is from a 1980 medical journal (Gunnarsson, 2001, p. 
128): 
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What was recommended previously was a period of waiting for 
4-6 weeks if there was no valvular pneumo-thorax. 
In each case, what is being enacted through the choice of language is a 
social practice, and value, motivated by the writer’s orientations and 
concerns with what counts as a ‘medical matter’: in the 1782 article, what 
seems to matter to the doctor is that the experience of the patient is what it 
means to have that illness; in the 1980 article, what seems to matter is the 
clinical condition disembodied from the patient. The doctor who 
foregrounds the patient’s experience of their illness, rather than the illness 
itself, is committed to understanding the illness through the experience of 
the patient. This is different to understanding the illness by examining cells 
in a laboratory.  
It is in this sense that language reflects our ideologies, our world views, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
Clearly, both approaches advance knowledge of the illness: when 
understood through the patient’s experience, we develop a social 
understanding of what illness is because of how it affects others; when 
understood in a laboratory, we develop a chemical understanding. Each 
approach to the illness enacts a certain kind of social practice because it 
becomes one of several ways of knowing about the phenomenon.  
Such nuances and expressive choices are usually lost in EAP whereas critical 
discourse theorists in the tradition of Fairclough (1992, 2001), following 
Michel Foucault, and Ivanič and Simpson (1992) foreground the effects that 
language choice has on how social structures, particularly those that lead to 
power imbalance, are created and maintained. Academic writing scholars, 
like Helen Sword, have similarly shone a spotlight on flattened, 
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depersonalised prose (Sword, 2012) arguing in her ‘manifesto on style’ that 
higher education should be writing ‘differently’ (Sword, 2009) because there 
are different ways of representing knowledge of the world (also developed 
in Honan and Bright (2016); Richardson (1990a). 
What all of the above discussion indexes is, once more, that language 
choice allows meanings to emerge in ways that are complex and could not 
have been explained by a linear account of how parts and wholes relate to 
each other. When EAP encourages the use of academic word lists or 
discourages writers from using personal forms (as discussed in Part 1) 
without engaging students with what consequences this might have on the 
socio-academic practices they wish to communicate, it is narrowing 
possibilities for ‘re-defining writing’ (following Rose) and restricting writer 
agency.    
When viewed through a critical discourse lens, linguistic practices and 
choices are understood as embodying values, in the sense that it is through 
these actions and choices, through our practices, that we manifest and 
communicate to others what we hold to be important. Our practices, then, 
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including our written ones, 
affect the realisation of these 
values to greater or lesser 
extents. For example, when we 
value imagination, creativity, 
inclusiveness or innovation in 
the communication of 
knowledge, then a single 
standard mode or genre is 
unlikely to be effective in 
achieving these values. This 
might explain why Thomas 
(2018, emphasis added) chose 
the graphic essay genre to 
comment on research into 
gendered experiences of 
academia (Fig. 27):  
A graphic essay uses text 
and image to explore a 
specific topic. Graphic essays often look like graphic novels, 
magazines, or artist books but generally convey non-fictional 
histories, cases and/or arguments. Learning the craft of the 
graphic essay involves learning to structure and manipulate 
content within individual frames and across pages; judging the 
combination of textual and visual to communicate meaning to 
the reader/viewer; gaining confidence to know when to let the 
visual ‘speak’ for itself - through caricature, metaphor, 
broadbrush or detail. My laborious progress provides unexpected 
opportunity to reflect on participant narratives and make 
Figure 27: ‘Glass ceiling’ (graphic essay) 
Undisciplining Conference, Gateshead, 2018  
(photo Julia Molinari, 2018)  
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connections across them. Perhaps this is my most satisfying 
discovering, that the meticulous practice of creating a graphic 
essay enriches the process of data analysis, indeed that comics 
creation is a way of thinking. It is also particularly satisfying, in a 
project focusing on gendered experience, to have the ability to 
make female theorists literally visible and to place myself, as 
researcher, narrator, interpreter, in the research. 
The graphic mode afforded Thomas several academic opportunities that the 
linguistic mode did not, including ‘unexpected opportunities to reflect’; an 
‘enriched process of data analysis’; and a ‘way of thinking and making 
women literally visible’, which signals her endorsement of the values of 
feminism.  
What this indexes is the non-linearity, the disproportionate effect that 
changes in mode (and within modes) can have on academicness. 
Defending complexity 
That academic writing is complex has been implied in literatures on EAP (C. 
Coffin & J. P. Donohue, 2012), Composition Studies (Judd, 2003), Academic 
Literacies (Scott, 2004) and Research Writing (Parnell, 2012). Surprisingly, 
nobody seems to have explicitly explained writing in relation to complexity 
theory, despite the attention that complexity theory has had in its cognate 
field, namely language acquisition and development. What follows draws 
out possible parallels between a complexity account of language acquisition 
and a complexity account of academic writing. 
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Several theorists, most notably Diane Larsen-Freeman, explain language 
acquisition in terms of complexity theory (Ortega & Han, 2017)45 in an 
attempt to: a) reconcile the socio-cognitive divide that such theories cluster 
around (e.g. socio-constructivist theorists such as Vygotsky (1986), Halliday 
(1978) and Evans (2014) compared to cognitive-innatist ones in Chomsky 
(1968) and Pinker (2000); and b), situate language development within an 
ecological framework (van Lier, 2000, p. 246, emphasis added) that: 
shifts the emphasis from scientific reductionism to the notion of 
emergence. Instead of assuming that every phenomenon can be 
explained in terms of simpler phenomena or components, [an 
ecological approach] says that at every level of development 
properties emerge that cannot be reduced to those of prior 
levels. […] From an ecological perspective, the learner is 
immersed in an environment full of potential meanings. 
Specifically, Larsen-Freeman and Cameron (2008) have called for language 
acquisition (and development) to be framed in terms of ‘dynamic social 
interactions’ rather than cognitive functional input-output models (e.g. 
Krashen (1981) that explain acquisition as a function of what language 
learners are exposed to (what goes in) and what language they then 
produce (what comes out) (van Lier, 2000, p. 257): 
The ecological perspective questions the common assumption 
that language, cognition, memories, and intelligence are 
uniquely contained inside the brain, and that learning consists 
of various ways of putting them there. We have to learn to 
 
45 See also 2006 Special Issue of Applied Linguistics 27 (4) on Emergentism and Complex 
Systems and 2008 Modern Language Journal 92 (2) on Complexity Theory and Dynamic 
Systems  
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understand what Harold Garfinkel meant when he said that, to 
find answers to our questions, ‘there is no reason to look under 
the skull since nothing of interest is to be found there but 
brains’ (1963:190). 
To curtail such functional approaches, Larsen-Freeman and Cameron, 
together with the contributors to Ortega and Han (2017), propose a 
complexity model of language development and draw on ecological 
approaches which rely on the notion of affordance to explain how language 
is acquired and developed (van Lier, 2000, pp. 252-253, discussed further in 
Chapter 6). This requires placing significant emphasis on the learner as an 
autonomous agent and innovator who can perceive opportunities in the 
linguistic environment. Since each learner is different, they will perceive 
and cognitively process different linguistic inputs from the particular 
contexts they find themselves in. This suggests that there can be no 
guarantee that any two learners will be learning the same content in the 
same way even though the input (from a teacher or other source) appears to 
be the same (Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008, p. 124): 
Viewing language development as self-organisation or structure 
formation in a dynamical system means that different learners 
may develop different language resources even when the 
ambient language is similar […]. As Mohanan (1992: 653-654) 
puts it, ‘Suppose we free ourselves from the idea that [first] 
language development is the deduction of the adult grammar 
from the input data, and think of it as the formation of patterns 
triggered by the data’.  
By foregrounding the richness and networked complexity of the linguistic 
environment (which provides formal and informal opportunities for social 
interactions and for directed instruction) and by showing how the learner 
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makes sense of this environment (for example, by cognitively processing 
patterns of usage, rather than isolated instances (Cameron & Deignan, 
2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), complexity theorists give prominence to the 
learner (the agent) who becomes an active and creative meaning-maker and 
not a passive recipient of inputs.  
Since academic writing is the principal medium through which diverse 
practices and values are communicated and established, and since a key 
aim of EAP is to prepare students for academic study, it seems reasonable to 
posit that students learning to write academically should also be learning 
about the affordances of different modes and genres within a complex 
theory of writing.  
Is Complexity Theory redundant? 
Notwithstanding the intuitive allure of complexity theory (in the common 
sense sense that ‘everything is complex’), critics contend that its scope is far 
too broad, abstract and vague to be a useful explanatory theory of how 
social phenomena work. Viewed from the perspective of educational 
philosophy, Mason (2008a, p. 6), for example, argues that problems  
lie in complexity theory’s nature, status, methodology, utility 
and contribution to the philosophy of education, in that it is a 
descriptive theory that is easily misunderstood as a prescriptive 
theory, that it is silent on key issues of values and ethics that 
educational philosophy should embrace, that it is of 
questionable internal consistency, and that it currently adds 
limited further value to educational philosophy.  
Critics in the field of Applied Linguistics, such as Gregg (2010), argue along 
similar lines, adding that we commit an unjustifiable category mistake in 
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trying to explain social phenomena using models from the physical sciences 
(cf. Sokal, 2008) and that the very social phenomena that are being 
described as dynamic and non-linear (in this case ‘language’) are actually 
stable (or steady) and predictable (Gregg, 2010, p. 553):  
When I say steady state, I mean steady: I have been using 
English for more years than I am going to let on, and since 
puberty at least, pretty much nothing has happened to my 
phonological, semantic, or syntactic knowledge […]. A set of 
speakers is a dynamical system, or […] the acquisition process is; 
but not language.  
Gregg (2010, p. 556) further highlights what he considers to be 
‘inconsistencies’ in the way in which Cameron and Larsen-Freeman (2007), 
in particular, apply complexity theory to language learning. He does this by 
emphasising what he claims to be their initial misunderstandings of innatist 
theories of first language acquisition (the theory that the neurology can 
explain language acquisition and development) and accuses them of setting 
up a straw man, namely a problem that only they perceive (Gregg, p. 554):  
the position that their complexity perspective supposedly leads 
them to criticize is a straw man; [their] exposition of innatist 
linguistics is simply mistaken, across the board. 
Like Gregg, I too recognise the relative stability and predictability of our 
language systems and, by analogy, of academic writing genres. Despite 
evidence of changes in the way we write since the printing press was 
established (Eisenstein, 1983) and since the digital impact of the Internet 
(Bazerman, 2015), academic writing has remained relatively recognisable as 
a genre that distinguishes itself from, say, literature or journalism. This is 
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because writing becomes ‘encapsulated’ by the way knowledge is produced 
within stable and reliable publishing and institutional systems and 
distributed according to commercial imperatives, despite advances in 
technology or social changes that inspire writers to innovate (Bazerman, 
2015, p. 267). 
Why complexity theory is not redundant 
However, recognising that there is ‘relative stability’ does not mean that 
things are stable nor does it mean we can ignore the changes that do and 
could exist. Things may be stable for periods of time, in certain contexts 
and for certain reasons (e.g. re-prints of up-to-date grammar textbooks take 
time and are costly), but the levers of history, as we have seen, allow 
language and genres to evolve. Gunnarsson (2001)’s medical genre, referred 
to above, is evidence of this, as are more recent erosions to the formality 
and rules of academic writing, which are undergoing increases in ‘illicit 
sentence initials’ such as ‘But’, ‘And’ and ‘So’ (Hyland & Feng (Kevin), 2017, 
p. 47) and as signalled in the need to re-think traditional genres of 
dissertation writing (Paré, 2018).  
Moreover, framing academic writings in terms of social practices and 
threshold concepts, which foreground the identities and ideologies of 
writers and the social media through which they communicate (Carrigan, 
2016), further opens up possibilities for change: humans are diverse, 
creative and unpredictable, and their writings reflect this. This is why 
writing landscapes are varied and mobile (Blommaert & Horner, 2017) and 
include multilingual (Wei, 2016) and multimodal forms (A. Archer & 
Breuer, 2015) within ‘superdiverse’ global societies (Vertovec, 2007). 
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As for the charge that complexity theorists are making a category mistake 
by drawing on science to explain a social phenomenon, then the same 
charge can be levelled at all those who use science to explain non-scientific 
phenomena. This doesn’t invalidate the charge per se, but it does weaken it, 
because it begs the question of what might be wrong with drawing on other 
disciplines, such as science, to understand social phenomena, such as 
academic writing.  
Dismissing a complex approach to explaining sociolinguistic phenomena on 
the grounds that it is ‘unscientific’ because it commits a category mistake 
further betrays a misunderstanding of scientific enquiry and ignores the 
fact that boundaries between science and non-science are historically 
blurred. This is evident in nomenclature change that signalled the 
transition from ‘natural philosophy’ to ‘science’ (cf. the Royal Society 
Philosophical Transactions and Ross (1962) and in current disciplinary 
classifications that impose methodological, rather than substantial, 
divisions on the sciences, social sciences and humanities (for example, is 
Psychology part of the physical sciences or is it a humanity, like 
Philosophy?).  
All enquiry seeks explanations for phenomena the reality of which is not a 
given, even in science: Einstein’s theory of relativity and its quantum 
implications were considered heretic and to have threatened the whole 
‘edifice of physics’ with his “purely theoretical and non-empirical claims”, 
shattering confidence in what counts as ‘real’ (Sigmund, 2017, pp. 48-49, 
emphasis added): 
Planck’s idea, which restricted the ways that material objects 
could vibrate, was the first quantum hypothesis ever, and 
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although it was surprising and hard to reconcile with previous 
laws, it did not seem profoundly threatening to the entire edifice 
of physics. […] But to suggest that light had a particle nature [as 
well as wave] was definitely threatening. Thanks to James Clerk 
Maxwell’s great equations, published in the mid-1860s, and 
Heinrich Hertz’s great experiments roughly twenty years later 
(and countless other pieces of evidence), anyone who knew 
anything about light was convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that light was waves; indeed, that fact was an unshakable pillar 
on which huge amounts of the physics of the day rested. It was 
therefore a complete and radical break with virtually all of 
classical physics when Einstein proposed that light might consist 
of particles. This heresy really did threaten the entire edifice. 
Since knowledge is interdisciplinary (Chettiparamb, 2007), and since 
science itself deals with quantum dualisms that challenge our 
understandings of reality (not necessarily reality itself), shared processes 
and theories of enquiry to explain phenomena can, at least in principle, be 
explored.  
This does not amount to a ‘category mistake’, but to the humble admission 
that reality is complex and that a wide-angled approach is more likely to 
yield understanding. Whilst I agree with linguists such as Orman (2016) and 
Harris (1989), who lament the ‘scientisation of language’ and its 
‘segregation from’ rather than ‘integration with’ social behaviour, I don’t 
object in principle to interdisciplinary approaches to knowledge if these 
enhance and broaden understanding rather than narrow it by reducing it to 
finite and exclusive definitions. As signalled in my preliminary 
introduction, finite and exclusive definitions yield ‘shallow consensuses’. 
In this regard, I share the views of L. Kuhn (2008, p. 182, emphasis added) 
who argues that approaching phenomena through complexity theory is not 
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redundant because it amounts to an ‘orientation’ that affords ‘reflective and 
thoughtful engagement’ with the uncertainty of social phenomena. She 
sees: 
complexity as constituting a paradigmatic orientation, 
functioning as an intellectual successor of other previously 
favoured frameworks for explaining how novelty, order and 
evolution are present in the world. Extrapolating out from 
precise scientiﬁc and mathematical enterprises, the complexity 
sciences, or complexity theory, presents particular habits of 
thought about the nature of the organisation of the world, with 
complexity narratives and vocabularies generating alternative 
habits of explanation to those deriving from linear, objective, 
positivist accounts of the natural and social world. Complexity 
as paradigm offers evocative metaphors for making sense that are 
not bound to linearity or certainty (Kuhn, 2005). 
Gregg (2010) further accuses Applied Linguists who invoke complexity 
theory to dismantle innatist approaches to language acquisition of setting 
up a straw man. Specifically, he accuses them of misunderstanding innatists 
and of misrepresenting their claims regarding the social dimension of 
language. The innatist-social controversy (commonly referred to as the 
nature versus nurture debate) has been notably played out in Evans (2014), 
a sociolinguist who has painstakingly undermined Pinker (2000)’s innatist 
theory of ‘language as instinct’ on the grounds that it doesn’t explain 
language novelty, creativity and change, nor does it account for non-human 
language, such as the communication of bees, who are highly socialised. It 
is beyond my present scope to articulate the details of this controversy, but, 
judging by the relatively little uptake that sociolinguistic approaches to 
language acquisition have had in curricula, assessments and textbooks (in 
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EAP, for example (Hyland, 2018), it is understandable that innatists bear the 
brunt of sociolinguistic critique.  
I would further argue, in response to Gregg, (2010) that language needs to 
be explained as a complex system because a ‘narrow interpretation of 
language’ (van Lier, 2000, pp. 258-259) that reduces it to cognitive processes 
and functional models of explanation, which innatist theories tend to do, 
misses causes that may be equally relevant and efficacious in accounting for 
acquisition and development. For example, my choice of passive or active 
voice is more fruitfully explained by epistemological commitments and 
orientations than by ‘what goes on beneath my skull’.  
Finally, the charge by Mason that complexity theory is silent on ethics can 
be met by recognising that it does not have to be. This clearly doesn’t alter 
the charge per se, but it does open a space for ethics to be considered, 
which suggests that complexity theory and ethics are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, research on the ethics of affordances, which are 
integral to understanding complexity theory (van Lier, 2000), could be 
further developed (I discuss affordance in the next chapter, but not in 
relation to ethics, which is my present focus). In Sociology, Winner (1980) 
reflects on how urban design can enact, or afford, the politics of 
discrimination. He does this by offering an ideological explanation for the 
design of a bridge in a wealthy city. The bridge is not merely a point of 
transit linking one part of the city to another, i.e. it does not simply afford a 
passage. This is because it has been designed in such a way that buses are 
unable to pass under it. The social consequences of this are that poorer 
citizens, who are more likely to rely on public transport to reach the city 
centre, become excluded from social life. In this ideological sense, the 
bridge affords social exclusion. A non-complexity analysis of this might 
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ignore the ideological intentions driving the design or simply be blind to its 
unintended, unforeseen consequences. This is because a linear and 
reductive explanation of how the bridge came into being might focus only 
on mechanical or economic reasons, such as the availability of materials or 
costs.  
Unpicking whether language acquisition and development can be explained 
by complexity theory, whether language theorists in this tradition are 
setting up straw men or what areas complexity theory is silent on is beyond 
my present scope. I do, nevertheless, read these criticisms as potentially 
applicable to my own thesis which proposes a complexity approach to 
academic writing. For example, what might complexity add to existing 
theories on the sociolinguistic and ethnographic richness of writing (Barton 
& Papen, 2010; Blommaert & Horner, 2017; Scott & Lillis, 2007); or the Socio-
cognitive Genre approaches that systematise how learners process language 
(Bruce, 2008); or Multimodal and Threshold Concept analyses (Adler-
Kassner & Wardle, 2015; A. Archer & Breuer, 2015), which extend our 
horizons on what writing does; or the expanding field of Composition 
Studies (Gross & Ruehl, 2016; Judd, 2003; Russell, 2002), where previous 
literacies are celebrated rather than ignored?  
What complexity theory adds, or rather, does, is provide a macro-theory 
(Jackson & Pettit, 1992), as introduced below and further developed in 
Chapter 6. 
Complexity as Macro Theory  
A complexity approach to academic writing can provide an account of why 
all these theories exist. The all-encompassing scope of such an account is 
what makes it macro. Complexity theory can act as a heuristic and as a 
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paradigmatic orientation towards academic writing that does not collapse 
the social phenomenon that is academic writing into one or other theory, or 
domain (Lillis, 2013). This is because each theory, or domain, has reason to 
exist: the text-focused structural tradition of De Saussure and Chomsky 
accounts for text-centred analyses (Hyland, 2016c, p. 4); the writer-focused 
and expressivist traditions of Elbow account for the fact that writer 
intention matters (ibid, p. 12); the reader-focused social constructivist 
traditions of Fairclough account for the fact that readers bring their own 
interpretations to a text (ibid, pp. 21-30). A complexity approach to 
academic writing can show that each approach contributes to 
understanding the whole phenomenon that writing is. This is because the 
phenomenon requires an account of: 
• the social practices enacted by a text (such as social justice, a 
commitment to the truth, creativity, diversity, argument and 
inclusion); 
• the writer’s purpose; 
• the textual modes available to achieve such a text (such as 
vocabulary, grammar, genre and image); 
• the discrete skills needed to compose the text (such as the craft of 
paragraphing, sequencing or editing).  
Each interacts with the other to allow academicness to emerge but neither 
can be reduced to the other, nor can one exist without the other. Because of 
this, as discussed in Part 1, ‘there is no universal academic discourse’ 
(Downs & Wardle, 2007), which means that social practices, modes and 
skills require negotiation, and not what Mike Rose calls ‘the myth of 
transience’. 
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Macro-theories are better-suited than micro-theories to explain social 
practices, such as writing. By foregrounding the social and transformative 
nature of writing, social practice writing theorists are drawing on 
sociologies of education (structures) and of human flourishing (agency). In 
different ways, all the following social practice theorists of writing implicitly 
assume the tenets of complexity theory in their approaches: Ivanič (1998) 
sees writing as building identities; Lillis (2013) and Paltridge et al. (2016) 
focus on the transformative and generative effects of writing within an 
Academic Literacies tradition; and Judd (2003), Pratt (2011) and Williams 
(2017) highlight the importance of agency (understood as choice) based on 
previous and present literacies, in the tradition of Composition Studies.  
However, although they draw on or imply sociological theories, several 
writing theorists avoid being explicit about where they stand in relation to 
fundamental sociological concerns. One such concern relates to structure 
and agency. This can be understood as the tension that arises from trying to 
explain the behaviour of individuals in relation to the society they live in 
and, conversely, from trying to explain the nature of society in terms of the 
individuals that make up that society. This tension can be illustrated as 
follows: do we explain a phenomenon, such as someone’s racist or 
compassionate behaviour, in terms of the society they live in (structure) or 
do we explain the phenomenon in terms of individual choices (agency)? 
Common-sensically, the answer is both, but sociologically, the answer is 
highly complex.  
According to Sawyer (2001), sociology divides thinkers into two broad 
camps: the methodological collectivists (such as M. Archer (1995); Bhaskar 
(1979, 1998), who argue that phenomena such as racism cannot be reduced 
to the individual because they are emergent phenomena; and the 
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methodological individualists (Rom Harré), who accept that social 
phenomena like racism are emergent but who also argue that these 
phenomena can be reduced to, and therefore explained by, individual 
behaviours.  
Translated into the debate about what makes a text academic, how do we 
explain the social phenomenon of ‘academicness’? Do we explain the 
academicness of a text in terms of ‘domains’ (Lillis, 2013, pp. 162-163) of 
academic discourse (i.e. the institutional and disciplinary structures that 
establish norms) or do we explain the academicness of a text in terms of the 
intentions of the writer (agency)? Specifically, do we explain the scientific 
report genre or the historical monograph, understood as exemplars of 
academicness, in terms of the discourses they belong to (structures) or do 
we explain them in terms of the intentions of who has written them 
(agency)? If Wittgenstein’s writings are academic, in the sense of enacting 
academic values and practices, are they academic in virtue of who he was 
(agency) or of how he expressed himself (structure)? If they are not 
academic, then on what basis are they not? 
Critical Realism, and academic writing as an Open System 
While textbook writers will typically ignore such tensions by foregrounding 
rules and conventions, more nuanced writing scholars tend to embrace the 
complexity by providing rich descriptions of how texts vary and of how this 
variation can be explained by and reconciled with the needs of specific 
contexts and purposes. However, few writing theorists have ventured into 
the philosophical and sociological intricacies of how one might analytically 
explain the structure-agency binary. Those who have tend to view writing 
as an open system, as I explain below. 
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Recalling Mike Rose’s plea for change in the academy and for a re-definition 
of writing (1985, p. 359), Pratt (2011) and Judd (2003) can be said to have 
developed a sociological theory of academic writing that can ‘change the 
terms of the argument’. They share the sociological concerns of Academic 
Literacy theorists, although they are less visible in the literatures on 
academic writing and certainly not referred to in EAP. They have 
contributed to South African and American literacy practices, respectively, 
where issues of multilingualism, multiculturalism and fair access to 
academia are crucial. Their focus, however, is not so much on exposing 
diversity and injustice (with which they are ultimately concerned), but on 
how institutional writing practices can change to address these. They turn 
to the Critical Realism of M. Archer (1998, 2000); Bhaskar (1989a, 1989b) 
and Collier (1994) to do this, and specifically to the concept of ‘open 
systems’, which I explain below, after a cursory overview of what critical 
realism is. 
Critical Realism is a philosophical approach to social theory that attempts 
to explain social change and novelty by avoiding overly deterministic and 
reductionist accounts of how structure and culture determine what agents 
can and cannot do. Structures include the material, institutional and social 
resources that make up our environments, including policies that 
determine the roles of gender, race, ability, inclusion and exclusion; culture 
includes the realm of ideas and is non-material; agency refers to the ability 
of humans to act freely according to their intentions (Case, 2013, p. 31). 
Critical realist philosophy is also a response to postmodern tendencies to 
conflate subjective perception and experience, including ‘discourse’, with 
reality (M. Archer, 2000, pp. 33-44), a tendency which can easily slide into 
epistemic relativism and its associated problems (Boghossian, 2006).   
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Critical realism recognises that humans are born into pre-existing historical 
structures that they did not choose and that they have no immediate 
individual control over. These pre-existing structures affect their ability to 
act on and change the world. For example, an EAP student (writer-agent) 
will find it difficult to individually act on and change the conventions 
(structure) she is being asked to follow. 
However, critical realism also posits that because the world is made up of 
and linked by a ‘stratified ontology’ – where subjective (cultural, empirical 
and transitive), objective (structural, actual and intransitive) and 
mechanical (real) layers, or strata, make up human existence – these cannot 
be reduced to each other. Instead, these provide an ‘emergent’ space 
between strata where humans have agency to change structures because 
they are ‘rooted in them’, not ‘determined by them’ (Collier, 1994, pp. 110-
111). This is because the world is made up of distinct strata: what we 
perceive (culture, the realm of ideas, subjective and transitive experiences, 
i.e. these can change); what is independent of us (material structures, 
objective and intransitive facts, i.e. these cannot change) and what is 
unobservable, namely the underlying mechanisms of the subjective and 
objective, i.e., the reality. Although unobservable, these mechanisms are 
real in the sense that “they have causal effects” (Case, 2013, p. 41).  
For critical realists, therefore, our knowledge and experience of reality - the 
subjective and objective - are not the same as reality - the mechanisms 
underlying each and which explain knowledge and experience: to conflate 
reality with our knowledge and experience of reality amounts to 
committing an ‘epistemic fallacy’ (M. Archer, 2002, p. 12):  
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Realism can never endorse the ‘epistemic fallacy’ and, in this 
connection, it must necessarily insist that how the world is has a 
regulatory effect upon what we make of it and, in turn, what it 
makes of us. These effects are independent of our full discursive 
penetration, just as gravity influenced us, and the projects we 
could entertain, long before we conceptualised it.  
According to Bhaskar, the epistemic fallacy is a legacy of Cartesian 
rationality where it is our thinking that determines what there is. It is also a 
relic of Kantian idealism whereby the categories of our mind (space and 
time) impose structures on a world that may not exist (or at least not exist 
outside of our cognitive categories). Critical realism flips this dualism by 
asking ‘what must the world be like for humans to have knowledge of it?’ 
instead of ‘what must humans be like in order for the world to be as it is?’ 
(Collier, 1994, pp. 137-168). 
Rather, reality consists of a ‘depth ontology’ composed of layers of causal 
powers (mechanisms) and emergent phenomena (such as language, justice, 
knowledge and humanity) that can be analytically isolated in order to 
account for the causal workings of each stratum. In this ‘depth ontology’, 
humans have agency and are practical, social beings with discursive 
knowledge (M. Archer, 2000, p. 162). This allows them to act on the world 
by exerting their ‘critical’, i.e. emancipatory, concerns (such as a concern for 
social justice). For example, an EAP student (agent), in conversation with a 
writing teacher who is knowledgeable about academic writing conventions 
and possibilities (that is, about both structure and culture) has choices. 
This aligns critical realism with theorists like Fairclough who are concerned 
with the deterministic powers of unjust discourses, but it also allows for the 
existence of a structural reality, such as conventions, which agents can 
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change (see Case (2013, pp. 28-63) for a concise and precise summary of 
critical realist social philosophy and of its proponents). 
Because of its focus on a stratified and emergent ‘depth ontology’, Critical 
Realism conceives the human sciences as complex open systems that can 
change, a phrase also used by applied linguists to describe language 
(Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008, pp. 31-33) and by philosophers to 
describe education (Morrison, 2008, p. 20). 
One way of understanding what is meant by an open system is to compare 
it to a closed one. Closed systems are artificially created conditions 
designed to isolate mechanisms so that they can be observed in the absence 
of putatively irrelevant causal variables: for example, if I want to know what 
causes light to refract, all I need is a source of light and a medium through 
which it can pass, such as a prism of glass jar, to show that light changes 
speed and refracts depending on the medium it passes through. I don’t 
need trees, houses, rain or anything else that co-occurs naturally when light 
refracts in the environment because these elements are not causally 
relevant to the refraction of light.  
Open systems, by contrast, are characterised by several variables which 
have varying degrees of causal relevance, including agents and structures. 
So, for example, if I want to know what poverty, a social phenomenon, is 
and what causes it, I will need a rich explanatory toolkit that is unlikely to 
involve a linear reduction to a finite set of causes. Similarly, if I want to 
know what academic writing is, also a social phenomenon, and what causes 
it, I will need more than a list of conventions to establish this. This is 
because scholarly writing is a practice affected by co-occurring, inter-
related and evolving phenomena, such as author agency (Scott, 2000; 
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Williams, 2017) and structures that are historical (Bazerman, 1988, 2015; 
Russell, 2002; Russell & Cortes, 2012), audit and policy-related (Mcculloch, 
2017) and algorithmic (Introna, 2106).  
To illustrate how Critical Realism understands open and closed systems, 
Collier asks the following questions (1994, pp. 34-35, but see also pp. 62-63; 
121; 161): 
how can experiments inform us about nature when they are very 
special processes produced by us, in which things happen 
differently from the way they do in the open systems of the 
world outside the laboratory? What if experimental results can 
only tell us what happens under experimental conditions? If 
they don’t tell us how things happen in the open systems of 
nature at all, then they lack all epistemic value and are no more 
than interesting tricks. I have heard an eminent scientist argue 
that this is just how the ancient Greeks would have regarded 
them – as telling us no more about the real tendencies of things 
than the tricks of a circus animal tell us about the real 
tendencies of its species […]. The whole purpose of experiments 
is to isolate some mechanism which normally operates alongside 
others. In its normal operation, it has effects: it makes different 
things happen from what would have happened in its absence. 
But since what happens in an open system is the effect of a 
conjunction of forces, it is not what one would have predicted 
from any one of those forces taken in isolation. 
Prescriptive accounts of what makes a text academic, such as those found in 
textbooks and IELTS exams, portray academic writing as a closed system 
because they set, and therefore limit, the range of variables that account for 
the academicness of a text, isolating the text from environmental 
distortions, such as the writer’s creativity, literacies, intentions or emotions, 
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or negotiations with tutors, supervisors, publishers and policy-makers. In 
behaving like a closed system, academic writing aligns itself to laboratory 
science which is designed to eliminate the white noise of context and 
isolate phenomena from the systems in which they naturally co-occur. 
Mcculloch (2017) and Collini (2012), for example, have shown that the 
varied writing practices and genres of academics are tendentially airbrushed 
out of audit systems, such as the Research Excellence Framework, in an 
effort to standardise what counts as ‘excellence’. Similarly, the geopolitics of 
writing, including its injustices, do not generally count as factors in 
determining academicness (Lillis & Curry, 2010b). 
The appeal of critical realism for writing studies gradually emerges because 
it requires us to start asking how, adapting Collier, textbook templates and 
cookie cutters can inform us about the nature of academic writing when 
they are very special processes produced by us, in which things happen 
differently from the way they do in the open systems of the world outside 
the classroom. 
This is why Judd (2003, p. 14) explicitly positions academic writing 
(composition studies) as an open system: 
Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism has been borrowed by such 
academic disciplines as sociology, economics and psychology. 
All of these disciplines fall under the heading human sciences as 
qualified by Bhaskar’s Possibility of Naturalism (1979). 
Composition Studies clearly qualifies as part of the human 
sciences because it operates in open systems, does not have 
access to predictive experimentation, and utilises explanatory 
justifications in its production of knowledge. 
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Pratt (2011) has similarly invoked critical realism and its focus on open 
systems to explain academic writing. She claims that an open system (2011, 
p. 18), although relatively stable, is ultimately more generative than static 
(or deterministic) because it can be changed by agents who have free will 
(2011, pp. 27-28): 
Critical realism offers an appropriate perspective from which to 
view the complex processes involved in composing [writing]. 
The critical realist philosophy represents reality as complex and 
dynamic, and inquires into the way things work – particularly 
the deep-structure causes of events and social processes […]. The 
participant focus is also favoured by critical realism, which views 
human action not as governed by behaviouristic laws, nor as a 
conditioned response to pre-determined social structures, but as 
individual agency (M. Archer 2002) with a fair amount of free 
will within any given social order. Human agency is both 
enabled and limited by the opportunities and constraints 
afforded by social structures, at the same time maintaining the 
fabric of these social structures, which are fairly stable, but 
capable of gradual change, usually by one or more of the 
complex social mechanisms which maintain these structures 
rather than as the result of individual human agency (or specific 
interest groups) per se. This means that, while learner writers 
often find themselves operating in a “given” (but not fixed or 
static) context, where academic writing is an undisputed fact of 
academic life, they are able to make efforts to empower 
themselves by gaining insight into and expertise in academic 
composing, in spite of the constraints set by academic 
requirements and other factors (e.g. lack of experience and/or 
background knowledge).  
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What both Judd and Pratt are saying is that writers are agents who can 
change the practices they engage with because these are open and 
generative social systems. 
Conclusion 
The historical and linguistic levers of academic writing index its complexity 
because of the inter-play between the structures that generate writing and 
the agencies that author it. This inter-play constitutes a relation that needs 
to be accounted for in explanations of what makes writing academic. This 
explanation cannot be reduced in a linear way to either structure or agency 
(represented in Appendix A as ‘textual environment’ and ‘writer’, 
respectively) because to do so would restrict accounts of what counts as 
academic writing: strictly structural explanations would only include 
writings that follow conventions; wholly agentic explanations would 
include anything that a writer decrees by fiat. By locating academic writing 
within complexity theory, texts can become social and critical open systems 
that are generative of novelty and change, but also bound by historical 
structures and continuity. 
The following final chapter further elucidates the notion of complexity by 
proposing four conceptual spaces in which to re-think what makes writing 
academic.  
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Chapter 6 - Academic emergence 
any general complexity social science has to get beyond micro-determined 
emergence. It has to allow for structures with causal powers and it has to address 
human agency as capable of transcending narrow rules for behaviour (Byrne & 
Callaghan, 2014, p. 56). 
Introduction 
Having positioned academic writing as a complex open system that cannot 
be explained by reducing it to its constituent parts (Chapter 5), I now 
articulate the detail of what it means for a text to be academic in the 
absence or presence of specific textual features. This brings together Part 1 
(what academic writing is in EAP) and Part 2 (why it is so) to show how else 
it could be. I propose an original model that draws on four concepts:  
Affordance Theory 
Organic Unity 
Emergence Theory 
Program Explanation 
These can show that having a prima facie resemblance to academic writing, 
as hoaxes do, does not mean being academic. They are also relevant within 
broader metaphysical debates about the ways that whole entities, or 
phenomena, such as social ones, relate to their constituent parts without 
being reduced to them. For example, they create spaces to explore the 
extent to which the academicness of a text is a function of its constituent 
parts, in a mechanistic sense, and to what extent it is not, in the complex 
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sense of academicness being a novel non-linear property that defies 
reduction, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
As shown in Part 1 and Part 2 respectively, EAP writing practices are broadly 
dualistic: skills-based approaches, which for convenience in this Chapter, I 
label SBA, foreground transferable rules and conventions; social practice 
approaches, labelled SPA, foreground transformation and ideologies. What 
I am claiming is that for a text to be ‘academic’, each approach must 
interact in optimal ways to allow socio-academic practices to emerge. I label 
these ‘SAP’. They refer to the property of ‘academicness’ introduced in 
Chapter 4.  
To do this, I have chosen a conceptual toolkit that stems from the 
Philosophy of Social Science, Art and Mind. This is because all three 
traditions seek to understand complexity (of society, of beauty, and of 
consciousness, respectively) in ways that enable me to articulate the 
academic writing dualism analytically, thus unpacking and disentangling 
complexity without conflating and collapsing parts and wholes. In this 
regard, Margaret Archer’s reasons for approaching the complexity inherent 
in structure-agency critiques are helpful because they provide a space for 
framing each part of the binary on its own terms whilst recognising their 
inter-relational cause and effect (M. Archer, 1995, pp. 165-170).  
In other words, for there to be a relation at all between parts, it must be 
possible to make independent claims about each. So, for example, to make 
sense of the Sokal and Labbé hoaxes as wholes, we need to be able to make 
claims about their form (their parts), that are independent of their whole.  
I open and close this chapter by proposing that academic writing is a whole-
part relationship which cannot be reduced to either a skill or a social 
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practice because it emerges from a relational multiply realisable base that 
integrates the capabilities, values and literacies of writers ( the Writer (SPA) 
in Appendix A) with the skills, conventions and genres of textual 
environments (The Textual Environment (SBA) in Appendix A). 
The (dis)unity of parts and wholes 
Philosopher Jerry Fodor (1974, 1997), inter alia, has articulated the debate 
about how parts and wholes relate to each other in terms that can help 
illustrate where the conceptual difficulties lie. He discusses how the special 
sciences, like psychology, relate to the physical sciences, like physics and 
chemistry, and asks how the special sciences can remain autonomous from 
the physical sciences when many reductionist physicalists persuasively 
argue that they cannot (e.g. McCauley, Churchland, and Churchland (1996). 
By ‘autonomous’, he means having independent laws and predicates that 
are not reducible to the laws and predicates of the physical sciences. He 
explains this autonomy in functional terms, as opposed to substantial ones 
because to invoke substance would require referring to physical matter, 
which would invalidate his anti-reductionism. Rather, Fodor argues that 
each science serves distinct purposes that need not be nomologically 
reduced to the other to count as ‘real’.  
This means that while pains and beliefs (psychological states), for example, 
can be described in terms of the laws and predicates of the physical 
sciences, they cannot be reduced to them because they are functionally 
distinct. The ‘disunity’ of the sciences, as Fodor calls it, consists in the fact 
that “pain states are nomologically homogenous under their functional 
description despite the physical heterogeneity of their realizers” (Fodor, 1997, 
p. 153, emphasis in original). What follows is that we feel and respond to 
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pain as a single, homogenous phenomenon, as a psychological 
phenomenon, as unity. This is in spite of the fact that it is realized, or 
generated, by a wide (multiple) range of physical and chemical phenomena 
each of which has its own rules and predicates: we do not describe and 
respond to pain by describing it chemically and physically as, for example, 
‘lactose acid is causing my muscles to contract’ but we describe and respond 
to it psychologically as ‘my leg hurts’. In this sense, each science, the 
physical one and the special (psychological) one, says something different 
and meaningful about the same phenomenon (Fodor, 1974, p. 103). 
Importantly, each is ‘real’ because it causes other events to happen: 
knowing it is lactose acid means I can make decisions about which pain 
killer to take; knowing it hurts, means I can’t work.  
This allows for macrostructural regularity, unity and stability at the 
psychological level to co-exist with what Fodor has since referred to as the 
physical ‘to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces that buzz and bloom with 
confusion at the micro-level’ (1997, pp. 160-161).  
Fodor’s mereology (namely, his account of how parts and wholes relate to 
each other) resonates with references to stratification and emergence, 
recalling a critical realist ontology where wholes (macrostructural 
regularities) can do things that parts (micro-level to-ings and fro-ings) 
cannot: a dog barks, but its cells do not (Collier, 1994, pp. 107-108). 
Academicness can be similarly understood as a macro-level phenomenon 
composed of and multiply realised by micro-level ‘buzzing and blooming 
confusions’ which we perceive as a stable whole but which is a teeming 
cacophony of disparate parts whose individual properties are 
incommensurate with the whole: knowing or not knowing that lactose or 
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any other infinite combination of chemical reactions is causing my pain is 
different to how I experience that pain; similarly, knowing or not knowing 
which skill produced my text is different to how I perceive that text.  
This opens up several scenarios including problematic ones such as the 
possibility for a hoax to be academic. This is because Fodor’s disunities 
potentially eliminate causal links between the micro and the macro: for 
example, phantom pains are perceived as real even though no limb exists to 
allow the micro-level physics to exist. Similarly, a hoax is perceived as real, 
even though one of its generative constituents, the need for a commitment 
to the truth, for example, is missing. However, in the case of academic 
writing, when links in the causal chain are broken or even non-existent, 
academicness can still emerge because of our ‘judgments’ (Smith, 1999) 
about writing practices and because of what we ‘care’ about (Dall'Alba, 
2012), such as nurturing diversity. 
So far, however, I have suggested that what makes writing ‘academic’ 
cannot be reduced to either the mechanical textual features of SBA or the 
social dimension of SPA. This is because the consequences of reducing to 
the SBA would commit us to: a) excluding scholarly work by Sousanis and 
others on the grounds that they use the ‘wrong’ modes and genres, and 
don’t have a conventional academic reader in mind; and b) to including 
hoaxes, which would count as academic because they manifest 
conventional genres. On the other hand, the consequences of reducing to 
an SPA account would make a text both academic and non-academic: 
academic because of the socio-academic practices enacted by Sokal were 
real (after all, he was being ‘critical’ and generated much academic debate 
around what counts as knowledge); non-academic, because if honesty and 
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truth are to count in what makes writing academic, then his integrity is 
certainly questionable.  
I now introduce four philosophical theories that can be used as a toolkit to 
frame how the parts relate to the whole46. By parts, I mean the writer and 
their textual environment (SPA and SBA). These parts are composed of 
individuals (WRITER) and their interactions with structures (TEXTUAL 
ENVIRONMENT). In this sense, the parts constitute a relation 
(AFFORDANCE). By whole, I mean the ACADEMICNESS that emerges 
from the AFFORDANCE (Appendix A).  
Affordance 
Since we cannot rely exclusively on either the writer’s intention or on the 
features of a text to establish whether the writing is academic or not, but 
still need both a writer and a text, we need an account of the nature of their 
interaction. The psychological, philosophical, educational and socio-
political concept of affordance can provide such an account.  
Affordances have their origins in ecological psychology and in philosophies 
of perception (Bonderup Dohn, 2009; Gibson, 1977; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
They have since become a key tenet of theories of educational technology 
(Hammond, 2010) and communication (Hutchby, 2001, 2014); of complexity 
theory, as developed in Larsen-Freeman and Cameron (2008); and are 
invoked by the literatures that frame writing as a social practice (English, 
 
46 In Chapter 4, I claimed, with reference to threshold concepts, that a shift in how EAP 
conceptualises academic writing is needed, such as the recognition ‘that when writing is 
reduced to a relatively finite set of skills it may fail to ‘encapsulate’ new socio-academic 
practices’. The four theories outlined in this chapter are examples of such shift and could 
be understood as threshold concepts of academic writing. 
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2011). They have also been explored in social theories to show that they 
embody ‘political powers’ (Winner, 1980). 
A first reading of the literatures provides a fairly straightforward account of 
what affordance means. I have tailored the original quotations below to 
writing (in square brackets) (Gibson, 1977, pp. 67-68): 
the affordance of anything [a text] is a specific combination of 
the properties of its substance [topic] and its surfaces 
[vocabulary] taken with reference to an animal [the writer]. 
The affordances of the environment [the textual environment] 
are what it offers animals [writers], what it provides or furnishes 
for good or ill [the realisation of academicness]. 
The focus on interaction as a feature of affordance is given in Greeno (1994, 
p. 338): 
In any interaction involving an agent [the writer] with some 
other system [the textual environment], conditions that enable 
that interaction include some properties of the agent 
[intentions] along with some properties of the other system 
[vocabulary] […]. The term affordance refers to whatever it is 
about the environment [the textual environment] that 
contributes to the kind of interaction that occurs. 
 
An example of this can be found in Sousanis (2015)’s Unflattening. Sousanis 
perceives several affordances in the textual environment, such as cartoons, 
which he uses to further his academic values and to harness his background 
in visual literacy. The image mode in the textual environment is perceived 
by him as academic because of his interests, scholarly knowledge and 
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abilities. The cartoon affords him an informed opportunity to advance his 
thesis, but it does not afford me that same opportunity because my 
interests, scholarly knowledge and abilities are different. 
There are several metaphysical problems with the concept of affordance. 
These can be briefly stated as relating to their ontological and 
epistemological status. Ontologically, it is not clear whether they are to be 
classified as perceptions, opportunities, capabilities, or relations (Bonderup 
Dohn, 2006). Epistemologically, this poses constraints on how we explain 
their existence and their usefulness. Educationalists such as Martin Oliver 
argue that affordances are “not reassuring for educationalists” (2005, p. 404) 
because the writer (the ‘perceiver’ of the affordance) could be mistaken by 
what they perceive in the text (the ‘environment’) and therefore the notion 
of ‘affordance’ loses its practical use as an analytical tool for understanding 
the ontology of the objects around us. Another objection that Oliver 
advances is that ‘affordance’ is not a single entity or aspect but rather a 
complex that arises from “hierarchies of simpler affordances” (2005, p. 408) 
and that, once again, this doesn’t make it a helpful educational heuristic. 
However, notwithstanding such metaphysical criticisms, the notion of 
affordance can serve as a philosophical heuristic, a place-holder, a 
metaphor or paradigmatic orientation that enables me to locate 
academicness between the writer (their intentions and capabilities, 
knowledge of the audience, context, and so on) and the textual 
environment. This allows me to discuss academicness in terms of a property 
of an interaction, not of a writer or of a text, but of their relations. It also 
allows me to side-step, and potentially resolve, the binaries that pertain to 
the intentional fallacy mentioned in Chapter 4, because what now matters 
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is neither the writer nor the text, but their interaction. This presupposes 
that both the writer and the text exist. 
Organic Unity 
This theory claims that a ‘whole’ is perceived as a unity that is independent 
of its parts. We can understand ACADEMICNESS as the ‘whole’ and the 
AFFORDANCE as the ‘parts’ (i.e. the interaction of the WRITER and the 
TEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT). The affordance allows the whole to emerge. 
According to the theory of Organic Unities, ACADEMICNESS cannot be 
reduced to the AFFORDANCE. 
In connection with the subject of reduction and emergence – discussed 
below - a more familiar notion needs unpacking. This is the notion there 
occurs in nature an important type of individual wholes (which may be 
physical, biological, psychological, or social) that are not simply ‘aggregates’ 
of independent members, but are ‘organic unities’; and such wholes are often 
characterized by the familiar dictum that they possess an organization 
which makes each of them ‘more than the sum of its parts’. Examples of 
wholes that are ‘organic’, and which allegedly also illustrate this dictum, can 
be cited from many fields of inquiry. Such alleged facts are sometimes taken 
as indications of limits to the possibility of reduction and to the scope of the 
methods of the physical sciences (Nagel, 1952, p. 17). 
The idea of organic unities might therefore be of use here47 because they 
give a further option within this discussion on how wholes can relate to 
parts without being reduced to them. For example, if Nagel is right, then 
 
47This reminds me of Gestalt theory (e.g. Köhler (1970) – in particular, the relation between 
parts and whole in perception. However, I do not develop this separate theme here.  
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using the idea of organic unities, we could limit the possibility of reduction 
from ACADEMICNESS to AFFORDANCE.  
There is an ongoing debate about the coherence of the notion of organic 
unities. However, I assume, for the sake of argument, that some 
understanding of organic unities is coherent and outline one broad 
description of these unities to ask how they might help in the discussion 
regarding academic writing.  
A number of writers have discussed ‘organic unities’ (e.g. Dancy (2003); 
Hurka (1998) G. E. Moore and Baldwin (1993). To understand these, we can 
consider a Moore inspired example regarding the consciousness of beauty 
(1993, pp. 28-29). This example is merely illustrative. That is, the notion of 
organic unities is about a way of thinking about a relationship, a conceptual 
toolkit - and doesn’t need to make reference to, for example, consciousness 
of things, nor aesthetic properties such as beauty.  
Moore thinks that the mere existence of an unobserved beautiful object is 
of little or no intrinsic value. He also thinks that consciousness is of little or 
no intrinsic value. But when we have both these states, that is, when there 
is a consciousness of the existence of a beautiful thing, we get a state of 
great value. Specifically, we get a value far exceeding the combined value of 
the nearly worthless parts. Other examples of organic wholes, according to 
Moore, include personal affection, courage and compassion (J. Allen, 2003). 
Thinking of and describing water or wind as organic unities rather than as 
reductive aggregates of H2O or flows of atmospheric pressure, respectively, 
is another way of comprehending what philosophers mean by organic 
unities.  
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Before applying this to academic writing, let’s consider two other key 
features. 
First, whatever we mean by ‘parts’ of organic unities, there need be no 
causal relationship between them. Something doesn’t get to be called an 
‘organic unity’ in virtue of the casual relationships that the parts have. 
There is no ‘causal recipe’ for creating an organic unity. This will be 
important when we think of how the AFFORDANCE (the parts) may or may 
not be related to the ACADEMICNESS (the whole). 
Second, there is no requirement that we can only understand the ‘parts’ of 
an organic unity in virtue of the unity itself. Each part can have significance 
and meaning independent from the whole just as each part is conceivable 
independently from the whole (this is what M. Archer means by ‘analytic 
dualism’).  
Organic unities can thus help in the discussion about academic writing by 
considering the relationship between ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE 
in a way which isn’t simply additive or reductive.  
For example, imagine a world in which there is ACADEMICNESS (e.g. 
argument) but in which there are none of its typically associated 
AFFORDANCE features (e.g. no hedges or modality or human writer). 
Imagine such a world having value AC. Furthermore, imagine a world 
where there are AFFORDANCE features but no ACADEMICNESS features – 
call the value of that world AF.48 
 
48Although this is harder to imagine it is conceptually possible. That is, we can imagine a 
possible world such that it isn’t the case that the AFFORDANCE features have given rise to 
the ACADEMICNESS analysis: the computer generated hoax could be an example of this. 
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My suggestion is that if we think of ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE as 
an organic unity, we can say that ACADEMICNESS + AFFORDANCE, 
considered as a whole, isn’t exhaustively understood simply in terms of 
ACADEMICNESS + AFFORDANCE. The value of AF and AC, IS the 
‘academicness’, understood as a whole, – it is not simply the value of AF 
plus the value of AC.  
Because AFFORDANCE plus AC (the whole value) is the organic unity, we 
cannot reduce ACADEMICNESS to any specific item, or combination 
thereof. If we tried, we would always have a ‘remainder’ and that remainder 
is precisely ‘academicness’. So, this anti-reductive account preserves the 
need for both AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS whilst at the same time 
favouring neither.  
Moreover, given the qualifications regarding organic unities, there need be 
no strict causal relationship between any specific parts of AFFORDANCE or 
how they relate to ACADEMICNESS. That is, ACADEMICNESS plus 
AFFORDANCE aren’t an organic unity simply in virtue of the casual 
relationships AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS have49. 
Furthermore, ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE each have significance 
and meaning independently of academic writing. Both are conceivable 
independently from the whole. For example, the Sokal hoax or an IELTS 
essay are devoid of ACADEMICNESS (the whole) because, as claimed in 
Chapter 4, they are devoid of the socio-academic practice (SAP) of integrity 
or commitment to the truth. Yet, the AFFORDANCE is there because in 
each case there is a writer and a textual environment from which the writer 
 
49Of course there remains a story to be told in virtue of which they do earn the label 
‘organic unity’. But this is beyond my present scope.  
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drew his resources. However, no ACADEMICNESS emerged. This indicates 
that AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS can be conceived of 
independently of each other. 
So, if we can motivate this approach of organic unities, then we can justify 
moving away from a predictive or mechanistic approach to academic 
writing. This is because there is no possibility of extracting a universal 
formula linked to AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS in virtue of 
‘academicness’ being an organic unity; rather than a mechanistic approach, 
we can only take the organic unity of academic writing as it is50. Consider 
this adapted quotation summing up this point (G. E. Moore & Baldwin, 
1993, p. 87): 
A chief part of [teaching academic writing] should be occupied 
in comparing the relative values of various [pieces of academic 
writing]; and the grossest errors will be committed in such 
comparison if it be assumed that whenever two things form a 
whole [ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE], the value of that 
whole [ACADEMICNESS] is merely the sum of the values of 
those two things [ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE]. 
On an Organic Unity account, Sokal’s hoax was considered academic 
because it was perceived as such by an academic community who ignored 
the affordance, namely how the writer and his textual environment 
interacted: specifically, Sokal’s intentions and values as a writer were 
overlooked. Conversely, a comic dissertation or Tractatus is unlikely to be 
perceived as an academic whole if the affordance is ignored. This is because 
 
50This ties into the phenomenological point of students describing things as ‘clicking’. 
Again, this reminds us of the Gestalt point that a perceiver sees something as a whole 
rather than via the active composition of parts. 
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the academicness, the AC value, of such a text requires an account of the 
relations between academicness and its realisers, namely the affordance 
base. In the latter case, AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS would need to 
be perceived as an aggregate and not a unity in order for the academicness 
to be explained. 
While an Organic Unities account can help us avoid recourse to a reductive 
explanation of how we come to perceive the value of a whole, it says little 
about the kinds of constraints that the affordance, i.e. the parts or realisers 
of academicness, necessitates in order to restrict what counts and does not 
count as academic. 
I now turn to the third theory which, unlike Organic Unities, allows us to 
understand the whole whilst also trying to account for its constituent parts. 
Emergence 
Emergence is a concept that can be understood in the terms outlined by 
Kim51 (2006, p. 548): 
a purely physical system, composed exclusively of bits of matter, 
when it reaches a certain degree of complexity in its structural 
organisation, can begin to exhibit genuinely novel properties not 
possessed by its simpler constituents. 
 
51 Although Kim engages actively in debates about emergence, it is not clear where he 
stands on the issue. Some suggest that for Kim, explanations of non-physical phenomena 
are entirely exhausted at the physical level (Fodor, 1997); others (Marras, 2006) seem to 
read Kim as a functional emergentist, which would align him with Fodor. The subtleties of 
this debate are far too nuanced for my present purposes so I am framing my discussion as 
an overview in order to create an introductory conceptual space.   
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Examples of emergent properties include water, pain and consciousness. 
Water, a liquid, emerges from two gases, hydrogen and oxygen. The 
psycho-physical property (Wongsriruksa, Howes, Conreen, & Miodownik, 
2012) of liquidity is not contained in the property of gas. As such, liquidity is 
a novel property that is not possessed by its gaseous constituents. Water is 
therefore said to be an emergent property. Pain can be felt regardless of 
whether it can be physically located in or reduced to the body (van Gulick, 
2001). There is no identifiable location in the body that corresponds to pain 
and pain can occur in parts of the body even when those body parts are 
missing: a common example of this is ‘phantom pains’, when patients have 
had a limb amputated yet report feeling pain in it. Pain is said to be an 
emergent property because it is novel compared to its supervenient physical 
base. Consciousness is also an emergent property (Chalmers, 1996). What it 
feels like to be me or what it means to be aware that I am in pain is not the 
same as being me or being in pain. An ‘awareness of being’ is a psychological 
(or other) state which is qualitatively and quantitatively different to the 
physical state of being. Therefore, consciousness emerges or arises from a 
physical state but cannot be located in or made to correspond to anything 
in that physical state. 
Theories of emergence are associated with the philosophies of mind and 
science (Chalmers, 1996, 2006; Hohwy & Kallestrup, 2008; Kim, 2006; 
Marras, 2006; Taylor, 2015) and of art (Eaton, 1994; Sibley, 1965). They are 
used to try and explain how physical matter, like the brain, can give rise to 
non-physical entities, like thoughts. They are also used in sociology to 
explain how complex economic social phenomena, like poverty, arise from 
the micro individual actions of agents and from macro social structures 
(Sawyer, 2001) as well as from relations between agents and social 
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structures (Emirbayer, 1997), and in economics and statistics to explain the 
difficulty of predicting the effects of individual human behaviours on 
complex social phenomena, like traffic flows and jams (P. Ball, 2004).  
According to these theories, what would make a text ‘academic’ is an 
account of how academic properties arise from non-academic properties 
without being reduced to them, but all the while still being connected. Such 
theories may offer a further conceptual space in which to think about how 
writers and their textual environments interact to allow academic wholes to 
emerge (Kim, 2006, p. 547): 
The term ‘emergence’ seems to have a special appeal for many 
people; it has an uplifting, expansive ring to it, unlike ‘reduction’ 
which sounds constrictive and overbearing. 
An early example of emergence is offered by Ablowitz (1939). Imagine we 
want to build a house. In order to do this, we need a number of bricks. We 
then need to place one brick on top of the other following an architectural 
design until the total sum of the bricks arranged according to the design 
results in a house. The analogy with SBA should be apparent: if we want to 
produce a text, we need a series of academic skills which, taken together 
within a genre, result in a piece of writing. 
However, Ablowitz also asks us whether the placing of one brick on top of 
the other can result in a ‘home’, not merely a house. His answer is that it 
cannot because a home emerges from its constituent parts whereas a house 
results from these. He refers to the house as a resultant of the sum of the 
bricks and to the home as an emergent property of the bricks. A home 
emerges from the bricks in the sense that the mere presence of bricks and 
of purposeful design cannot predict the way the final building is perceived. 
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We can now begin to make analogies with writing. SBA, understood as the 
sum of academic skills, may result in ‘writing’ but not necessarily in 
‘academic’ writing. For writing to be ‘academic’, ‘academicness’ has to 
emerge from its constituent parts, not result from them. A hoax might be an 
example of academicness resulting but not emerging.  
On the other hand, when we frame academic writing in terms of an 
AFFORDANCE, genuinely novel properties emerge from that affordance 
that could not have been predicted from its underlying constituent parts 
(the writer and the textual environment). 
Furthermore, according to Kim (2006, p. 547), for a property to be 
emergent, two conditions must be met, both of which are difficult to 
reconcile. The first is supervenience. The second is irreducibility. 
Each condition attempts to capture the need, on the one hand, for novel 
properties to be explained in terms of a constituent base (supervenience), 
and, on the other, for novel properties to be autonomous of their parts 
(irreducibility).  
(Recall Fodor’s ‘disunity of science’ and the need for each science to be 
functionally autonomous whilst being physically dependent). 
Supervenience 
Chalmers (1996), like others who are averse to making analogies between 
scientific phenomena and social phenomena, warns against the 
misapplication of emergence theory to the social sciences or humanities 
where value judgments (1996, p. 34), rather than causality, are more adept 
at explaining social events. This is because, with qualification, in the 
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sciences we establish correlations and causal chains between properties 
using the notion of supervenience (Chalmers, 1996, p. 32): 
The notion of supervenience formalizes the intuitive idea that 
one set of facts can fully determine another set of facts. The 
physical facts about the world seem to determine the biological 
facts, for instance, in that once all the physical facts about the 
world are fixed, there is no room for the biological facts to vary. 
So, for example, when we have full knowledge of the internal physical 
workings of a plant (such as gravity, chemistry, cause and effect), we can 
predict its biological behavior (growth, flowering, reproduction). In this 
sense, plants are a ‘complicated’, rather than ‘complex’, system, where 
linear and reductive explanations suffice. Chalmers explains that we can 
predict such behaviour by understanding it in terms of ‘facts supervening52 
on other facts’, namely certain biological facts (higher-level B-properties) 
supervening on certain physical facts (lower-level A-properties) (Chalmers, 
1996, p. 33): 
B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible 
situations are identical with respect to their A-properties while 
differing in their B-properties. 
In other words, to stick with the plant analogy, two flowers will be 
biologically identical as long as their physical properties are identical. That 
is to say, their biology (growth, reproduction, i.e. the effect) will not differ 
as long their physics (gravity, pollination, i.e. the cause) are the same. In 
 
52 Chalmers further distinguishes between local and global supervenience, and logical and 
natural supervenience. 
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this sense, the physics (lower-level A-properties) determine the biology 
(higher-level B-properties).  
Another example of supervenience relates to shape. Shape supervenes on 
any two objects that are identical with respect to their physical properties: 
two footballs being physically identical in respect of their diameter, 
circumference and volume of air cannot but be round (Chalmers, 1996). 
While the notion of supervenience seems intuitive for physical and 
biological properties it becomes less so as we shift along the continuum 
towards what Fodor (1974, 1997) calls the ‘special sciences’, namely those 
domains of enquiry that include physical phenomena but are mainly 
concerned with the effects that such phenomena generate: for example, 
biochemistry moves beyond physical descriptions of matter to describe 
processes and life (vitalism) and this, in turn, calls for neurological 
explanations which then become predominantly focused on synaptic 
connections and processes to then form the supervenient (physical) base 
that explains psychology (special science).  
However, psychology is a behavioural science that requires external 
observations of social and verbal interactions as much as it requires internal 
physical observations of its explananda: we know somebody is in pain by 
observing their behavior, e.g. wincing, as well as by the physical evidence of 
a cut. By arguing that we cannot reduce the special sciences to the physical 
sciences - because each science deploys predicates that refer to and describe 
novel phenomena that ‘have things to say’ independently of each other53 – 
 
53 For example, ‘I feel a sharp pain in my leg’ (psychological predicate/claim) means 
something different to ‘there are C-fibres firing in my calf muscle’ (physical 
predicate/claim). 
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Fodor highlights the inherent difficulty (and futility?) of explaining in what 
sense properties supervene when the physical supervenient base is located 
further and further away from the non-physical phenomena that emerge. 
As we move even further along the spectrum and into the domains of the 
social sciences, where we find sociology and academic writing, the difficulty 
is magnified because we are yet further removed from any supervenient 
physical base54, and, indeed, the very need for a supervenient physical base 
may not even be relevant, as an Organic Unity account might suggest, 
because it allows us to conceive of ACADEMICNESS (the whole, emergent 
property) without AFFORDANCE (the parts, or base from which the whole 
emerges).  
For example, what higher and lower-level properties might be relevant in 
explaining economic poverty or academic argument? To illustrate the 
difficulty of establishing what properties might be relevant in explaining 
non-physical phenomena, Chalmers uses the example of making value 
judgements. He claims that ‘value’ does not supervene locally on anything 
physical. Two physically identical pictures of the Mona Lisa – one real and 
one fake - would not be identical in value because value judgments depend 
on social and historical factors, not physical ones (Chalmers, 1996, p. 34): 
An exact physical replica of the Mona Lisa is not worth as much 
as the Mona Lisa. In general, local supervenience of a property 
on the physical fails if that property is somehow context-
dependent – that is, if an object’s possession of that property 
depends not only on the object’s physical constitution but also 
on its environment and its history. The Mona Lisa is more 
 
54 For example, from neurolinguistics to linguistics (speech, vocabulary, grammar, syntax, 
language), discourse, communication, academic writing, society? 
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valuable than its replica because of a difference in their 
historical context: the Mona Lisa was painted by Leonardo, 
whereas the replica was not. 
The difficulty with fixing a stable base from which higher-level properties 
can emerge, is further captured by Eaton (1994, p. 389), who, in her 
argument that aesthetic properties are non-supervenient, claims that 
aesthetic properties need a relational base that includes contextual ‘facts’ 
such as when a painting was created and who is judging it: 
The intuition behind supervenience is that when all base 
properties remain stable, the supervening properties must 
remain stable. All aesthetic attributions must remain stable if 
the underlying non-aesthetic attributions remain stable. But if 
relational truths (“made in the sixteenth century” or “seen by 
Jane,” for instance) are included in the base, the test for 
supervenience breaks down – and we are no longer in the 
possession of a helpful tool. 
Despite the evident difficulty, and possible futility, of trying to explain how 
higher-level social or aesthetic properties supervene on lower-level 
properties, EAP academic writing instruction and assessment practices 
seem to assume that this is possible, as we saw in Part 1. This is because 
textbooks, classroom instruction and assessment criteria prescribe a fixed 
and finite set of skills (SBA) - a supervenient base - claiming that these lead 
to the creation of, or conditions for judging, an academic text. In reality, the 
range of relations and variables of this lower-level base make it too unstable 
to act as a ‘helpful tool’, as Eaton laments. Perhaps a supervenient base is 
not needed after all, but if it is not, then how do we know which criteria 
and skills to draw on in order to write an academic text? And if it is needed, 
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then what sort of lower-level realisers do we need to ensure that 
academicness emerges? 
Irreducibility 
Kim’s requirement that a theory of emergence necessitates an account of 
how higher-level properties supervene on lower level ones places a huge 
burden on the explanatory usefulness of emergence theory for social 
phenomena, like academic writing. This is because supervenience seems to 
simultaneously demand that higher-level phenomena be explained by the 
lower-level ones, as in the physical sciences, but not be reduced to them, as 
in the social sciences and aesthetics. 
The incompatibility between supervenience, which seems to conceptually 
assume reduction, and irreducibility, which conceptually assumes non-
reduction, has led some philosophers to claim that “[a]n emergent property 
is not necessitated by the features, laws and combinations of the parts (it 
does not supervene from its base)” (Van Gulick in Kim: 549), which might 
explain the lure of side-stepping all physicalist endeavours that collapse the 
novel emergent property into physical terms, such as the requirement to 
have a supervenient base.  
Fodor’s functionalism is one way of avoiding such reductive physicalism 
because it simply eliminates physical explanations, replacing them instead 
with functional ones: i.e. pain is both physical (‘c-fibres firing’) and 
functional (‘it hurts, I can’t work’) just as writing might be (it is physically 
composed of vocabulary and grammar and functionally aimed at social 
justice).  
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Weak and strong emergence 
A third way of understanding emergence may might lie in the distinction 
between a weak and a strong form of emergence, the former allowing for 
supervenience, the latter not. The stronger form may, arguably, avoid the 
strict requirement for a supervenient base and for irreducibility 
Chalmers initially excluded value judgments and socio-economic 
phenomena from explanations requiring supervenience and emergence 
because he was mainly concerned with establishing the phenomenon of 
consciousness as a form of strong emergence that cannot be predicted from 
its physical supervenient base (Chalmers, 1996, p. 49). However, he later 
conceded that socio-economic phenomena can be explained by weak 
emergence (Chalmers, 2006, p. 250). This move is compatible with 
emergence theories that have been used to explain social phenomena, as 
shown by Sawyer (2001, p. 553): 
Although philosophical arguments about emergence and 
reducibility have focused on the mind-brain relation, they can 
be generalised to apply to any hierarchically ordered set of 
properties. 
I explain the difference between strong and weak emergence below and 
then relate it to my model. 
The most fitting theory of emergence, for my illustrative purposes, is one 
that has been referred to as ‘weak emergence’ (Bedau, 1997; Chalmers, 
2006). This way of describing emergence can help us to explain the fact that 
academic writing requires a (supervenient) base from which it can be 
assessed (e.g. in terms of nominalised forms and passive/active agency), but 
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to which it cannot be reduced and from which ‘academicness’ cannot be 
predicted.  
Weak emergence can be understood as follows: certain phenomena, such as 
crowd behavior (in sociology) or mental states such as pain (in psychology), 
are novel and real. They are novel because they are different to their 
constituent parts and they are real because they cause other phenomena to 
happen (such as new mental states, e.g. fear). However, whilst their identity 
cannot be reduced to a physical base55 (because of Fodor’s disunity of 
science), it can still emerge from it in the sense that it is then possible to 
deduce the existence of lower-level phenomena from the higher-level ones 
because deduction is not the same as reduction.  
Weak emergence occurs when a new phenomenon arises from a lower-level 
phenomenon in such a way that we would not have expected the new 
phenomenon to occur by simply looking at the phenomenon which gave 
rise to it in the first place. However, once the new phenomenon has 
emerged, it is possible to deduce its originating lower-level phenomena. For 
example, H2O (liquid) is weakly emergent because it is genuinely novel 
compared to its constituent properties (gases). However, we can deduce its 
constituent properties by applying the laws of physics and chemistry 
without reducing water to mere molecules and motion (Chalmers, 2006, p. 
246, emphasis added): 
by showing how a simple starting point can have unexpected 
consequences, the existence of weakly emergent phenomena can 
be seen as showing that an ultimately physicalist picture of the 
 
55Something that would be worth further research – but is beyond the scope of the thesis - 
is using the ‘emergence’ theory as a way of conceptualizing organic unities. 
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world need not be overly reductionist, but rather can 
accommodate all sorts of unexpected richness at higher levels, as 
long as explanations are given at the appropriate level. 
A weakly emergent account allows us to give ‘explanations at the 
appropriate level’ by erasing the conflation that seems to be a source of 
confusion, namely that reduction and deduction are synonymous. The 
former is a physical process that collapses one state into another; the latter 
is a form of reasoning that is substantive, it generates new propositions and 
predicates. A cooking analogy might explain this distinction. By reducing a 
tomato sauce to a paste, I am enacting a physico-chemical transformation 
that allows me to make the following claim: my tomato sauce is composed 
of fibre, citric acid, and so on. By deducing its basic composition, I am 
engaged in a process of observation and analysis of its current liquid state, 
taste and colour to explain what might have given rise to its ‘sauciness’, 
namely an emergent property that has qualities that its lower-level base 
does not possess, qualities such as ‘deliciousness’ and ‘comforting 
umaminess’. Reduction and deduction explain the same phenomenon but 
at a level that is ‘appropriate’ to my needs. 
With reference to academic writing, I can reduce any text to discrete lower-
level grammatical, lexical, eidetic or haptic units by physically 
deconstructing the text. In turn, I can make claims about each of these 
properties. For example, I can say the use of the passive is objective. 
However, deducing these lower-level properties from the higher level does 
not mean I can make the same claims about the text as a whole. In this 
sense, the whole is ontologically distinct from its parts meaning that it 
cannot be reduced to them. However, the parts can be deduced from the 
whole. In each case, the parts exist and are related to the whole. In this 
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sense, the parts form a supervenient base and can explain the existence of 
the whole. However, the whole cannot be reduced to its parts. 
This can be illustrated by recalling the sociology article by Gillies et al. 
(2016) in Chapter 2, which received a scholarship award for challenging 
social perceptions about how mothers raised their children. It displayed 
many of the conventional academic features reified by EAP, such as the use 
of the passive to convey scientific objectivity at the lower supervenient 
level, but at the higher emergent level, it conveyed a powerful subjective 
stance described by the judges as a “hell of a ride” and a “stern warning” 
that was characteristic of the whole, not of the parts. 
However, despite the uplifting allure of emergence, deep divisions exist in 
how it is understood, which is one reason why it is inconsistently applied 
(Sawyer, 2001). For example, according to Kim (2006, p. 551), you cannot 
explain the whole by deducing it from its constituent microstructure 
because deduction entails reduction. 
The physicalist objections to emergence (which posit that all higher-level 
properties can be reduced to the micro-level) could be side-stepped by 
appeal to a functionalist explanation of how parts and wholes relate. This 
does away with the reference to physics. For example, although we can 
claim that ‘water is refreshing’ (the whole), we can’t claim that ‘hydrogen 
and oxygen are refreshing’, even though the phenomenon we are referring 
to is the same. This is because ‘water’ (i.e. what we mean by ‘water’ as 
opposed to what we mean by ‘H2O’ Chalmers (1996, p. 69) manifests novel 
properties that can be described functionally, i.e. ‘water is for drinking’. 
Although it is physically reducible to the atomic bonding of hydrogen and 
oxygen, it is not functionally so. 
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In terms of academic writing, this would allow us to make separate 
meaningful claims about a text such as Unflattening (2015). Academicness is 
achieved because the whole is academic, not because the author used a 
drawing of his dog (2015, p. 40), for example. This is because as a whole, the 
dissertation can be said to have a function that is different to the function 
of its parts. As a whole, the dissertation is academic because it functions as 
an argument about visual literacies. When reduced to its parts, however, 
the use of an image can be dismissed as non-academic. 
Similarly, with reference to Chalmer’s own academic writing style, we could 
say that The Conscious Mind is academic as a whole, but his frequent use of 
bracketed paragraphs, clipped prose and inclusion of Calvin and Hobbes 
cartoons, is not academic in and of itself. 
Implications of the theory of emergence for academic writing 
Leaving aside the technicalities of different types of emergence, what is of 
interest in this debate is that novel properties, such as criticality 
(ACADEMICNESS), can arise from a physical supervenient base (an 
AFFORDANCE) that is, in turn, composed of multiply realisable and wildly 
disjunctive components (Sawyer, 2001, p. 556). Multiple-realisabability 
indexes the multiple ways that a phenomenon can be realised: an emergent 
state, such as a mental state, can be realised by several physical states. 
These physical states may also be ‘wildly disjunctive’, meaning that ‘the 
supervenient base of a higher-level property is made up of an unrelated 
combination of concepts and items’ (ibid). So, a WRITER and a TEXTUAL 
ENVIRONMENT can combine in multiple and potentially unpredictable 
ways. This is why academic writing can be novel and diverse, whilst 
drawing on a relatively finite supervenient base. 
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Academic writing in EAP, as we have seen, tends to be understood in terms 
of discrete skills. This has involved, for example, claiming that personal 
forms are inappropriate ‘constituent parts’ in the creation of an ‘academic’ 
whole (Bailey, 2006). By framing ‘academicness’ as an emergent property we 
go some way to explaining why the Watson and Crick article is academic 
despite its constituent parts (e.g. its personal pronouns) not being classified 
as such: it is ‘academic’ not because its ‘academicness’ can be reduced to its 
constituent properties (i.e. we cannot predict its academicness from the use 
of its personal pronouns), but because its constituent textual properties 
interact with the relevant dispositions of the writer (knowledge, abilities, 
understanding of the reader) which allow the academicness to emerge.  
By contrast, the Springer (Antkare) fake papers would be an example of 
‘academicness’ not emerging, despite their constituent textual parts being 
‘academic’, in a strictly skills-based EAP sense. These fakes are not 
‘academic’ because the properties of the constituent parts, however 
academic these may be in an SBA sense, are not interacting with any 
relevant writer dispositions thus preventing the novel property of 
‘academicness’ from emerging. 
Program Explanation 
This theory turns my model on its head in the sense that it attempts to 
explain how the whole (ACADEMICNESS) can help us to understand the 
parts (AFFORDANCE) by ‘programming’ them to become academic. For 
example, the use of the passive (a lower-level supervenient property) is not 
academic, in and of itself. However, the academic need to avoid agency is 
an academic need and this need programmes the grammatical base to serve 
an agency-avoiding function.  
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The theory of Program Explanation allows for ACADEMICNESS to 
academically program the AFFORDANCE. According to this theory, which 
is macro-structural (Jackson & Pettit, 1992, pp. 98-99), what would make a 
text ‘academic’ is the identification of relevant causes in the ongoing social 
practices of the academy, such as a need to be objective or the need to 
make an original contribution to knowledge or the need to engage with a 
wider public. Program explanation is used in social theory to advance the 
idea that downward causation is possible. It posits that higher-level entities 
have causal powers “that influence the behavior and even the constitution 
of the entities of which they are composed” (Little, 2018a).  
Specifically, in my model, PROGRAM EXPLANATION is a non-
epiphenomenal account (i.e., downward causation, from the macro to the 
micro, is possible) of how ACADEMICNESS – once it has emerged and is 
‘out there in the world’, so to speak (for example the texts of Sousanis, 
Carson, Piper, Wittgenstein and Galileo) can cause the AFFORDANCE to 
generate academic properties. 
Jackson and Pettit (1990) have mobilised Program Explanation to conclude 
that something can be causally relevant without being causally efficacious.  
To understand this, we first need to consider their conditions under which 
a property is not causally efficacious: 
A property F is not causally efficacious in the production of an effect ‘e’ if 
the following sub-conditions are fulfilled (1990, p. 108, emphasis added): 
(i) there is a family of distinct properties G1,..,Gn such that F is 
efficacious in the production of e only if some Gi (1≤ i ≤ n) is 
efficacious in its production 
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(ii) the F-instance and the G-instance are not sequential causal 
factors 
(iii) the F-instance and the G-instance are not co-ordinate causal 
factors.  
This is rather abstract and it is unclear what the issue is, so let’s consider 
one of their examples. Suppose that we boil water in a closed glass 
container and the container cracks. If we were asked why the container 
cracked we would likely say that the high temperature caused the cracking. 
However, this sort of answer is actually hard to justify given what we have 
just said56. 
Why did it crack? First answer: because of the temperature of the water. 
Second answer, in simplified form: because of the momentum of such and 
such a molecule (group of molecules) in striking such and such a molecular 
bond in the container surface. The temperature property was efficacious 
only if the momentum property was efficacious: hence 3(i). But the 
temperature of the water – an aggregate statistic – did not help to produce 
the momentum of the molecules in the way in which it, if efficacious, 
helped to produce the cracking: hence 3(ii). And neither did the 
temperature combined with the momentum help in the same sense to 
produce the cracking: one could have predicted the cracking just from full 
information about the molecule and the relevant laws (1990, p. 110, emphasis 
added). 
So what? Well, if we assume that the only way in which a property can be 
causally relevant to an effect is by being causally efficacious in its 
 
56 Jackson and Pettit (1990, p. 8) set out the conditions under which a property is/is not 
causally efficacious. I have omitted this due to space. 
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production, we get the conclusion that because the temperature of the 
water is not causally efficacious in the cracking of the glass (that was the job 
of the momentum, etc.) it is not causally relevant to the cracking of the 
glass. Of course, that is a very odd conclusion precisely because of where we 
started. Namely, it seems correct and perfectly natural to say that it was the 
high temperature that caused the glass to crack.  
Jackson and Pettit’s response to this worry about the cracking beaker is to 
say that the temperature is relevant in the causal explanation even though 
the temperature isn’t causally efficacious. How? Well because they claim 
the temperature programs for the existence of distinct, lower-level 
properties that are causally efficacious. As they say (1990, p. 114, emphasis 
added): 
Although not efficacious itself, the temperature property was 
such that its realization ensured that there was an efficacious 
property in the offing: the property, we may presume, involving 
such and such molecules. The realization of the higher order 
property did not produce the cracking in the manner of the lower 
order. But it meant that there would be a suitably efficacious 
property available, perhaps that involving such and such 
particular molecule, perhaps one involving others. So the 
temperature was causally relevant to the cracking of the glass, 
under a perfectly relevant sense of relevance, though it was not 
efficacious. It did not do any work in producing the cracking of 
the glass…but it has relevance of ensuring that there would be 
some property there to exercise the efficacy required). 
Carrying on with their example, Jackson and Pettit say program explanation 
is useful because it gives more information than one would get simply by 
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citing underlying mechanisms. Because it could be true that (1990, pp. 116-
117): 
The momentum of the water molecule can crack a container 
without the water’s being at boiling temperature. Thus, to know 
that the temperature is explanatory, programming for the result 
in question, it has to have information which is not available for 
the [other] explanations. 
Program Explanation, academicness and affordance 
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation might help in working out the 
relationship between ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE. This is because 
ACADEMICNESS is causally relevant in explaining why someone takes 
some work to be ‘academic’. However, ACADEMICNESS itself isn’t causally 
efficacious in this explanation. Rather, its realization ensures that there is a 
set of efficacious properties in the offing: the properties described by the 
AFFORDANCE.  
For example, I read an essay and form the belief that this is an academic 
piece of work. Is there any explanation of the belief in terms of 
ACADEMICNESS? Yes. However, it is not that ACADEMICNESS is 
efficacious in causing the belief that it is academic: rather, it is that 
ACADEMICNESS is causally relevant to my forming that belief.  
That is to say - and taken from the AFFORDANCE this time - the 
AFFORDANCE model will highlight many parts (sentence structure, use of 
pronouns, writer’s intention): what the ACADEMICNESS does is program 
for a certain way of understanding the AFFORDANCE. The atomisation 
associated with the AFFORDANCE is important because it codifies what is 
causally efficacious, whilst the holistic approach of ACADEMICNESS is 
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important because it allows us to make sense of which causally efficacious 
properties are causally relevant in thinking about what is academic. 
So, to use the phrasing of Jackson and Pettit above, to know that 
ACADEMICNESS is explanatory relevant, i.e. programming for the 
academicness of the AFFORDANCE, is to have information which is not 
available from simply thinking about the AFFORDANCE alone. 
Apart from trying to make sense of the relation between ACADEMICNESS 
and AFFORDANCE, there are other reasons why Program Explanation 
might be important in the area of academic writing. One reason relates to 
the realism/anti-realism debate. There is a general question regarding 
whether showing that one set of properties depends on another is in some 
way undermining the reality of the ‘higher-level’ properties. For example, 
we might think that by showing that ‘wrongness’ is in some sense 
dependent on pain, we undermine the claim that ‘wrongness’ is a real 
property.  
However, what program explanation might allow us to do is to say that 
wrongness is real even though moral properties aren’t causally efficacious in 
the way that the underlying property(s) - such as pain - are57. 
This discussion about program explanation might then have some 
ontological consequences in the debate about academic writing. That is, we 
might be able to say that ACADEMICNESS is real. It is real because it has a 
relevant causal role in the explanation of why we form the belief that 
certain things are academic. However, that doesn’t commit us to saying that 
 
57 See Miller (2003) for an excellent discussion of this in ethics. 
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ACADEMICNESS is causally efficacious in a way which would be more 
suitable to talk about in relation to the AFFORDANCE. 
A related and exciting implication then is one of peace resolution. If 
‘explanation’ can be disambiguated into (i), explanation in terms of causal 
relevance; and (ii), explanation in terms of causal efficaciousness, then 
there is space for both the AFFORDANCE and ACADEMICNESS in 
explaining what makes a text academic. In fact, program explanation might 
go further. For this approach suggests that far from being in conflict, 
ACADEMICNESS and AFFORDANCE are dependent on one another in 
discussions about the academicness of a piece of work. The causal 
explanation in terms of causal efficacy (AFFORDANCE) requires a story in 
terms of causal relevance (ACADEMICNESS).  
Reflections 
Firstly, how might these three theories relate to one another? For example, 
perhaps we can understand the notion of ‘organic’ unity by using emergence 
as a way of explaining how the whole can be greater than its parts. 
Secondly, how does program explanation add an extra layer of explanation, 
one which is not exhausted by a fine-grained account at the AFFORDANCE 
level? Or, in terms of emergence, how can a work’s constituent textual 
properties interact with the relevant writer dispositions towards audience, 
purpose, and criticality thus allowing the academicness to emerge 
Thirdly, there are the broader implications that each theory has, both 
practically and theoretically. If an organic unity approach leads to a 
rejection of a codification of ‘academicness’ and to a more ‘particularist’ 
approach, then it is an interesting question how this might be played out 
within the political and assessment-driven academic context. One such 
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critical question would relate to the effectiveness of analytic test scoring, 
which prevails in EAP. Analytic scoring assumes that the whole can be 
deconstructed into its constituent parts and that the totality of parts 
constructs an academic whole (Davies, 2008; Weigle, 2002). However, this 
process of deconstruction/construction does not, as we have seen, 
guarantee the ‘academicness’ of either the parts (cf. Watson and Crick) or 
the whole (cf. computer hoaxes). 
More generally, the lack of predictability from a constituent base of textual 
properties (skills), to emergent, holistic, and social academic properties,- 
leaves open the possibility, in theory, for any, or all or no particular lower-
level textual property to bring about a higher-level academic property. This, 
in turn, paves the way for exploring the sense in which diverse forms of 
writing, such as blogs and multimodal texts, can be classified as ‘academic’. 
Conclusion 
Set in the context of EAP’s dualistic approach to writing, I suggested that a 
fruitful way of understanding the relationship between SBA (skills-based 
approach) and SPA (social practice approach) was to borrow four theories 
from the philosophy of mind, aesthetics and sociology: affordance, organic 
unities, emergence and program explanation. This allows me to move 
towards a discourse of academic writing that is less mechanistic and linear, 
framing it instead as a non-reductive part-whole emergent relationship, a 
conceptual description that could have implications for classroom 
discourses and resources on academic writing. 
This framing leads to critical questions about the extent to which the whole 
depends on - or can be predicted from - the parts. I proposed that for a text 
to be considered academic, there needs to be open interaction between the 
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Writer (SPA) and the Textual Environment (SBA). This constitutes an 
Affordance, whereby the Writer interacts with the Textual Environment by 
perceiving and judging what is available for the creation of a Text. The 
affordance constitutes a Multiply Realisable supervenient base from which 
the academic properties of the text Emerge. The supervenient base becomes 
causally efficacious in making a text academic because adopting a weak 
form of emergence allows me to claim that emergent properties can be 
rooted in a cause rather than reduced to one. Moreover, the multiply 
realisable nature of the supervenient base makes it difficult to trace token-
token correlations between cause and effect allowing instead for infinite 
combinations of SBA and SPA variables to interact and ensure novelty can 
emerge. In turn, once the Academicness (SAP) of a text has emerged, it 
becomes causally relevant in Programming the supervenient base to be 
causally efficacious in achieving Academicness. By being causally relevant, 
Academicness forms an Organic Unity that cannot be reduced to the 
Affordance. 
This weakly emergent and multiply realisable conceptualization of 
academic writing allows us to account for the ‘academicness’ of new and 
emergent forms of writing, such as comics, weblogs, multimodality and 
multilingualism, because it broadens the pool of variables and interactions 
thereof in the supervenient base.  
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Explaining the research 
What’s next? 
Summary 
Set in the context of twenty first century neo-liberal educational practices 
and commodification, I have argued that what makes writing academic are 
its emerging socio-academic practices, not the unhinged will of the writer 
or the decontextualized rules and surface features of the textual 
environment. Having framed academic writing in the field of EAP, which is 
influential in shaping academic writing discourses, I endorsed the view that 
academic writing is a social practice that has a history and is therefore 
contingent. This contingency implies that it can be different to how it is 
conventionally portrayed by EAP and prevailing study skill approaches.  
Moreover, its contingency suggests that it can evolve to reflect changing 
academic needs and to disrupt ossified institutional constraints and 
imperatives (structure). This would make more space for writer capabilities 
(agency), such as the need for creativity (Besley & Peters, 2013), imagination 
(Barnett, 2013), diversity (Thesen & Cooper, 2013) and a future generation of 
thinkers (Bengtsen & Barnett, 2018). For such changes and disruptions to be 
possible, academic writing needs to embody a wide range of threshold 
concepts (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015; Kiley & Wisker, 2009) that extend 
its narrow framing as an autonomous and transferable skill (Mike Rose, 
1985; Street, 1984) to embrace a broader conceptualisation of academic 
writing that includes images and diverse literacies (such as rap and 
performance poetry). 
To achieve this, I have re-conceptualised academic writing by arguing 
against reductive skills-based approaches in favour of rethinking it as an 
open system in which the academicness of a text emerges as a socio-
academic practice within a non-linear, non-reductive complex system. This 
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forms a whole which can be described as an organic unity. This shift in 
thinking could be considered as a new threshold concept which is 
troublesome because it disrupts previous conceptualisations of writing in 
EAP. 
The philosophical and sociological tradition of critical realism allowed me 
to make this shift (Collier, 1994; Judd, 2003; Pratt, 2011). For a text to be 
considered academic, there needs to be open interaction between the writer 
and the textual environment. This constitutes an affordance (Bonderup 
Dohn, 2006; Gibson, 1977), whereby the writer interacts with the textual 
environment by perceiving and judging what is available for the creation of 
a text. The affordance constitutes a multiply realisable supervenient base 
from which the academic properties of the text emerge and is causally 
efficacious in making a text academic. In turn, once the academicness of a 
text has emerged, it becomes causally relevant in programming the 
supervenient base to be causally efficacious in achieving academicness. By 
being causally relevant, academicness forms an organic unity that cannot be 
reduced to the affordance. I have drawn on the philosophies of mind 
(Chalmers, 1996, 2006; Fodor, 1974, 1997; Hohwy & Kallestrup, 2008; 
Jackson & Pettit, 1990, 1992) and social science (Sawyer, 2001; Winch, 1990) 
to argue for this emergence. 
This re-conceptualisation ensures that hoaxes and IELTS essays cannot be 
considered academic. They are not academic because their perceived 
academicness is the result of a crude reduction of the text to its surface 
forms and does not take into account writer integrity or the properties of 
the textual environment with which the writer knowledgeably interacts. By 
contrast, open systems - which characterise complex systems whereby 
social phenomena like academic writing become non-reductive - are 
emergent, and the emergence of academicness can only occur when the 
writer interacts appropriately with their textual environment. This 
appropriateness includes an optimal interaction between writer intentions 
(including integrity) and capabilities (including background literacies). 
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With such optimal interaction, forms of writing that rely on visual thinking 
(Arnheim, 1969) and multimodal argumentation (Blair, 2008; Gilbert, 1994; 
Tarnay, 2002) can be just as academic as a traditional essay. 
Contribution 
The contribution of my research can be summarised as threefold and is 
further explained below:  
• It provides a macro theory of academic writing that accounts for 
diversity and change in writing 
• It lays the foundations for a future pedagogy of EAP writing 
• It begins to clarify writing terminology and concepts that have 
become tired  
By framing academic writing as a complex open system where change can 
occur, I have contributed to existent theories of writing by offering a macro 
generative account that offers conceptual and discursive tools to overcome 
encapsulation (Bazerman, 2015) and fraudulent (Shanahan, 2015) writing 
practices. Encapsulation is the metaphor used by Bazerman to describe how 
writing becomes trapped in its forms because of institutional audit systems 
that demand standardisation. Fraudulence is Shanahan’s way of indexing 
how scientific texts inflate findings over methods because this increases the 
chances of publication. A complex macro theory of writing exposes the 
multiply-realisable ways in which writers can interact with their 
environments to generate academic texts that do not have to be 
encapsulated or fraudulent (they can be, of course, but they do not have to 
be – this is the point, i.e. that we have choices and are not wholly 
determined by structure). 
The creativity that also emerges within an open system, namely an account 
of how diversity in academic writings can exist as the norm, not the 
exception, potentially lays the foundation for a future pedagogy whereby 
teachers and learners can engage in discussions about writing (Downs & 
Wardle, 2007) rather than simply prescribe rules and follow instructions. 
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This would open up avenues of possibility, creativity and confidence in the 
classroom and for how knowledge and research are re-presented in the 
twenty-first century global academy (Barnett, 2012).  
What this research has further contributed is an initial step towards 
clarifying some of the tired and unquestioned terminology associated with 
academic writing. For example, its labelling writing as ‘linear’ closes down 
opportunities to re-think what the concept of linearity means. I have 
proposed that when it means ‘sequential’ and ‘orderly’, as I suggested in 
Chapter 4, it narrows opportunities for it to evolve. This is because linearity 
is a feature of closed systems that are ‘complicated’, not ‘complex’ (Chapter 
5). In closed systems, we can predict the effects of causes mechanically. Is 
this what we want academic writing to be? A complicated mechanical 
system where the effect of a passive is always objectivity? If so, we 
perpetuate the transparency tropes berated by Bennett (2015). In a complex 
system, however, non-linearity means that ‘the effects are disproportionate 
to its causes’, meaning that small changes in its forms generate huge 
variation in its impact (for example, small changes in personal pronouns 
generate disproportionate effects at the level of epistemological and 
ontological stance).  
Implications and future research 
Several implications emerge from my thinking. These can be broadly 
classified as follows and all potentially form the basis for future research: 
• Philosophical 
• Educational 
• Ideological 
Philosophically, by framing academic writing as an open system, there is 
potential to fine-tune some emerging but undeveloped notions. For 
example, within critical realism and the philosophy of social phenomena, 
what might be the relationship between the stratification of emergent social 
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properties and the multiple-realisability needed for a theory of weak 
emergence, as discussed in the literatures on the philosophy of mind? What 
might constitute each stratum in the academic writing system and what 
would the relationship between strata be: causal or rooted? If causal, then 
how can determinism be meaningfully avoided? If rooted, then rooted to 
what? What new language and concepts might we need to describe how 
parts relate to wholes?  
One possible route to a new explanatory discourse that avoids recourse to 
deterministic causes might be to root academicness in the notion of 
practical wisdom and judgment (Smith, 1999), care (Dall'Alba, 2012) and 
capabilities (Case, 2013, pp. 10-11) where what determines the academicness 
of our writing are our human values, not textual forms. This might allow us 
to counter the trend of deferring authorship of our knowledge and  
academic writing to systems of artificial intelligence (Collins, 2019). 
A second philosophical implication, and further building on the reflections 
concluding Chapter 6, is whether there is an incompatibility between the 
notion of Organic Unity as a perception that is more than the sum of its 
parts and the dis-Unity of science that I appealed to with reference to Fodor 
in order to explain emergence.  
Thirdly, if Organic Unities are possible, then does this entail that hoaxes are 
academic? They ought to be, because on an Organic Unity account, they 
would be perceived as academic wholes that do not necessitate an account 
of how that unity is constituted. This, however, might undermine the thesis 
that a supervenient base is needed for the emergence of SAPs. 
Educationally, my research has the potential to shift prescriptive and 
deterministic approaches to the teaching of writing away from training and 
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towards educating, in the sense proposed by John Dewey. This would 
ensure teachers and learners were engaged in discourses about writing – its 
history, its threshold concepts, its possibilities - and provide opportunities 
for scholarship, research and continuous professional development. 
Educating about writing would ensure we were able to re-define what 
writing means to us and for us, in the way imagined by Mike Rose (1985, p. 
359), namely as a practice that respects writer agency and structural 
affordances, such as the possibility of negotiating choices with teachers and 
supervisors. 
A further practical consequence of re-imagining academic writing as an 
open creative practice is that it may reduce the need for students to 
plagiarise and rely on ghostwriters. This is because a culture of writing that 
respects writers’ agencies and literacies is more likely to foster trust, 
communication and collaboration, rather than competition. Moreover, new 
assessment constructs could be designed to reflect these new and diverse 
forms of writing. 
Ideologically, there are several exciting implications for future research. 
Firstly, the kind of writing culture I envisage forces us to ask what kind of 
higher education we want. Do we want university students to replicate 
templates or do we want them to innovate and critique? An open writing 
culture assumes the latter. Work that is already re-imagining what 
universities are for (Besley & Peters, 2013; Collini, 2012), who they are for 
(Sperlinger et al., 2018) and where they are heading (Barnett, 2012; Bengtsen 
& Barnett, 2018) is already underway. It signals hope for re-shaping higher 
education as a creative, reflective and socially just endeavour. 
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Secondly, this further allows us to imagine a university where different ways 
of approaching knowledge are explored (Badat, 2002; Morrow, 2009) and 
included in a diverse, multicultural and post-colonial landscape (de Sousa 
Santos, 2017) that avoids epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007) and respects 
capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011; Robeyns, 2016) as part of a broader pedagogy 
of human rights. 
Limits 
I consider the main limitation of this thesis to be its glossing of the finer 
nuances that inform the huge area of research that is academic writing. In 
order to propose a macro theory, I have had to make sweeping 
generalisations about linguistics, argument and EAP, as well as cherry-pick 
historical narratives and philosophical theories, ignoring the vast amount of 
precise thinking that each disciplinary tradition embodies. I see this as part 
of the collateral damage that comes with adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach that attempts to capture ‘the big picture’. I hope the spirit of my 
interdisciplinary intentions, which was to retain a panoramic and broad 
ecological perspective, outweighs occasional superficialities. 
Final reflection 
This PhD has raised far more questions than I intended it to answer, and 
because of this, it has been both excruciatingly frustrating and addictively 
exhilarating. As pre-empted in the preliminary framing of the thesis, it has 
been explorative, rather than exploitative, which means it remains open-
ended and a site of fertile potential for future research.
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  Appendix A – Affordance Model of Academic Writing (forming an Organic Unity) 
This model represents Academicness, a socio-academic practice (SAP) of writing that forms an Open, non-Linear, non-Reductive Complex System. For a text to be considered academic, there needs to be 
open interaction between the Writer (SPA-Propositional Knowledge) and the Textual Environment (SBA-Procedural Knowledge). This constitutes an Affordance, whereby the Writer interacts with the 
Textual Environment by perceiving and judging what is available for the creation of a Text. The Affordance constitutes a Multiply Realisable supervenient base from which the academic properties of the 
text Emerge. The supervenient base is causally efficacious in making a text academic. In turn, once the Academicness (SAP) of a text has emerged, it becomes causally relevant in Programming the 
supervenient base to be causally efficacious in achieving Academicness. By being causally relevant, Academicness forms an Organic Unity that cannot be reduced to the Affordance. What emerges cannot 
always be predicted. 
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